Rethinking Japan's Climate and Energy Policies Through the Lens of Uncertainty: Some Thoughts on Factors Behind the Avoidance of Open Deliberation of Uncertainty and Future Research Agendas

This report follows up on the outcomes of the first workshop of an upcoming series of themes forming a research project aiming to reevaluate why climate change matters and what should be done in relation to the wider Japanese societal context. Under the heading “Climate Change × Uncertainty,” the first workshop examined Japan's nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle policies using tools and concepts developed overseas, such as Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty (DMDU) and Anticipatory Governance. This paper takes findings from the workshop and prior studies to examine the broader policy implications beyond those for nuclear power, and outlines several possible research themes that may assist future investigations into uncertainty.

1. Why consider uncertainty?

The obvious answer lies in the enhancement of policy flexibility against unexpected futures. When we consider the context of climate and energy policies, particularly of Japan, several other reasons come to mind:

• Acknowledging the limits of knowledge: Policy making discussions in Japan mostly center on what experts know, and what they predict. Reaffirming and examining the “unknowability” of past, present, and future socio-environmental phenomena (rather than ignoring it) may serve as a way to open up new avenues of investigation and policy dialogue.
• Relativizing expertise and redefining the role of experts: Presently, almost all recognition and discussion of climate change matters are mediated by scientific experts. This often leads to a societal divide between those who want to “leave it to the experts” and those who feel “science people can’t be trusted.” Meanwhile, uncertainty is often characterized by the unique circumstances of each field of expertise - which means it may become a vehicle for promoting interdisciplinary investigation as well as a new role of experts as “people” harboring personal reservations, concerns or intuitions (that cannot be documented scientifically but may be articulated and shared with society) based on knowledge of the field.
• Planning societal change in a conservative and democratic manner: The left-right dichotomy is losing explanatory power worldwide, particularly in issues of climate and energy. What policy planning needs (and what people want) may be “conservative change,” which is what the term originally implies. By advancing policy making capacity through DMDU or anticipatory governance methods to make trade-offs clearer, future scenarios more comprehensive, and future triggers of policy change more visible, it may be possible to overcome political division and find a common agenda for pressing matters to society.
  
  

2. How do present climate and energy policies consider uncertainty?

A review of major Japanese policy documents—such as the Ministry of the Environment's Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures, the GX Implementation Strategy, and the 7th Strategic Energy Plan—reveals an unwillingness to address uncertainty in the planning process. All plans are by and large a linear trajectory toward the 2050 net-zero target, and uncertainty is mostly acknowledged as “differing views on the speed and scale of technological development” which are to be “addressed in a flexible manner as circumstances arise.” Explicit consideration of triggers for policy revision or multiple, wide-ranging scenarios is absent. While periodic reviews are mandated, they will likely be “progress reports” which identify areas where more effort or funds are needed to fulfill net-zero targets.There is a substantial risk that consideration of policy adaptation will come too late.

3. Factors that may be contributing to the avoidance of open consideration

Factors that influenced the negligence against open discussion of uncertainty in Japanese climate and energy policies may include:

• Net-zero policy as a rhetorical pretext: Net-zero goals may be functioning as a legitimizing pretext for introducing large-scale support for industrial development (i.e. GX policies), which means there is no incentive to account for uncertainties such as under-achievement.
• Socio-cultural tendencies: A social predisposition to believe that “thinking about adverse scenarios constitutes pessimism, which undermines performance” may be behind unwillingness to consider uncertainty (and/or a willingness to embrace its under-examination).
• The “panic myth”: This existing hypothesis points to the possibility that the “elite” strata have a strong and scientifically rejected belief that “the masses are prone to panic,” leading them to prioritize “reassuring” messages over blunt discussions of how policies may go awry.
• Structural “blind spots” in policy-making processes: The prioritization of informal deliberations and non-official actor dynamics (such as those within ruling parties or ministerial networks) that are not made public or properly documented may be the underlying factor of a lack of consideration of policy uncertainty. Such studies can be found in scholarly research under the term “informal governance”.
• Success bias of past economic policies: Widely applauded milestones such as the rapid growth of post-war economy and the successes of a “stable electricity supply” may have instilled cognitive biases concerning governmental planning capacity and uncertainties of policy execution, rendering the acceptance of alternative paradigms and planning methods difficult.
  
  

4. Future Research Agendas

Possible themes to study based on the hypotheses explained above include:

• Systematic investigation of the various political, historical, institutional, and stakeholder-driven factors that impede open deliberation of climate and energy policies. Clarify why net-zero targets acquire utility as political pretexts.
• Study past paradigms/political vehicles that have served to shortcut political deliberation of energy policies. For example, the need for “stable electricity supply” or the “S+3E (Energy security, Economic efficiency and Environment with Safety as a first priority)” concept outlined in the post-Oil crisis “Basic Energy Plan” are all key to understanding how Japan’s energy has been formed. Studies of their history, role, and present-day significance could lead to insights for reconsidering what the goal of present power policies should be, and what role the government or utilities should play.
• Reconsider the role of central economic planning in today’s climate and energy context, including the changes of stakeholders and issues/risks. Consider how policy approaches may be adjusted accordingly.
• Study the attitudes of experts, elites, and other relevant stakeholders concerning the predisposition to “avoid thinking about adverse scenarios.” Extend inquiries to include related concepts such as “catastrophes,” “crises,” or “worst-case scenarios.” Examine how experts and the elite react when confronted with such findings.
• Conduct comprehensive analyses of the determining factors of recent Japanese energy and climate policies, taking note of the black-box effect of the key concept “S+3E.”  Examine the influence of factors such as local-central government dynamics, ministerial division, and external diplomatic constraints, utilizing frameworks proposed in informal governance research.
• Clarify the multiple dimensions of policy-change costs in the Japanese climate and energy context. Encompass not only direct economic costs such as duplications in investment or sunk costs but also socio-political consequences such as the erosion of public trust in governmental institutions.

5. Concluding remarks

The introduction of existing methodologies for uncertainty assessment (such as DMDU and advanced policy modelling) and the critical inquiry of factors behind domestic resistance to evaluating uncertainty as outlined above are expected to deepen academic understanding of policymaking processes in the climate and energy sectors. Such results may also have broader implications for modernizing policy-making processes (such as Evidence Based Policy Making) and enhancing transparency. The discussions above shed light on the importance of actively seeking out the limits of our knowledge and policy planning capabilities in view of the uncertainties that climate and energy issues face.