Another Iraq power vacuum: Is the third time the charm?

On Sept. 30, multinational forces led by U.S. troops, who had been stationed in Iraq since 2003, completed their withdrawal. Has Iraq truly become an independent and unified nation, in both name and reality? Or will it once again be swept into chaos? Unfortunately, I am far from optimistic.

A close examination of the power vacuums that have emerged in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, particularly in Iraq, suggests that the third major vacuum to arise in Iraq in the 21st century, following the complete withdrawal of coalition forces, could once again destabilize the country. History offers ample reason for concern.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Iraq has experienced two major power vacuums. The first followed the 2003 Iraq War. With the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a vacuum emerged that was initially filled by U.S.-led coalition forces. Iraq’s democratization then proceeded under a U.S. military administration.

At the time, I was seconded to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad as Japan’s representative. Even as the democratization process unfolded, tensions — and at times outright conflict — among Iraq’s three main communities, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs and Kurds, remained unresolved. Civil strife persisted. In effect, although the first power vacuum was filled relatively quickly by the U.S.-led intervention, the turmoil within Iraq continued.

The second vacuum emerged in 2011. A new government was established under the Constitution of the new Republic of Iraq even though a de facto civil war was still underway. Thousands of American soldiers had lost their lives amid the conflict and U.S. President Barack Obama, having lost patience with the war, announced the withdrawal of his country’s combat troops that year.

The departure of U.S. forces, which had numbered as many as 170,000 at one point, left a massive power vacuum. History suggests that whenever such a vacuum emerges, others will try to fill it. The resulting shift in the balance of power can lead to war, conflict and human tragedy.

In Iraq, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps expanded its influence in Shiite areas of the south, while the Islamic State gained ground in Sunni areas of the north. The group eventually seized territory across large parts of Syria and Iraq, where countless civilians suffered and died. The second power vacuum in 21st-century Iraq brought no stability. If anything, it deepened the country’s chaos.

The broader history of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East offers further warnings. Power vacuums in the region have repeatedly triggered destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. The British military, which had dominated the Persian Gulf for decades, withdrew from the area east of the Suez Canal by the early 1970s. The shah of Iran moved to fill the resulting vacuum.

But when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, another vacuum emerged. Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, sought to exploit the situation by invading Iran the following year. The ensuing Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years and claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.

What, then, will prevent another power vacuum from emerging across Iraq following the complete withdrawal of U.S.-led forces, as happened in 2011?

In the Sunni-majority north, Islamic State activity could intensify once again. In the south, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Shiite militias aligned with Tehran may expand their operations, as they did after the previous U.S. withdrawal.

A weakened central government could also undermine the stability of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which governs the autonomous Kurdistan region in the north of the country and depends on Baghdad. The departure of foreign forces is therefore no guarantee of Iraqi sovereignty or stability. From a geopolitical perspective, the emergence of a third major power vacuum in 21st-century Iraq could instead set the stage for another descent into chaos.

If that happens, terrorist groups operating out of newly expanded safe havens in Iraq could step up their operations. U.S. political influence would likely wane as Iran’s grew, while the security of Arab oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could come under greater strain.

Unfortunately, Japanese media coverage of these risks has been extremely limited. I do not necessarily regard the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a mistake, either for Iraq’s domestic politics or for international relations. I sincerely hope Iraq can use the departure of foreign troops as an opportunity to become a genuinely independent, unified and prosperous nation. But the domestic benefits of withdrawal, if they materialize, must be weighed against the strategic risks to the wider region.

By withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and now from Iraq, the Trump administration may succeed in reducing America’s military involvement in the Middle East. Yet a smaller U.S. military footprint does not necessarily mean a smaller American stake in the region. The withdrawal could also give the Islamic State and other extremist groups an opportunity to regroup and reassert themselves.

The implications extend well beyond Iraq. Even if Washington shifts its attention to other theaters, it may be unable to stand aside as instability spreads across the Persian Gulf. Whatever happens in Europe or the Indo-Pacific, the United States could eventually find itself compelled to return to the Middle East.

That is the danger of leaving a power vacuum unfilled: another power will fill it, often on its own terms. Iraq has already learned this lesson twice in this century. Unless its government can consolidate its authority and prevent extremists and foreign powers from exploiting the withdrawal, the third time may prove no more of a charm than the first two. And Washington may discover that leaving the Middle East is far easier than staying out of it.