Why the far right isn’t winning elections in Japan

The landslide victory by the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt on Sept. 6 seems to have shocked many in Europe, even though it had been somewhat anticipated.

By contrast, related coverage in Japan was primarily factual, without conveying the same level of “shock” seen in the West. At the very least, there is little sense of crisis that such a phenomenon might occur in Japan anytime soon.

There is, however, no guarantee how long such optimism will last. The trends of nationalism, “America First” or “Europe First” attitudes, and xenophobic and discriminatory populism in Western countries over more than a decade are by no means temporary phenomena. Right-wing populism — which has served as an outlet for the frustration and anger of the “forgotten people” resulting from the widening income gap caused by the IT revolution and neoliberal capitalism of the 1990s — has real potential to become a political trend in Japan as well, a country that has experienced its own “Lost Three Decades.”

Therefore, it would certainly not be a waste of time to compare and analyze the recent rise of the AfD in Germany, the current situation in other Western countries and similar political movements in Japan. My assessment is as follows:

The AfD’s growing support is not merely a temporary surge in votes but the result of a complex interplay of structural discontent and social change. While the AfD fell short of the votes needed to govern alone and will need coalition partners to form a state government, its ability to win support among the electorate is on the rise.

The first and foremost reason is likely dissatisfaction with illegal immigration and refugees. Following the large-scale acceptance of refugees beginning in 2015 under the Merkel administration, anxiety among voters in Germany has grown due to strained infrastructure, concerns about deteriorating public safety and recent security incidents such as knife attacks. Consequently, distrust in the mainstream parties’ immigration policies has intensified, leading to increased support for the AfD, which explicitly advocates strict border controls and remigration.

The second reason is economic stagnation and financial hardship, particularly dissatisfaction with soaring energy prices and inflation. Economic sanctions against Russia stemming from the war in Ukraine, along with decarbonization policies, have driven up energy prices, directly affecting the lives of ordinary citizens. Consequently, amid persistent high prices and economic stagnation, public disappointment with the ruling coalition’s economic management has grown.

Another factor that must not be overlooked is regional disparity within Germany, particularly in the former East German regions. The AfD’s recent string of election victories — or explosive gains in voter support — has primarily occurred in the former East German regions. Even decades after German reunification, these states still grapple with unresolved issues such as the East-West wage gap, the exodus of young people and disparities in infrastructure.

Until now, Germany’s major political parties have maintained a so-called firewall — an agreement to refuse to form a coalition with the AfD. But as negotiations among mainstream parties stall and politics come to a standstill, people have felt that the traditional parties are fixated solely on staying in power and are not looking out for the people. Consequently, protest votes against the political establishment have increasingly gravitated toward the AfD. Furthermore, right-wing rhetoric — which would previously have been considered extreme — has gradually permeated mainstream society through the proliferation of social media and debates in the mainstream media, thereby reducing people’s reluctance to vote for such parties.

In fact, these phenomena are already unfolding and taking root simultaneously across Europe. Not only in Italy, the Netherlands and France but also in Austria, Sweden and Finland, there have been a succession of instances in which right-wing populist parties have become the largest party or formed coalition governments. The biggest reason for the “shock” this week is likely the realization that even Germany — a country that has consistently pursued denazification at the national level since the postwar era — may be unable to stop this trend.

So, what about Japan? There is no doubt that Japan shares social factors common to Europe and the United States. Recently, interest in issues related to foreign workers and illegal residents has been growing. As the acceptance of foreign workers expands to address labor shortages, reports of lax enforcement of rules and criminal incidents in some regions have spread on social media, leading to growing popular dissatisfaction and anxiety. Furthermore, as the Japanese economy stagnates and real wages struggle to grow, disappointment with established political parties, whether in the ruling or opposition blocs, is rapidly mounting in Japan as well.

In Japan, too, “anti-globalization” and “anti-establishment” movements spreading through social media are gaining support, and there are already examples of new political parties and movements — backed by anti-establishment sentiment and online forums — gaining more seats in parliament.

On the other hand, there are no doubt fundamental differences between Germany and Japan. The biggest difference from Germany or Europe lies in the “scale” of refugees and immigrants. Japan does not face a situation like Europe, where hundreds of thousands to millions of refugees and illegal immigrants arrive annually and border control is relatively straightforward.

Also, there is no strong far-right political party to serve as a receptacle for such sentiments. Traditionally, Japan’s ruling parties have been conservative, having to some extent incorporated conservative values and making it difficult for the kind of confrontational dynamics seen in Europe to emerge. For example, after right-wing populist parties rose to prominence in the 2025 Upper House election, the Liberal Democratic Party — led by conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — was able to recapture control of the Lower House in the 2026 election, as well as disaffected votes that might otherwise have flowed to these right-wing populist parties.

Even so, concerns remain. In Japan, too, the political environment bears similarities to that of Europe. If Japan’s political establishment continues to fail to adequately address public anxieties and economic challenges, emerging political forces capable of channeling similar discontent may gain further ground, even in the near future. Ironically, Takaichi — sometimes described in the West as “right wing” — appears to be preventing that from happening so far.