The turf wars between politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo

In early August just before Japan entered its midsummer vacation week, some drama unfolded within Tokyo’s bureaucratic apparatus.

The Asahi Shimbun reported that an elite Finance Ministry bureaucrat was reassigned in an “unusual transfer,” quoting a senior official at the Prime Minister’s Office explaining the reappointment because “He was uncooperative.” At the center of this is the Finance Ministry’s Jun Hitotsumatsu, deputy director-general of the Budget Bureau — who had been considered a future candidate for Vice Minister — being transferred to the Tokyo Customs Office.

It is highly unusual for such a senior figure in the Budget Bureau to become Commissioner of the Tokyo Customs Office. The move was reportedly driven by strong pressure from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, following clashes with Hitotsumatsu over the proposed consumption tax cut and fiscal restructuring. Anyone who immediately grasps the significance of this news is likely quite knowledgeable about Japan.

However, not only general readers from overseas, but even members of the foreign diplomatic corps in Tokyo may not fully understand the implications. That is because the Asahi’s report on this “unprecedented personnel move” may not necessarily be telling the entire story.

As someone who served in Japan’s bureaucracy, I’ve seen firsthand the tug-of-war between civil servants and politicians in Tokyo.

The Asahi report is as follows: Hitotsumatsu joined the Finance Ministry in 1995 and, after serving in the Budget Bureau, where social security budget issues are handled, he held various positions, including secretary to then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

He was rumored to be a “once-in-a-decade heavyweight finance bureaucrat.” But since last year, as deputy director-general of the Budget Bureau, he has been overseeing the implementation of tax credit benefits, and it was widely expected that he would naturally be retained in that position. However, he has now been suddenly “demoted” to commissioner of the Tokyo Customs Office.

If true, this means that the Prime Minister’s Office intervened in the Ministry of Finance’s personnel decisions.

However, I did not see this as a “relegation.” On the contrary, I suspect the ministry deliberately carried out his demotion to a local post to resist the Takaichi administration’s political pressure and to protect and preserve Hitotsumatsu.

In fact, similar personnel moves have often been made in the past. Without naming names, but even at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when the hostile ruling administration at the time intervened in appointing the vice minister, the ministry deliberately chose not to promote a future candidate for the position, instead keeping the person in reserve.

The battle between politics and bureaucracy is by no means a recent development. This struggle has continued consistently since 1945. Immediately after the war, many influential politicians were barred from public office by the Allied Occupation authorities, so many inexperienced lawmakers were able to enter national politics through democratic elections. Although military officials and diplomats were purged, many experienced economic bureaucrats survived, giving the bureaucratic establishment an overwhelming advantage over politicians.

This dominance of the bureaucracy continued until around the 1980s. During this period, Kakuei Tanaka was one of the few prime ministers without a bureaucratic background, but his administration did not last long and the traditional system of governance by a bureaucratic-centered political elite persisted.

The politicians struck back in the 1990s, particularly after scandals involving politics and money erupted, leading to a loss of trust in both the existing bureaucratic establishment and politicians.

In the mid-1990s, then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto launched reforms of the bureaucratic system, allowing politicians to gradually gain the upper hand. Even so, the bureaucracy at that time still enjoyed a degree of autonomy; Cabinet ministers would generally accept the proposals put forward by their ministries’ secretariats regarding personnel appointments for vice-ministers and directors-general.

This dynamic changed decisively with the establishment of the Cabinet Personnel Bureau during the Shinzo Abe administration. When the new bureau began centrally managing personnel appointments for bureaucrats at the director-general level and above, the bureaucratic autonomy suffered a decisive defeat. An era had arrived when ambitious bureaucrats could not become directors-general unless they were “in the good graces” of the Prime Minister’s Office.

Viewing the recent personnel changes against this backdrop, it is possible to conclude that the shift in the balance of power between politics and bureaucracy has finally extended to personnel decisions within the Finance Ministry. However, the bureaucracy may not have lost, either. It is equally possible to view this personnel change as a clever maneuver to preserve the Ministry of Finance’s organizational integrity — and thus, the Finance Ministry has by no means been defeated by the Prime Minister’s Office.

Even so, my take is neither of the above. If it is actual “sidelining,” it may be precisely because Hitotsumatsu is so capable that politicians detested him and sought to bring him down. On the other hand, if this “demotion” is intended to defend the bureaucratic organization, there could be no personnel decision more insulting to the public. After all, in the 21st century, there is no way the “autonomy” of a bureaucratic organization, as seen in the 20th century, should be recognized.

Here is my assessment: Is it truly in the nation’s best interest to be able to remove even capable bureaucrats — not just this Finance Ministry official, but capable bureaucrats in general — simply because they are politically unacceptable for various reasons? National civil servants are a group of people who have sworn to serve the public, and it is only natural that they should comply with the political decisions ultimately made by politicians elected by the people.

Failing to do so would disqualify them as national civil servants, but if they ultimately follow the Prime Minister’s instructions, aren’t they acting as exemplary bureaucrats? Is removing such bureaucrats truly in the best interests of the Japanese people? I have serious doubts.

Of course, it goes without saying that there are problems within all bureaucracies. They place too much emphasis on precedents and are reluctant to take on new challenges. Even when they do take on challenges, they often think only of their own interests or those of their organizations.

It is also a fact that there are many mediocre bureaucrats. However, if we were to dismiss top-tier civil servants simply because they are not politically acceptable, wouldn’t that ultimately lead to serious problems like those currently plaguing today’s U.S. domestic politics?

After all, when it comes to the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, there is absolutely no need to follow the American system of a revolving door of political appointees.