This U.S.-Iran MOU will likely be a ‘memorandum of misunderstanding’

The long-awaited Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States was electronically signed on June 14, Donald Trump’s 80th birthday.

Two days later, even as the Group of Seven leaders in Evian, France “supported” the MOU, the document had not yet been made public. The full text was finally “orally read” to the media shortly thereafter. As I read it, I felt it was no MOU at all but rather a “memorandum of misunderstanding.”

I have good reason to say so since Axios reported that the CIA Director had told the president that the agency’s intelligence “raised serious doubts about Iran’s willingness to make the nuclear concessions.” If the president was aware of this, then this document must be a “memorandum of deliberate misunderstanding.”

Even before the full text was disclosed, I was skeptical. First, because the MOU is far from a formal final agreement, deferring the details of the nuclear issues. Second, this MOU lacks in substance and is a compromise that allows both sides to declare “victory.” Finally, because it is highly likely that the Israeli Prime Minister was not informed of the MOU in advance.

Based on the publicized text of the 14-point draft document, I will explain in detail why I am so pessimistic.

Article 1 stipulates that both “Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon.” Surprisingly, the United States may have committed to this MOU without obtaining Israel’s consent. Consequently, this may leave a potential source of conflict with Israel and could even grant it a “veto” over the final agreement. For the United States, this represents a “step too far,” and I view this as an “Iranian advantage.”

Article 2 says both countries “undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.” Indeed, without it, Iran would not have agreed to the MOU in the first place. On the other hand, Israel may naturally claim that it is “not bound” by this MOU, so this is a “draw” between the U.S. and Iran.

Article 3 says both “undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.” “Extendable,” however, implies that a final agreement is not feasible for the time being. It is much like the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire deal and, therefore, the U.S.-Iran final agreement could, if things go badly, take years to be reached. This, too, can be viewed as a “draw.”

Article 4 stipulates that upon the signing of the MOU, the U.S. “will begin to remove the naval blockade and restore traffic to full capacity within a maximum of 30 days” and also “undertakes to remove its forces from Iran’s proximity within 30 days after the final agreement.” While the U.S. lifts the blockade for Iran’s traffic, it remains unclear what units at which bases are to be removed. Naturally, the U.S. military has no intention of withdrawing the forces it has forward-deployed thus far. I view this as a mutually painful compromise between the U.S. and Iran.

Article 5 says Iran will “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only” and “The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by Iran.” While it is commendable that Iran did not refer to “sovereignty over the Strait,” the reference to “the need to remove technical obstacles” is concerning. In any case, now that Iran can block the Strait of Hormuz at will, I view Iran as holding a slight advantage.

Article 6 stipulates that the U.S. “undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation and economic development of Iran, while ensuring financing of at least $300 billion.” Although details of this financing have not been determined, funds will not be disbursed until a final agreement is reached. Yet, the funding explicitly referred to in the MOU may give Iran a slight advantage.

Article 7 says the U.S. “commits to ending all types of sanctions currently facing Iran,” including U.N. and IAEA resolutions and all unilateral U.S. sanctions. While this is what Iran has long sought, the specific timeline for lifting the sanctions will depend on the “final agreement”; therefore, this can be viewed as a draw.

Article 8 stipulates that “Iran reiterates that it will never produce or develop nuclear weapons” and both “resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon ... with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA.” This commitment by Iran, however, is nothing new. Rather, by avoiding specific commitments on the nuclear issue in this MOU and deferring detailed negotiations until the final agreement, as well as by inserting such wording as “Iran’s nuclear needs,” Iran successfully implies its “right to enrich nuclear fuel.” Therefore, this point is also viewed as an advantage for Iran.

Article 9 says both “agree that they will maintain the status quo” regarding Iran’s nuclear program, U.S. sanctions and U.S. forces in the region. However, the status quo means that, for Iran, first, there will be no attack from the United States; second, there will be no new sanctions; and at the very least, third, there is no immediate pressure forcing it to make significant concessions in the final agreement. Therefore, this article is also seen as giving Iran a slight advantage.

Article 10 says “Until the date sanctions are lifted, the United States will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation and the like.” If this granting of waivers for all Iranian exports means that no restrictions will be imposed on Iran’s exports, this represents a major achievement for Iran.

Article 11 says the U.S. “undertakes that Iran’s frozen or restricted funds and assets will be released and made fully available.” Despite the U.S. commitment, the extent of this will be determined based on the progress of the final negotiations; therefore, I view this as a draw.

Articles 12 to 14 stipulate that both sides agree on “an implementation mechanism,” that they enter into negotiations “for a Final Agreement” and that it “will be approved through a binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council.”

In conclusion, this MOU is, at best, a product of compromise, if not a failure. Iran has been a master of moving the goalposts. Unless the Trump administration drastically changes its negotiating style, this conflict may end as a victory for Iran’s tenacity.