Is an honorable U.S. surrender to Iran inevitable?

In mid-March, I wrote that Iran in 2026 is like Japan in 1944. Now, with the Strait of Hormuz still blockaded and ceasefire talks unresolved, the United States in 2026 is beginning to resemble Imperial Japan in June 1942.

The Battle of Midway, fought in June 1942, was a decisive naval clash between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy around Midway Island. It is often cited as a turning point in the Pacific War. Japan’s naval forces suffered a crushing defeat, losing both the initiative and control of the seas.

Japan’s strategy had been to inflict decisive damage on the U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific — including at Pearl Harbor — and then force a ceasefire while maintaining the upper hand in a short, decisive conflict. But the U.S. counterattack proved far greater than anticipated, and by 1942, the tide of the war had turned.

In the current U.S. approach to Iran, there are similarities. Washington sought to force Iran to surrender through a short, decisive campaign, inflicting heavy damage via precision strikes beginning Feb. 28. That plan, however, has failed, not unlike Imperial Japan’s strategy after Pearl Harbor.

Although the U.S. military possesses far greater tactical capabilities than the Japanese Navy in 1942, it has committed a major strategic blunder. It has shown Iran how easily the Strait of Hormuz can be blockaded, effectively losing freedom of navigation in this international waterway.

What happens next? The near future could resemble Japan’s in the months after the events of 1942. The longer the war drags on, the greater the losses on the American side. In response, Iran — much like Japan in 1944 — will see its supreme leader continue efforts to unite the nation against an overwhelming U.S. military to preserve the national system.

Meanwhile, as with Japan in World War II, the U.S. refusal to acknowledge preservation of the national system until the very end may harden Iran’s resolve. Its leadership and supporters could choose to fight to the bitter end as the Japanese military did in the closing years of the war. How long this continues will depend on the judgment of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Militarily and tactically, the United States retains an overwhelming advantage over Iran, a key difference from Japan after 1942. Nevertheless, without a clear strategy, a just cause or committed allies, the United States may be unable to achieve a political victory.

If that is the case, the only path left may be what could be called an “honorable surrender” — a unilateral declaration of victory while ending the war without achieving its objectives. Iran would effectively emerge victorious, though at significant cost to its own national power.

The United States would declare victory and, while likely maintaining a military presence in the Gulf, hesitate to resume combat. As noted earlier, if this war has shown anything, it is that Iran can block the Strait of Hormuz with relative ease.

It has also become increasingly likely that Iran will pursue nuclear weapons development. With two potential deterrents — the ability to block the strait and the prospect of a nuclear capability — Iran will continue to compete with the United States and Israel.

An “honorable surrender” — whatever it is ultimately called — may become the most viable exit strategy for Washington. A memorandum of understanding could emerge in the near future, but in substance it may function more as a memorandum of misunderstanding.

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was a 160-page document resulting from more than 20 months of negotiations among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany and Iran. Such sustained diplomatic effort may be difficult to replicate.

As a result, any “honorable surrender” may not be accompanied by a detailed agreement. Instead, the region could enter a phase in which little is formally documented, increasing the risk of instability and leaving few guardrails on nuclear development.

It remains unclear how long Israel would tolerate such a situation. Without U.S. cooperation, sustaining effective long-term strikes against Iran would be difficult. This state of unresolved conflict — paired with a U.S. declaration of “victory” — could persist.

The implications for Japan are significant.

First, even if the United States maintains a presence in the Gulf, Iran could repeatedly attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz during periods of tension with Israel. Each disruption would threaten global supplies of crude oil and natural gas, raising the risk of another energy crisis.

Second, the likelihood of accelerated Iranian nuclear development raises the risk of broader proliferation in the Middle East and potentially the Indo-Pacific. This is a grave concern for Japan, the only country to have experienced atomic bombings.

Third, the issue extends beyond the waterways of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It suggests that freedom of navigation in international straits could be challenged elsewhere.

Freedom of navigation, as recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is a core interest for Japan, a maritime nation dependent on free trade. If that principle is undermined, Japan may be forced to reexamine long-standing assumptions dating back to the 1973 oil crisis.

Given its current defense and economic capabilities, Japan cannot single-handedly restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Western nations — including the United States and European countries — have yet to demonstrate an effective response to such challenges.

Japan now faces the prospect of reassessing a status quo that has endured for more than half a century. For now, however, its economic — and potentially strategic — security remains tied to developments in the Middle East, including the Strait of Hormuz.