Scoring the Trump-Xi heavyweight bout in Beijing

A week after the high-profile May 14-15 summit in Beijing, the verdict in Tokyo is split: Did U.S. President Donald Trump hold his ground or did Chinese leader Xi Jinping seize the upper hand?

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara struck a cautious note, emphasizing that “stability in U.S.-China relations is of the utmost importance” and urging China to act responsibly while maintaining strong ties with Washington.

Much of Japan’s media, however, has been more skeptical. Headlines have portrayed Xi as dominant and Trump as erratic, warning of a potential “historic deal” that could unsettle Japan and Taiwan. Some commentary has even mocked both Trump’s diplomacy and the Takaichi administration’s emphasis on close coordination with the United States.

Such snap judgments miss the bigger picture. Assessing long-term U.S.-China competition through the lens of a single summit — or its domestic political optics — risks obscuring the strategic realities at play.

U.S.-China rivalry increasingly resembles a third iteration of the “Great Game” — following the 19th-century British-Russian contest and the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. This latest phase is likely to unfold over the next decade or two.

A better analogy is a heavyweight title fight. The United States is the reigning champion; China, the top contender. Neither will be knocked out by a single blow. This is a 15-round bout, and the Beijing summit was, at most, the third round.

If so, the outcome will not be clear until the later rounds. Debating the judges’ scorecards after round three may say little about who ultimately wins.

Iran leverage

Some analysts expected Washington to press Beijing to use its influence over Iran amid the ongoing conflict. That expectation was always unrealistic.

China has no formal allies and avoids military commitments in regions such as the Gulf. Its noninterventionist posture limits its leverage. Even if Beijing urged Tehran to accept a ceasefire, its influence would be constrained.

Iran, meanwhile, is fighting with the survival of its Islamic Republic at stake. China’s priority, by contrast, is managing its relationship with the United States. Under those conditions, Tehran is unlikely to trade a critical bargaining chip — a ceasefire — simply at Beijing’s request.

While Iran may show some deference to a long-standing partner, the chances of a Chinese-brokered breakthrough remain low.

Concerns that Trump might make concessions out of personal affinity for Xi are also overstated. The notion of a genuine “friendship” between the two leaders is doubtful.

Xi’s political record suggests a leader guided by power and control, not personal bonds. Trump’s references to friendship are better understood as diplomatic rhetoric aimed at facilitating deals, not evidence of meaningful trust.

On substance, the summit produced no breakthrough on the core economic, trade or security disputes that have defined U.S.-China relations for decades.

Washington remains deeply frustrated with what it sees as China’s mercantilist practices. Beijing, in turn, has leveraged tools such as rare-earth exports. Neither side shows meaningful willingness to compromise.

Past dialogue mechanisms — from the post-1979 Joint Economic Committee to later iterations such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and its successors — have yielded few lasting results beyond episodic Chinese purchases of U.S. goods.

The same stalemate persists on security. China’s military buildup in the Indo-Pacific continues to shift the regional balance, raising a fundamental question: Would Washington make concessions on Taiwan under these conditions? That appears highly unlikely.

A warning and risk

One point from the summit does warrant attention: Beijing’s warning that mishandling Taiwan could lead to confrontation and even conflict.

This raises a deeper concern — that growing Chinese confidence could lead to overreach and miscalculation. That risk was identified decades ago by former Japanese diplomat Hisahiko Okazaki, who argued that parity between rival powers can provoke war.

As a rising power approaches military equality with a dominant one, it may begin to believe it can win. At the same time, the established power may feel pressure to act before the balance shifts further. Such dynamics can make conflict more, not less, likely.

Pundits would do well to understand that Okazaki’s insight remains relevant today.

U.S.-China strategic competition has only fully taken shape over the past decade. The Beijing summit is not a definitive moment but an early chapter in a prolonged contest.

Rather than fixating on personalities or short-term optics, policymakers should focus on the evolving balance of power. This is a long drawn-out contest between two battle-tested heavyweights — one that will be decided not in an early round at a single summit, but over many rounds to come.