Will Japan's new National Intelligence Council function properly?

Amid the chaos from the outbreak of the war in Iran, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Cabinet approved a bill on March 13 to establish the National Intelligence Secretariat and its central coordinating body — the National Intelligence Council.

The former will be granted “comprehensive coordination authority” to consolidate intelligence currently dispersed across various ministries and agencies, while the latter — chaired by the prime minister — will formulate the “National Intelligence Strategy,” which serves as the mid- to long-term basic policy for intelligence.

At first I was delighted with the news, thinking that a full-fledged external intelligence service was finally being established in Japan.

But as more details became available, I began to harbor significant doubts and concerns. The plan positions the secretary-general of the National Intelligence Secretariat on the same level as the secretary-general of the National Security Secretariat, aiming for close coordination between intelligence and policymaking.

This proposal not only creates unnecessary layers of bureaucracy but also carries the risk of generating serious conflicts of interest between intelligence and policymaking.

External intelligence services

To begin with, an external intelligence service, for the purpose of national security, collects and analyzes classified intelligence regarding other countries’ military, political and economic affairs and reports it to government leaders such as the prime minister or president.

Their activities include not only information gathering through espionage and interception, but also analytical work of transforming raw “information” into highly reliable “intelligence,” with the ultimate expectation that this intelligence will be provided to political leaders — the consumers of intelligence.

External intelligence services vary widely in structure and organization, making direct comparisons difficult. However, no single country operates a single external intelligence service.

Instead, each country maintains multiple services that leverage the specialized expertise of their respective sectors, such as diplomacy, defense, police and public security.

Consequently, consolidating and centralizing all intelligence services from various ministries or agencies into a single organization is neither realistic nor appropriate.

On the other hand, if these intelligence services operate in isolation, there is a risk that accurate intelligence cannot be gathered. Consequently, the United States, for example, having learned from the drawbacks of such siloed structures in the past, established the position of director of national intelligence to oversee the intelligence community.

Independence from policymakin

The most important concept is the independence of intelligence services from policymaking. Intelligence services are not bodies responsible for formulating or executing policy. While intelligence services support organizations that plan, formulate and execute policy, the ironclad rule is that they must never “discuss policy.”

This is because if intelligence services were to factor policy judgments into their information collection and analysis, not only would it cease to be truly independent intelligence, but in some cases, it could even lead to erroneous policy decisions.

Operators and analysts

The structure of external intelligence services generally consists of two main departments. The first is information collection — the work of operators. Operators are required to obtain necessary information, primarily overseas, and to engage in covert activities if necessary. On the other hand, information gathered by operators is merely raw data; it does not become intelligence unless it is refined through detailed and careful scrutiny by analysts.

To use an analogy, information is like raw fish. Consumers of intelligence cannot simply eat raw fish. Only after a chef has filleted, prepared and turned it into sashimi can consumers eat it. Similarly, the information gathered by operators should not be directly briefed to the consumer as-is; rather, it should first be refined into intelligence by analysts who add value to it before being briefed to the policymakers.

If this is the ideal model for Japan’s external intelligence service, how should we evaluate the Cabinet's recently approved National Intelligence Secretariat and National Intelligence Council bill? There are two key issues to address.

First, the head of the new organization overseeing the intelligence community must not be a policy decision-maker. As mentioned earlier, what is necessary for formulating sound policy is to provide policy decision-makers — the consumers of intelligence — with intelligence that has been refined through analysis independent of the policymaking process. Analyzing information with political considerations or political intent is even harmful.

However, under the proposed Japanese bill, the prime minister — who is responsible for policymaking — is designated to oversee the intelligence community. This would result in the consumer of intelligence simultaneously overseeing the intelligence community, creating a classic case of conflict of interest. Perhaps this is feasible in a dictatorship.

But in a democratic nation — whether it be in the CIA, MI6 or MI5 — the heads of the intelligence services are neither the president, the monarch nor the prime minister. This is only natural given the nature of intelligence services.

The second issue concerns the background of the head of the external intelligence service. As stated earlier, external intelligence services are divided into two groups: operators and analysts.

However, I have never heard of a former field officer or law enforcement official being appointed to lead an external intelligence service in other countries. Generally, such positions should be led by individuals with a background in foreign policy or national security — ideally, by intelligence experts.

That said, the bill has already been approved by the Cabinet and it is highly likely that it will be debated in parliament and enacted into law. Should the bill pass in its current form, I do not believe that Japan’s external intelligence community will function effectively.

I sincerely hope that parliamentarians will continue their relentless efforts and, if necessary, even restructure the organization to urgently establish an external intelligence service in Japan that is more effective, politically independent and capable of producing high-quality intelligence.