Memo to the Trump administration: Iran has no Maduro

Japan has a proverb: “Hell if you retreat, hell if you advance.” It describes a situation in which no choice offers escape. Unfortunately, that is where the United States, Israel and Iran now appear headed.
Since last week, U.S. media have been filled with reports about the possibility of a Trump administration strike on Iran. Such an attack could create precisely that no-win outcome: To advance is hell; to retreat is hell.

Unlike Venezuela

Iran is not Venezuela. A decapitation strike like the one the United States carried out last month against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro would not be feasible in Iran.
Venezuela covers about 920,000 square kilometers and has a population of roughly 28 million. Though ruled by a leftist populist dictatorship, it posed no direct military threat to the United States. Removing a dictator from coastal Caracas made political subjugation comparatively easier.
Iran, by contrast, spans about 1.65 million square kilometers and has a population exceeding 90 million. Tehran and the city of Qom lie deep inland. Military operations there would be far more complex.
Iran is also a theocratic state in which religion and government are intertwined. It is ruled by Islamic jurists and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which wields both military power and religious legitimacy. Even if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were assassinated, he would likely become a martyr. Subduing a proud nation that traces its heritage to the ancient Persian Empire would be extraordinarily difficult.
Militarily, politically and economically, Iran has no Maduro.

Defining the aim

Before initiating military action, a nation must clearly define its war aims. That question is more important than legal justification alone. Strategy — the objective — should come before tactics — the means.
Yet U.S. President Donald Trump appears focused on tactics. Even if described as a “limited operation,” a strike on Iran would face steep odds of success.
If the goal is regime change, the United States would need detailed plans for the aftermath. The 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War offer contrasting lessons. The Trump administration does not appear to be considering an occupation of Iran, raising doubts about how regime change could be achieved without one.
Iran today lacks an organized opposition capable of mobilizing the broader population. The 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution shows how quickly power can consolidate around religious authority. Removing current leaders would not necessarily collapse the system. Successors could be even more hard-line and accelerate nuclear development. Avoiding that outcome would require careful preparation.

International law and allies

War also requires a just cause and allied support. Before the 2003 Iraq War, President George W. Bush publicly argued the case for military action. His administration cited U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq to justify its position and secured support from NATO allies, including the United Kingdom, Poland, Spain and Italy in what became known as the “coalition of the willing.”
Today, the diplomatic groundwork appears far thinner. Comparisons between Iraq in 2003 and Iran now are imperfect, but the absence of clear international backing is striking. Recent developments suggest that whatever course the Trump administration chooses, the situation could deteriorate further.

All politics is local

Why pursue such risky tactics? The answer may lie in domestic politics.
For more than a year, the Trump administration has struggled with inflation and other controversies. With midterm elections approaching in November, it may see foreign policy as a way to shift the political narrative.
But while Trump looks outward, many Americans are focused inward — on household finances and economic stability. That gap is unlikely to close soon. If domestic priorities truly came first, the administration would have little appetite for military intervention with uncertain prospects. The turn toward hard-line foreign policy may reflect political vulnerability at home — a dangerous dynamic.

Compromise and consequences

The only alternative may be compromise. Iran is unlikely to make sweeping concessions. At most, it might suspend uranium enrichment — and even that could be seen as a temporary measure. Hard-liners in Israel and the United States would view such a step skeptically.
Trump has said he does not want a full-scale war. A narrow agreement — for example, removing highly enriched uranium from Iran and reducing its concentration, while deferring disputes over ballistic missiles and regional proxies — could slow momentum toward conflict. Yet history suggests Iran would be unlikely to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely under such terms.
An attack on Iran could carry costs that outweigh any benefits. As U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations proceed in Geneva this week, the stakes could hardly be higher — and the sense of foreboding is difficult to ignore.