Nothing ‘unexpected’ about the left’s election blowout

Many observers of Japanese politics called the magnitude of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s overwhelming victory in last weekend’s snap election “unexpected.” It wasn’t.
Her win reminded me of a saying favored by Katsuya Nomura, the legendary Japanese baseball manager who died in 2020 and revolutionized the sport with data-driven strategy: "Victory may come by chance, but defeat never comes by chance."

Takaichi and her ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which won the most Lower House seats of any party since World War II, may have benefited from favorable conditions. But the blowout of the Centrist Reform Alliance was not due to bad luck. Losses often stem from mistakes, poor preparation or an opponent’s superior strategy. Calling the result “unexpected” is an excuse.

The core story of the Feb. 8 election was not simply the LDP’s landslide. It was the crushing defeat of the left-liberal forces that have shaped much of Japan’s postwar domestic politics. Some argue the election was not about ideology — right versus left — but that misses the point. Takaichi’s high approval ratings mattered. But the CRA’s loss was not accidental. It was close to inevitable.

Some cite voter “disillusionment” with the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which helped co-found the opposition CRA. But turnout was higher than in the previous general election, so those votes did not simply disappear. Disenchanted voters could have backed other left-leaning parties, namely the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and Reiwa Shinsengumi. Neither gained significant ground. Many voters, particularly younger ones, appear to have shifted to the LDP.

The reason is straightforward. Over the past two decades, the political center of gravity in Japan has moved from center-left to center and then to center-right. Some CDP candidates seemed to assume voters remained firmly center-left. Many, especially younger voters, had already moved on.

Commentators described the “Sanae boom” as a political typhoon. Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister, generated enthusiasm with her crisp messaging and confident public presence. But the snap election came only months after she took office. Much of the praise likely reflects high expectations for a leader who has yet to be fully tested in parliamentary debate and governance.

Questions also remain about whether her administration can deliver meaningful reform. The LDP’s commanding majority may complicate that task. Among its 316 Lower House members are lawmakers who represent entrenched interests. Can such a broad and internally diverse party forge consensus around bold political, economic and security reforms? That remains uncertain.

The dominance of conservative parties reflects a longer-term shift in Japan’s political center of gravity. Political realignment is likely. One possibility is a consolidation of conservative forces, akin to the 1955 merger that created a durable ruling bloc. Another is a split into two conservative parties — one center-right to right, the other center-left to left. If realignment fails, fragmentation and instability could return.

There are diplomatic implications as well. The rise of domestic conservatism mirrors a broader global trend fueled by frustration among voters who feel left behind by globalization and technological change. Yet recent developments in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States suggest conservatism alone does not guarantee stability.

Takaichi’s administration may be the LDP’s last opportunity to rebuild a stable conservative base within this global environment. Success could enable more assertive foreign policy: deeper ties with allies such as the U.S., South Korea, Australia and India; stronger deterrence; expanded economic security measures; anti-espionage legislation; and the creation of a national intelligence service. Relations with China, Russia and North Korea would likely emphasize independence and a firm defense of national interests.

Still, the greater risk may lie at home — particularly in the economy. With conditions more fragile than during the Abenomics era (2012-2020), aggressive fiscal expansion, including consumption tax cuts, could trigger a destabilizing mix of surging stock prices, a weakening yen and rising long-term interest rates.

Having secured a sweeping mandate, Takaichi now faces the harder task: careful economic management and sustained dialogue with financial markets. The political capital generated by a landslide can be fleeting. How she uses it will determine whether this victory proves durable — or merely momentary.