Where will a Democratic Japan go from here?

In forecasting the Feb. 8 snap election, Japan's political analysts seem utterly perplexed, with almost everybody claiming that this time, we won’t know the outcome until the very end. Some predict that the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party could gain momentum and win a majority in the Lower House of the parliament. But in an early February general election, when temperatures are at their lowest for the year, you just never know what might happen.

Many also question the rationale for the snap election. Criticisms include the claim that it is an election without a “just cause,” with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi angling for a landslide victory while her approval ratings remain high. Others argue that it is a reckless move not only to divert attention away from “politics and money” scandals but also to delay the early passage of the fiscal 2026 budget essential for people's livelihoods.

All of that misses the broader point. This election represents a crucial turning point in determining the direction Japan should take as a nation rather than a referendum over specific policies.

Setting aside various domestic political factors for now, there are three possible scenarios.

First, there is the possibility of a "new looser conservative coalition" government formed through an alliance or partial cooperation among conservative parties alone.

Then there is the second and opposite scenario: a coalition government formed by non-LDP parties, primarily centrist-liberal parties, that would create a new political force specifically aimed at excluding Takaichi and her friends.

Finally, there is the possibility that neither the LDP-JIP coalition nor the newly formed Centrist Reform Alliance can secure a simple majority of total seats. This would delay the formation of a new government, prevent the establishment of a stable governing foundation and lead to the destabilization of Japan’s politics.

Before discussing these three possibilities, two points regarding Japan's recent political situation warrant mention. First, against the backdrop of widening economic disparities during Japan's “lost 30 years,” distrust toward the existing political elite — both moderate left and moderate right — has grown significantly among those left behind. This trend aligns with phenomena occurring in other major advanced nations like Europe and the United States.

Looking at the results of Japan's 2024 Lower House and 2025 Upper House elections, it is undeniable that the existing moderate parties on both sides — the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the LDP — were losing support among voters who felt left behind. In particular, the so-called forgotten voter base, centered on young people, seems to vote for smaller parties that hold more extreme or decisive positions. I believe this situation remains unchanged today.

The second crucial point is the changing geopolitical environment surrounding Japan. Until now, the Indo-Pacific region, particularly East Asia, enjoyed relative stability, overshadowed by the Cold War in Europe or the war on terror in the Middle East. However, over the past decade, coinciding almost exactly with the rise of the Xi Jinping regime in China, a new trend of challenging the status quo has intensified in the Indo-Pacific region. The two incidents involving China and the Senkaku Islands in 2010 and 2012 appear to have significantly shaped Japan’s domestic politics.

Since those events, the political center of gravity in Japan, which used to be what I called “utopian pacifism” — the liberal, left-leaning stance of postwar Japanese politics — has gradually shifted closer to the center. Of course, the left would likely label this as a shift to the right. However, I do not believe Japan’s political center of gravity today is veering “far right.” At least until China's rise, Japan enjoyed an ideal environment under the Japan-U.S. alliance. It had no need to worry about major conflicts or strategic crises in its vicinity, politically, economically or militarily.

This is precisely why the strategy known in Japan as the Yoshida Doctrine — maximizing economic benefits with minimal defense costs — functioned effectively in the postwar era. However, as the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, particularly East Asia, has deteriorated in recent years, the political center of gravity among the Japanese public has shifted from the left toward the center — and perhaps even slightly to the center-right. Given this, it is only natural that the long-standing coalition between the LDP and Komeito, which lasted 26 years, came to be seen as an obstacle, gradually failing to sustain the strategic equilibrium.

In short, the political chasm between Komeito and the LDP, whose ideologies and political consciousness are as incompatible as oil and water, has made the idea of forming a coalition unsustainable. If so, it stands to reason that following Komeito's departure, the LDP would form a coalition with the similarly conservative Japan Innovation Party. Depending on necessity, it could then move toward a new, looser grand coalition of conservatives — possibly including the hard-line conservative Sanseito party or the moderate conservative Democratic Party for the People.

On the other hand, a completely different scenario is also possible after the general election. It's conceivable that the Takaichi administration's “tilt to the right" could awaken the political forces centered on Japan's postwar utopian pacifism — the liberal or moderate left — prompting them to regroup around more realistic policies. This could lead to the consolidation of political forces centered around liberals and the moderate left — a movement already under way. In some cases, they might even intend to eventually draw in some anti-Takaichi factions within the LDP.

Which of these perspectives is correct? Or, will Japan’s domestic politics return to an era of instability? Nobody knows the answer before Feb. 8, though that may not immediately reveal the whole story. Considering this, the outcome of the election will test whether Japan can make the necessary adjustments to its domestic political system required by the rapid changes in geopolitical circumstances.