Media Foreign Affairs and National Security 2025.12.19
The document falls short of being a 'grand strategy' and is more a collection of 'grand tactics'
The Japan times on Dec 12, 2025
Earlier this month, the Trump administration finally released its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025). As expected, media coverage in Japan and South Korea often featured commentaries that missed the forest for the trees, with headlines such as:
These headlines make one suspect whether the journalist read the 33-page report in its entirety. While these articles may not be “wrong,” they fundamentally fail to grasp the essence of the Trump administration's National Security Strategy 2025.
What I see as the “essence” of NSS 2025 is that this document appears to be a product of compromise intended to bridge the differences that surfaced within the Trump administration, particularly between U.S. President Donald Trump and the primary writers of the document. As a result, it is undeniable that NSS 2025 has fallen short of being a "grand strategy" for national security, instead becoming little more than a collection of "grand tactics.” That said, however, I also do not believe this fundamentally altered the basis of U.S. national security strategy compared to the era of the Biden administration.
I will explain why I say this, comparing it to the full 48-page “National Security Strategy 2022” released by the Biden administration three years earlier.
It is unlikely the president reviewed the full text of the national security strategy. However, I suspect Trump’s intent was to avoid using phrases like “democracy versus authoritarianism,” “climate change” or “cooperation with allies,” to steer clear of negative references to Russia and China and to thoroughly criticize the policy mistakes of the previous U.S. administration. The writers likely anticipated the president's wishes on these points.
Yet this alone falls far short of a coherent document on “strategy.” Having spent years within Japan’s executive branch reading and writing nothing but bureaucratic literature, I personally suspect the primary writers of NSS 2025 struggled considerably. This is evident from the obvious signs and efforts to include the Trump administration’s core ideas without angering the president, while also inserting language aimed at adversaries, particularly China, such as “defending the First Island Chain” or “preventing foreign companies from building infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.”
In Washington, speaking the truth, it seems, still risks expulsion. Former national security adviser John Bolton, who famously declared “Trump's diplomacy has no strategy, no philosophy, no policy,” was indicted in October for mishandling classified information. Indeed, as Bolton stated, this NSS 2025 lacks a “strategy” in the traditional sense. Instead, it appears to seek overall balance by incorporating various “tactics” to address individual activities of adversaries.
The intentions of the primary writers are also evident in the writing style. Largely eliminated is the lofty, scholarly, bureaucratic and abstract language that was common during the Biden administration years; it instead relies on plain, concrete, high school-level explanations. Content-wise, it shifts from a catch-all approach covering everything to frank expressions indicating clear priorities. Put positively, it's easy to understand. Put negatively, it features conspicuous, self-righteous criticism of the Democrats.
In 2022, the Biden administration's regional priorities were the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, Africa and, finally, the Arctic, oceans, airspace and space. In terms of volume, the Biden administration gave attention to all these regions and subjects equally, dedicating nearly a page and a half to each.
However, the Trump administration's strategic priorities and explanatory content were significantly different. First came the Western Hemisphere, followed by Asia, then Europe, the Middle East and finally Africa. Moreover, while the Western Hemisphere received three and a half pages and Asia nearly six, Europe got only two and a half pages, the Middle East less than two and Africa a mere half page. In short, the highest priorities are the Western Hemisphere and Asia. Crucially, the latter makes no mention whatsoever of North Korea or the Korean Peninsula.
Setting Africa aside, people in Europe and the Middle East, not to mention the Korean Peninsula, would likely be quite shocked upon reading this. I believe this is another defining feature of the newly released NSS 2025.
What stands out throughout the NSS 2025 is that the Trump administration is openly stating what would previously have been considered confidential or the true intentions. It seems the U.S. has begun to recognize that while winning the long-term competition with China is its top priority, it currently lacks sufficient capability to do so.
Given this, the immediate actions the U.S. can realistically take are limited: defining security strategy goals at minimum achievable levels for now, demanding increased defense spending from allies, fortifying its “backyard” in the Western Hemisphere, rebuilding domestic manufacturing sectors and striving to maintain the status quo with China and Russia. The NSS 2025 seems to effectively acknowledge this reality.
However, these points were actually the “realities” privately acknowledged even within the Biden administration. This suggests that while the content and style of the newly released NSS 2025 differ significantly from its predecessor, the “limits” of U.S. national security strategy may not have changed much in the Trump administration.
How will the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party read and interpret this NSS 2025 with such content? Above all, one can only hope they avoid misinterpreting it.