A sad day for U.S. strategic analysis as the Office of Net Assessment is disbanded

On March 13, a friend of mine in Washington sent me an email saying the Pentagon had announced a surprising statement that said, “As part of the Department's ongoing commitment to strengthening our national defense, the secretary of defense has directed the disestablishment of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA).”

Although the Japanese media hardly reported on this momentous decision on an obscure office that focused on long-term strategic planning and analysis for the Department of Defense, it must have been a big shock for Washington's national security community.

I instantly replied to him, “So it's finally come." Recently, I stopped hearing from friends in the ONA, so I wasn’t surprised — I had already prepared for the possibility that it might get the axe. March 13 will be remembered as a funeral of sorts for America’s practitioners of strategic analysis, though I don’t think this will immediately have a major impact on U.S. strategy toward China.

However, I continued, “perhaps in 10 or 20 years, the U.S. strategy for the ‘future’ will lack a much longer-term perspective than it does now. If ONA is not re-established in four years, I am afraid the U.S. will gradually cease to be a superpower and become just a mediocre power.” Amazingly, the tradition of the Pentagon's ONA — greatly feared by America's adversaries and eagerly emulated by its allies — is now disappearing.

A Republican senator from President Donald Trump’s camp called the department a “wasteful and ineffective office,” but conducting continuous net assessment over the long run requires significant human and financial resources. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth appears to want to rebuild it so it aligns with the department's strategic priorities, but under the Trump administration, where federal personnel cuts and cost savings are top priorities, that will be nearly impossible.

For readers unfamiliar with the ONA, let me explain why this is so disappointing. It was a small but crucial organization that directly reported to the secretary of defense. It was one of the few offices in the U.S. government responsible for conducting long-term strategic assessments. As of 2022, it had a staff of just 14 people — an elite group of experts, including 10 civilians and one representative from each of the four military services.

The ONA rose to prominence during the Cold War. While most people and pundits focused on the military aspects of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, ONA was the only group to conclude that the key to winning the Cold War was not through the number of troops, but through economic means. The office focused on a scenario in which the Soviet Union would be forced to self-destruct through financial collapse, and it was duly credited with helping lead the U.S. to victory in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

Moreover, during the 1990s, while the rest of the world was celebrating the end of the Cold War and the prospect of a more peaceful world, ONA began analyzing the long-term threat to the global order posed by the ascent of China and considering ways to counter its rise. In this way, ONA’s staff was always thinking 20 or 30 years ahead.

The ONA's first director, Andrew Marshall, was nicknamed the Pentagon's “Yoda." He led the office for 42 years, from its establishment in 1973 during the Nixon administration until his retirement in January 2015. Dr. Marshall, originally a statistician, was a rare strategic thinker.

However, some may wonder what makes so-called net assessment so important. Here’s why: The target of net assessment is not short-term threats, but the long-term nature of military conflict and competition between the U.S. and its potential adversaries. Its aim is to identify long-term trends in conflict and competition before adversaries do, allowing the U.S. to maximize its time and avoid their strengths while attacking their vulnerabilities.

And unlike one-off reports, the format is one of constantly being updated along with comprehensive analysis. In addition, that analysis is not solely the work of military experts, but a broad effort involving top minds from fields such as politics, economics, history and sociology.

Some 80 years have passed since the end of the last world war and Japan has been fortunate to enjoy peace. However, the wave of nationalism is once again rising around the world. How can Japan survive? To understand the strategic conflicts and competition among major powers that Japan will face in the coming decades, and to develop the wisdom needed to navigate potential conflicts, the methodology used in net assessment — established by Dr. Marshall and further developed by his disciples, who often refer to themselves as alumni of “St. Andrews Prep” — is essential.

Marshall always taught that “the right questions are needed for the right assessment.” The “right questions” for net assessing China are as follows:

• What are the long-term goals of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party?
• Can the Chinese economy support the expansion of the People's Liberation Army?
• Does the PLA have the ability to carry out information warfare that surpasses the U.S. military?
• Is the PLA truly strong enough to go to war?

Japan was short on true strategists before World War II due to the lack of a system for comprehensively evaluating the long-term trends of strategic conflict and competition between nations. This system would need to consider factors beyond military elements, such as population, statistics and economics. Unfortunately, this tradition has persisted and it is unlikely that the Japanese government can easily or will adopt the net assessment methodology developed by Marshall and his disciples any time soon.

However, time is not on Japan's side. If the country does not implement its own net assessment practices that cover the military, political, economic and historical aspects of the strategic rivalry between China, Japan and the United States, it may soon be too late. Personally, I was fortunate to learn even a little about the intellectual work of Dr. Marshall and his disciples. Going forward, we can only imagine how the Pentagon's "Yoda" would have approached the issue of China.