What is Trump’s foreign policy strategy, if there is one?

Former French President Charles de Gaulle once said, “You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination.”

As we witnessed last week, the Americans don’t seem to have changed much in the interim since the French leader made the comment over half a century or so ago. What’s worse is that none of the European leaders who gathered for the Munich Security Conference had the courage to publicly reference de Gaulle’s insight.

De Gaulle also reportedly said something similar to, "The United States is the cruelest country, in my view, that makes the fastest transition from dreams to reality." The French president was right, if “dreams” refer to Ukraine's accession to NATO, sovereignty and territorial integrity and “reality” to “Russia's annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories. The Trump administration’s “cruel” policy toward Ukraine remains as American as apple pie.

That said, the rapid succession of policy changes and the speed at which implementation has taken place in the second Donald Trump administration has left many pundits in Tokyo dumbfounded. Starting with the new U.S. president's phone call with Vladimir Putin earlier this month, many have been deeply puzzled by a series of surprising statements from Trump officials, a somewhat subdued response from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and panicked remarks from European leaders who were caught off guard.

My analysis and take on the unfolding events, however, is a bit different from that of other experts. International politics shouldn't be seen as a single, still image, but rather as a long motion picture with millions of frames. A still image is just a momentary snapshot of an event. If we apply this idea to the recent series of international events, what kind of motion picture are we watching?

So the question is, why did they hold the U.S.-Russia talks on Ukraine in Saudi Arabia? The reasons I can think of are as follows: first, to completely exclude Ukraine and Europe from the discussions; second, to give credit to the crown prince of Saudi Arabia for hosting the U.S.-Russia talks; third, if possible, to encourage Saudi Arabia to resume negotiations on normalizing relations with Israel; fourth, to encourage the kingdom to cooperate with the U.S.' "maximum pressure" policy against Iran; and finally, to attempt to strike a deal among the U.S., Russia and Saudi Arabia regarding the stability of energy prices.

The most important factor, however, is to ponder what the U.S. priorities are if there is any strategy behind Trump’s Ukraine policy. Is his priority to maintain stability in Europe through a policy of appeasement toward Russia or to preserve the status quo in the Middle East through deterrence against Iran, involving Israel and Saudi Arabia? Or is his priority to stabilize the Indo-Pacific through deterrence against China in the medium to long term?

Some pundits argue that “Trump is a mad king,” suggesting the second Trump administration has no priorities at all. Others insist that the administration seems trapped in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, while Europeans have been overreacting to the outcome of the Munich Security Conference, Gulf countries have been carefully watching Trump’s policy toward Iran and East Asian nations, such as Japan, are trying to draw parallels between the situations in Ukraine and China's saber rattling on Taiwan.

Let’s start with Europe. The U.S. president’s decision to begin negotiations with his Russian counterpart, without involving Ukraine and other Europeans, faced strong opposition, particularly from France and Germany, who see it as a policy of appeasement toward Russia. The Europeans also reacted harshly to U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s use of the term “censorship” during a recent speech he gave describing measures to counter false information on social networking sites, viewing it as a U.S. challenge to European values.

In contrast, the Gulf countries in the Middle East seem to be hoping for better U.S.-Iran relations. Iran, weakened by the Gaza War and political upheaval in Syria, is now seriously exploring an improvement in its relations with the U.S. Gulf Arabs may hope the Trump administration will shift its “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran, aiming for de-escalation through dialogue rather than confrontation. If you ask me, that’s just wishful thinking with an ulterior motive.

Furthermore, the response of East Asian countries, including Japan, to the latest peace process for Ukraine is ambivalent at best. During the Joe Biden administration, it was enough to say that “today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Taiwan” or that we must not “send the wrong message to China.” However, depending on the foreign policy stance of the second Trump administration, which could eventually abandon Ukraine, significant policy changes may be required not only for Taiwan but also for other nations, including Japan.

So, the ultimate question is, what is the real intention behind the second Trump administration’s foreign policy? In my view, the answer is surprisingly simple. My current hypothesis is as follows:

In the medium to long term, the real threat to the United States is not Russia or Iran, but China. Additionally, the U.S. no longer has the military capacity to fight wars on two or three simultaneous fronts. Therefore, the U.S. strategy, whether it likes it or not, will have to focus its political, economic and military power on the Indo-Pacific region, rather than Europe or the Middle East, to ensure deterrence against China.

My assessment, the viability of which I am not 100% certain of yet, may be welcomed by the countries in the Indo-Pacific but not so much in Europe and the Middle East. This is because none of the regions can ensure their own security without the military power of the United States. If this is the case, we can be sure that we are entering an era where U.S. allies around the world will be on tenterhooks as they observe the habits, preferences and whims of an unpredictable Trump administration, and in particular of Trump himself. This would only make Russia, China, Iran and North Korea happy.

Will Trump’s confusing and strange strategy really work? For now, we can only say, let's see what he gives us. But if his second-term foreign policy includes medium- to long-term strategic priorities, we can predict the storyline of the "motion picture" we are watching to some extent. On the other hand, if Trump lacks such priorities, his foreign policy will inevitably hit an impasse sooner or later.