So far, so good for Ishiba — at least for now

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's visit to the United States for face-to-face talks with U.S. President Donald Trump — their first meeting as national leaders — ended with moderate success, contrary to the predictions of many in Japan, especially the prime minister's critics.

Before the visit, the mood in Tokyo was largely pessimistic. Ishiba was never a particularly powerful politician and only narrowly won the Liberal Democratic Party’s presidential election. In an attempt to boost his power base, he took a desperate gamble by calling a snap general election last year — only to suffer a crushing defeat. As a result, the Ishiba administration now leads a minority government forced to tread on thin ice.

What’s more, the U.S. president is now Trump, who has little interest in Japan without Shinzo Abe. Trump’s personality is the complete opposite of Ishiba’s, making it unlikely they would get along well. Since November, Ishiba has tried to boost his popularity by attempting to visit Washington, but Trump repeatedly turned him down. Can the two men have productive diplomatic discussions? This has been the prevailing question among political pundits in Tokyo until Ishiba’s visit on Friday.

I, however, have my own take.

This month, Trump has met and will meet with the leaders of four countries. The first was with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Feb. 4, the second was with Prime Minister Ishiba, followed by a meeting with Jordan's King Abdullah II this Tuesday, and finally with Indian Prime Minister Modi on Thursday. In each case, the leaders were invited to the White House for talks.

That said, in Japan, people generally focused on the results of the Japan-U.S. summit meeting and the personal relationship between the two leaders and there was almost no questioning of why the Trump administration had chosen these four as the first countries to hold such meetings with.

In contrast, the Trump administration since its inauguration has singled out Canada, Mexico, China, Panama and Denmark, threatening them with tariffs and other measures while keeping its comments about Russia to a minimum. Of course, there is a reason for this, too.

First of all, Canada, Mexico and China have some of the largest trade deficits with the U.S. Panama, meanwhile, is a concern because a Hong Kong-based company operates two key ports at either end of the Panama Canal, a crucial waterway for the U.S. and the world. The U.S. is also worried about Russia and China’s growing influence over Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, as well as their potential domination of vital Arctic Sea routes and natural resources in the region.

In short, what they all have in common is their connection to Washington's strategic competition with Beijing. In this respect, Tokyo's concern is not truly strategic but is primarily focused on Trump's personal unpredictability.

Three weeks into Trump’s second term, the administration’s strategic approach is becoming clear. But that was not the case in the first Trump administration. In his first week, only five executive orders were signed, focusing mainly on reviewing Obamacare, border security and environmental regulations.

The reason for this is simple: The Trump campaign really didn't anticipate winning the election, so it had little preparation time to formulate plans on how it would govern. As expected, from the start, and with varying strong opinions being thrown around, the administration faced internal conflicts, leading to the rapid resignation of key Cabinet ministers and senior White House officials.

In his second term, however, several dozen executive orders have been signed in his first few weeks. This suggests that Trump’s team had been planning for a long time the strategies for his second administration, determining the extent to which they could implement policies in both domestic and foreign affairs.

This is why, in less than a month after taking office, Trump has been able to quickly roll out a wave of new domestic policies and diplomatic initiatives. Ishiba’s visit to Washington, then, should also be analyzed through the lens of U.S. domestic politics.

Trump’s goals in picking such fights weren’t to impose higher tariffs or reclaim the canal. His true aims were to pressure Canada and Mexico into tightening border controls while encouraging Panama and Denmark to reduce their reliance on China, or at least distance themselves from it. Essentially, he was playing the role of the “bad cop.” Unfortunately, Tokyo’s concerns are not there.

The questions asked by the two Japanese journalists at the joint news conference were, surprisingly, not about specific policies or future prospects, but more about how the two leaders personally evaluated each other. In comparison, the majority of the questions from American journalists were also unrelated to foreign policy and focused on such things as “Is Elon Musk's authority to reform the government unlimited?” or “Will FBI employees really be fired?” So, it’s a case of two sides of the same coin. All politics are local, both in the past and in the present, and in the East and the West.

It's safe to say, Ishiba’s visit to the U.S. went well. But we must not become complacent. If the foreign policy of the second Trump administration is strategic, then after Canada, Mexico and China, the American president's next target for tariffs will undoubtedly be aimed at European countries — and Japan's turn will certainly follow.

If we can't accurately predict when and to what extent unreasonable demands will be placed on Japan, or understand the real purpose of these demands, we won't be able to play Trump's game and navigate the situation effectively. The Japan-U.S. relationship must be analyzed from a global perspective — thinking solely in terms of Tokyo and Washington is no longer enough.