Can lessons from Iraq's regime change be applied in Syria?

The contrast couldn’t have been more striking. On Dec. 9, while the West was still shell shocked from the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria the day before, the Japanese prime minister was busy with the celebration of the empress’ birthday and parliamentary deliberations on the supplementary budget.

For sure, there was some discussion in Tokyo about humanitarian and reconstruction assistance following the upheaval in Syria. The collapse of the Syrian regime is truly a major event that could lead to a tectonic shift across the Middle East if handled poorly. And yet, unfortunately (and unsurprisingly), the reaction of the Japanese government and the media was slow and tone-deaf.

The Assad regime was virtually the last of the old “Arab socialist” states in the Middle East. Now, many of the key players in the region — such as Hamas, Hezbollah and countries like Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel — have mostly become political forces influenced by strong religious ideologies.

Similar movements driven by anti-internationalism, anti-liberalism, nationalism and religious motivations are gaining prominence not just in the United States, but also in Europe. This trend suggests that, in both the West and the Middle East, solutions that rely on force rather than dialogue are becoming more widespread.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the sudden collapse of the Assad dictatorship has created a significant power vacuum in Syria. With Iran losing its long-time ally, the balance of power in the Middle East is set to shift dramatically. Additionally, Russia, another major ally, was apparently too preoccupied with the war in Ukraine to prevent the collapse of the government in Damascus and will likely see its influence in the region diminished.

Now, Syria has become a battleground for neighboring countries, and given the ongoing chaos, Syrians will face significant challenges in forming a unified, moderate central government in the foreseeable future.

Turkey has seized the opportunity to weaken or even eliminate the Kurdish forces within Syria. Israel, meanwhile, has prioritized its own national interests, refusing to engage with the Biden administration.

Although the Biden administration did not endorse these actions, it was also unable to prevent them. The ambitions of both Israel and Turkey are likely to remain unchanged under a second Trump administration.

What’s striking is the contrast between the fall of the Assad regime and that of Saddam Hussein’s following the war in Iraq in 2003. The situation in Syria today could be even more dire than what Iraq faced nearly 20 years ago for several reasons.

In Iraq, the U.S. military defeated Saddam's army and established security in the region. In Syria, however, Assad's army has completely disintegrated.

The Coalition Provisional Authority, where I was seconded in 2004, very soon took charge of Iraq and attempted to govern the country. In contrast, Syria lacks a unified governing body and is instead fragmented, with various extremist armed groups in control.

After the American-led invasion, the Iraqi National Army was disbanded and Baath Party members were removed from public office. It took nearly a year to create a new Constitution and hold elections to establish a new state. In Syria, although groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) are emerging as influential forces, there is no consensus among these groups about what the future Syrian state should look like after the Assad regime.

That said, unlike in Iraq in 2003, HTS in Syria has not disbanded the former Syrian Army. In fact, it has shown a willingness to pardon and incorporate many of its soldiers, which could prevent the country from descending into the same kind of anarchic state that Iraq experienced. However, even with this approach, the chaos that will follow in Syria is likely to be far less manageable than the situation in Iraq after 2003.

In contrast to Iraq in 2003, where there was little direct military intervention by neighboring countries, Syria in 2024 is seeing increased military involvement from Turkey, Israel and the United States. These countries are stepping up their activities, aiming to replace Russia and Iran and to gain influence in post-Assad Syria.

In short, while HTS, the new dominant power in Syria, appears to be trying to learn from the post-Hussein situation in Iraq, it may not be enough to prevent further instability.

The negative consequences of all-out chaos in Syria couldn’t be overstated.

The Benjamin Netanyahu administration in Israel will continue prioritizing its national security, regardless of opposition from the U.S. or Europe, and is likely to pursue the annexation of the West Bank.

Iran could be facing its greatest crisis since 1979, as it loses the military support of proxy forces like Hamas, Hezbollah and the former Syrian government. These setbacks could cause Tehran to become more entrenched in its view that the Iranian Islamic Republic is facing increased threats.

If the government in Tehran feels like it's backed into a corner, it may be more likely to accelerate its previously hesitant pursuit of nuclear weapons and move toward actual production for its own survival.

In response, Israel will consider taking military action to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, either in cooperation with the United States or unilaterally if necessary.

If the above scenario unfolds, Iran would likely adopt a more confrontational stance against Israel and the United States, possibly interfering in neighboring Arab countries. This could lead to widespread chaos in the Middle East. If the situation worsens, the conflict could spread to the Gulf waters, potentially disrupting the flow of energy from the region — which supplies the majority of Japan's crude oil and natural gas.

And as a former Japanese diplomat, I find it concerning that, by the end of 2024, Tokyo lacks a sense of urgency regarding this crisis.