Today's Tehran looks a lot like the Tokyo of the 1930s

The idea that “history sometimes rhymes” is always my starting point when analyzing international affairs.

Israel appears to be on the brink of launching a large-scale and more destructive retaliatory attack on Iran in response to its recent ballistic missile strikes on the Jewish state. The crucial question now is how Iran will react to this impending retaliation. I’m concerned that the current political situation in Tehran mirrors that of Tokyo in the 1930s, with similar tensions and divisions influencing the decisions.

The situation has become extremely grave, especially when we consider recent events over the past month. Starting on Sept. 17, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah that are suspected to have been booby trapped by Israel's Mossad spy agency unexpectedly exploded, injuring and killing many of their users. Then, on Sept. 27, Israel conducted an airstrike in Lebanon that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Following this, on Oct. 1, after launching ground operations in Lebanon, Israel faced a direct attack from Iran, which fired hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel.

Still, Iran must surely want to avoid a full-scale war with Israel, as such a conflict could jeopardize the stability of its regime. This raises the question: Why did Iran choose to launch an attack that could provoke a large-scale retaliatory strike from Israel? Many Middle East observers have been pondering this and a recent article in The New York Times offered some insights into the situation.

The article reported:

• There was a heated debate within the Iranian leadership over whether or not to launch a second missile attack on Israeli territory this time.
• The Iranian Revolutionary Guard argued that “the only option to show Iran's strength is to attack.”
• On the other hand, the moderates, including the reformist president, were cautious and concerned about the deterioration of relations with the United States, arguing that “Iran should exercise restraint.”
• In response, Iran's supreme leader agreed with the Revolutionary Guard's opinion and the president eventually justified the attack.

Other analyses in newspapers suggested the missile attack was essential for Iran to maintain support from its pro-Iranian allies and to pressure Israel into accepting a cease-fire in Gaza through diplomatic negotiations. Wait a minute, I've heard this somewhere before. If I remember and understand correctly, this situation seems reminiscent of the debates in 1930s Japan, where hard-liners in the military clashed with moderates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with both sides presenting their cases in front of then-Emperor Showa.

At that time, Japan's leadership was divided, much like Iran's is today, leading to intense debates between hard-liners and moderates regarding the country's policy vis-a-vis the United States. The emperor was not an absolute monarch nor a dictator, and was generally neutral and even skeptical of the military's hard-line arguments. However, due to events such as the attempted coups by naval and army officers in 1932 and 1936, along with an unstable domestic situation in Japan, and perhaps out of a concern for maintaining stability, the emperor gradually began to lean toward the military's viewpoints.

As my astute readers may have already noticed, there are similarities between the political atmosphere in Tokyo at the time and in today’s Tehran:

• The military, acutely aware of the country’s fragility and feeling “weak,” attempts to apply pressure on its enemies by demonstrating its “strength” in order to turn the situation in its favor.
• Conversely, the moderates, also mindful of the nation’s vulnerabilities, argue that if the military persists with its hard-line approach, large-scale conflict will become inevitable. This could ultimately put the country at a disadvantage and make it harder to maintain the national system.
• In response, the supreme leader, who prioritizes the stability of both the national system and his own regime but is not politically secure, seeks to balance the hard-liners and moderates to protect both the vulnerable national system and his position.

There is a critical flaw in this line of reasoning. A hard-line foreign policy can succeed only if the enemy is perceived as “weak” and lacks the “will to fight.” However, this approach will likely fail if the enemy is “strong” and unafraid of engaging in all-out war. Reports indicate that the Netanyahu administration is “not afraid of all-out war with Iran.” If this is the case, there is a significant risk that Iran, Israel and even the United States could find themselves on a collision course.

Throughout the 1930s, Japan managed to avoid a full-scale war with the United States, even after the 1931 Manchurian Incident. However, in 1941, the situation changed dramatically. As the war between Germany and the Soviet Union began in Europe and Japan moved its troops into French Indochina, Washington took a tougher stance on Tokyo. It demanded that Japan withdraw its forces from both French Indochina and China and imposed severe economic sanctions, including a ban on the export of oil and scrap iron to the island nation.

However, at that time, the Japanese military informed the emperor that they had no option but to take military action, arguing that accepting the United States' demands would undermine their achievements in China. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was still engaged in negotiations with the U.S., but as the United States issued even stricter demands, they concluded that a resolution was unlikely. This marked the most significant strategic miscalculation in Japanese history, ultimately leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Now, we can only pray that Iran is smarter than Japan of 80 years ago and does not make a similar strategic mistake.