Japan-U.S. alliance transforms with concrete 'two-plus-two' talks

The "two-plus-two" security talks between the foreign and defense ministers of the U.S. and Japan in Tokyo last month were a pleasant surprise and out of this world.

Japan's liberal media repeated their familiar argument, suggesting that closer integration with Washington might undermine Tokyo’s command independence and increase the nation's reliance on America's nuclear umbrella.

One newspaper went so far as to argue in its editorial that the "further acceleration of Japan-U.S. integration, mainly with China in mind, has been confirmed." It also warned that if this integration becomes too military-oriented, it could increase regional tensions. The paper further questioned, "whether Japan will be able to exercise independent judgment."

But as a former diplomat involved in previous two-plus-two meetings, I found the most recent iteration to be notably refreshing.

Be that as it may, one of the most important points in the joint statement, in my opinion, was this: "To facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies, the United States intends to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) reporting to the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)."

Curiously, the Japanese tentative translation uses the phrase “joint bilateral activities,” with the word “operations” being replaced by the more generic — and perhaps more palatable — term, “activities.” This change might make it difficult for the Japanese public to fully grasp the meaning if they read the translation. Additionally, the concept of "reconstituting the U.S. Forces Japan as a joint military command under the Indo-Pacific Command" may not be clearly understood by many Japanese.

In short, it means that the U.S. Forces Japan command will effectively become the U.S. joint forces command in Japan.

Moreover, the new commander will lead the U.S. side in joint operations involving Japan and the United States. While some liberal media in Japan worry that Tokyo’s "command independence" might be compromised, these concerns are unfounded because the Self-Defense Forces will not report to this new U.S. commander.

A careful reading of the joint statement reveals that, in addition to the establishment of the joint military command and the discussion of extended deterrence at the ministerial level, there is a third main feature of this year’s two-plus-two meeting: That is greater cooperation in their defense industries and on advanced technologies. This move is crucial, reflecting lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, such as how rapidly stockpiles of arms and ammunition can be depleted.

This area of Japan-U.S. cooperation involves aspects that are not well understood by the average Japanese when only reading the statement. However, the reality is that Japan is producing certain air-to-air missiles and missile defense systems that are interoperable with U.S. systems and is making them available to their American counterparts. This means that the two militaries will be fully prepared to fight together, sharing these systems in the event of, or in preparation for, military contingencies. Japan's neighbors should fully understand the implications of this cooperation.

There is something even more important. The reason I described a pleasant surprise that was out of this world at the beginning of this essay is that I believe a sea change has emerged from this bilateral meeting.

Looking back to the early 1990s, when the U.S. and Japanese authorities began the two-plus-two meetings, it was supposed to be "two-plus-two," but in reality, it was more like "two-plus-one and a half." The U.S. side often asked if a deputy secretary could attend instead, as the Cabinet secretaries were often too busy. Washington also informed Tokyo that holding the meeting every year would be difficult. At the time, having a full-fledged two-plus-two meeting in Japan was considered a dream come true.

Take, for example, the two-plus-two meeting held in New York in September 2000; at that time, I was the director for Japan-U.S. Security Treaty affairs. In retrospect, the joint statement issued at that meeting had almost no substance. Most of it focused on the spirit of the Japan-U.S. security alliance and day-to-day issues involving U.S. forces in Japan. There were almost no concrete references to military operations between Japan and the U.S. or details of command and control, as was the case this time. Nevertheless, Japanese officials praised themselves for producing a document of historical significance.

Even a decade later, the two-plus-two joint statement referred for the first time to new security domains such as those involving cyber issues and space, which everyone thought was groundbreaking at the time. In hindsight, however, it was all abstract, with no concrete substance. In fact, the situation was such that it was hardly possible to write anything in a concrete manner. Even the two-plus-two joint statement of January last year was not as substantial as this one. Times have changed that much.

But despite the long and challenging history of Japan-U.S. two-plus-two meetings, I believe that, having observed these gatherings for the past 30 years, this year's Tokyo meeting was truly groundbreaking.

This time, not only was a full two-plus-two meeting held in Japan, but there were also simultaneous meetings of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea defense ministers and "the Quad" (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) foreign ministers.

This indicates that the Japan-U.S. deterrent in the region is significantly enhancing its combat capabilities. The strategic importance of this improvement should be recognized not only by neighboring countries that might seek to alter the status quo through force, but also by the Japanese public.