The Taiwan question: 'Strategic ambiguity' and U.S. foreign policy

At the National People's Congress in March, China appeared to be toughening its stance on Taiwan by removing a key adjective from its official language regarding the island.

Premier Li Qiang in a government report delivered at the opening of the congress emphasized only "unification," dropping the mention of "peaceful" used in the previous year. While such changes have occurred before and may not be unprecedented, it signals a potentially more aggressive approach to Taiwan.

By "peaceful unification," China means that Taiwan would willingly accept and adopt the Chinese political system. However, it is unlikely that the people of Taiwan, who currently enjoy a democratic system, would agree to this. They are also aware of the ongoing situations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, which makes the prospect of accepting Chinese rule even less appealing. Therefore, what China refers to as "unification" would likely involve the use of military force against Taiwan.

However, if China resorts to military action and the West responds appropriately, China's economy could collapse. Economic sanctions would be imposed and oil supplies would be cut off. Given that China needs to focus on rebuilding its struggling economy, it would be impractical for Beijing to invade Taiwan, given the economic hit it would take. Therefore, if rational judgment prevails, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan can be deterred.

Still, what is most concerning is whether the next U.S. administration will handle a Taiwan contingency effectively. Specifically, will the U.S. continue its policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan? This policy involves being deliberately unclear about whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Former President Donald Trump has never clearly stated whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan while President Joe Biden has repeatedly, intentionally or not, affirmed that the U.S. would protect the island.

In a recent interview with Time Magazine, Biden was asked about the Taiwan issue. The Japan Times, in an insightful article on June 6, reported on the piece. Biden had much to say on the matter; the following are the best parts of the interview:

Time: You said on multiple occasions that you would use U.S. forces to defend Taiwan. What does that mean? Is it boots on the ground? What, what shape would that take?

Biden: It would depend on the circumstances. You know, by the way, I've made clear to Xi Jinping that we agree with — we signed on to previous presidents going way back — to the policy of, that, it is we are not seeking independence for Taiwan nor will we, in fact, not defend Taiwan if they if, if China unilaterally tries to change the status (quo). And so we're continuing to supply capacity. And, and we've been in consultation with our allies in the region.

Time: So if I might, not ruling out the possibility of deploying U.S. troops to Taiwan in the case of an invasion?

Biden: Not ruling out using U.S. military force. There’s a distinction between deploying on the ground, air power and naval power, etc.

Time: So you're maybe striking from bases in Philippines or Japan, is that...

Biden: I'm not going to get into that. You would then criticize me with good reason if I were to tell you.

What should we make of Biden's remarks? He continues to adhere to strategic ambiguity, focusing more on the extent of military engagement rather than definitively stating if the U.S. will be involved militarily. This stance persists despite his recent clearer statements and the bipartisan debate in the U.S. capital in the last few years about the necessity to reassess the policy regarding Taiwan.

It is undeniable that since U.S. President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the U.S. government has maintained the status quo in East Asia by employing a policy of strategic ambiguity. This approach aims to deter both a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and Taiwan's declaration of independence. It does so, as noted earlier, by deliberately not specifying how the United States would respond if China were to invade Taiwan.

However, as some now claim, this policy fails to address whether the U.S. can effectively respond to China's significantly improved military capabilities. The main distinction between strategic ambiguity and so-called strategic clarity lies in their underlying assumptions. The former operates under the belief that China's objective is to prevent Taiwan's independence whereas the latter assumes that China is determined to annex Taiwan.

I am concerned because the presence or absence of U.S. action in a Taiwan crisis and how that action is taken could significantly impact Japan's national security. Whether Trump fully understands the nuanced and changing nature of this issue is a major question that could affect the future of the alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region. Biden appears to understand this well, but it is unclear to what extent Trump comprehends it.

If the U.S. abandons its policy of strategic ambiguity, it would undermine the foundation of the 1972 normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, as well as between Japan and China. This foundation is based on the tacit understanding that the U.S., Japan and China would not rush to resolve the Taiwan issue. If the U.S. shifts to a policy of strategic clarity, China could use this as an excuse to openly abandon its promise to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, ultimately harming Taiwan's security.

Conversely, if the United States does not defend Taiwan, it will lose the trust of its East Asian allies. On the other hand, the allies are not willing to assume the obligation to defend Taiwan on behalf of the United States. As long as Washington's strategic ambiguity continues, these allies are unlikely to become involved in the Taiwan issue, so the U.S. strategy of ambiguity is beneficial to the allies as well.

Deterrence through strategic ambiguity has been somewhat effective so far. If this strategy is to be changed, a new mechanism for deterring aggression toward Taiwan must be established with China's agreement. Any policy change without such a mechanism will likely fail and the U.S. could find itself in a "red-line trap," having given itself no choice but to defend Taiwan without clear guidelines and risking direct military conflict with China.

There is some pessimism that Trump, if re-elected, might abandon Taiwan if China attempts to force unification. However, we won't know for sure until it happens. For now, we can only hope that Trump understands these points and makes informed and sound decisions regarding Taiwan.