Ifri-CIGS Op-Ed Series, "Crossing the line - A new status quo in the East China Sea?"

Deepening their partnership, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) and the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) are launching a series of op-eds, written both by Ifri and CIGS experts. This new series aims at providing the European and Asian public with original and different visions on the rapidly evolving international affairs.

The decision of the Japanese Government to purchase a number of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from their private owner sparked fury in Beijing. While condemning the initiative in very harsh terms, China's authorities have allowed some particularly violent anti-Japanese demonstrations and continue to use a battery of economic and diplomatic sanctions to keep the pressure on Japan. Beijing accuses Tokyo of breaking the status quo set in 1972, when leaders of the two countries agreed to set aside the issue of disputed islands to normalize their diplomatic relations and develop their cooperation. However, on the Japanese side, the national government's decision to purchase the islands was meant to thwart the projects of the ultra-nationalist mayor of Tokyo, who was raising public donations in order to acquire and develop the Senkaku/Diaoyu. The ultimate goal of the Japanese government was therefore to reduce the risk of angering China. This "nationalization" has also not led to any beefing-up of the Japanese presence on the islands.

Such spikes of fever between China and Japan are not without precedent. However, the gravity of this latest episode raises the question of whether a point of no return has been reached in the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Firstly, the repeated and increasingly serious frictions between China and Japan in recent years seem to have led to a certain radicalization of public opinion in both countries, which in vast majority feeds very negative feelings toward its neighbor. This trend is instrumentalised by politicians on both sides, but particularly by Chinese leaders who divert the public's attention away from growing social and political problems and direct it against Japan. In this context, excesses of "patriotism" from both sides are going to be more difficult to control.

Political authorities will also be more constrained to adopt an uncompromising attitude on issues related to national sovereignty. Therefore, a critical question becomes how to ease bilateral tensions without losing face, not only towards its Asian neighbor, but also toward its own public opinion. In this context we see the emergence of a vicious circle of fueling nationalism and provocation.

Another important and relatively new element is China's efforts to methodically deconstruct the legal grounds on which Japan bases its sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu. In particular, Beijing has launched a diplomatic and legal battle, submitting its claims to the UN to define the outer limits of its continental shelf in the East China Sea, and denying the validity of a number of legal1 and historical arguments brought by Japan. In doing so, China's objective seems to be pushing Japan to recognize the reality of a territorial dispute around the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Consequently, Japan has adopted a rather uncomfortable public position: Tokyo has no choice but to justify its control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, even if it does not admit any ambiguity regarding its sovereignty over the islets...