U.S.-Japan Alliance under the New Defense Cooperation Guideline

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Security Environment in Asia
- 1990s: regional contingencies (DPRK/Taiwan), humanitarian crisis
- 2000s: rise of asymmetrical threats (AQ), proliferation of WMD
- 2010s: (re)rise of power politics (CHN), (re)rise of extremism (ISIS)
- 2020s: global shift of balance of power (CHN)

U.S. “Contested” Global Power
- Withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan
- “Rebalancing” to Asia
- Reluctant engagement (fiscal constraints..etc)
- Ukraine Crisis
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- rise of ISIS
- spread of extremism
- Mismatch between strategy and reality
- flawed consensus after the mid-term election

Japan: Strategic Realignment
- Diversifying strategic partnership: Australia, ASEAN, India, NATO, Russia...etc
- Reforming legal basis of security policy: NSS, defense equipment transfer, CSD...etc
- Fiscal constraints
- Abenomics, Tax reform, TPP, energy policy...etc

Agendas for U.S.-Japan Alliance
- Revising U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline: All-Phases/Seamless Cooperation?
- Asian security order: maritime stability through “asymmetrical equilibrium?”
- Whither strategy towards China?: US-Japan strategic coordination?
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Regional Level

Korean Peninsula

Taiwan Straits

National Level

1996 US-JPN Joint Declaration on Security
1999 Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

周辺事態と後方地域支援
Japan’s Defense and Security Policy Developments Under the Abe Administration

- National Security Strategy (2013.12)
- National Security Bureau (2014.1)
- Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (2014.4)
- Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation (2014.7)
Gray-zone Challenges
Infringements of territory (water/air-space) without crossing the military threshold

A2/AD Challenges
A2 prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations. AD aims to prevent freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under an enemy’s direct control.

Keywords: Seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to **ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved.** In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.


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Previous Guideline (1997)
- Cooperation under normal circumstances
- Actions in response to the armed attack against Japan
- Cooperation in **situation in areas surrounding Japan**

3 situational division

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A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime
1. Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance (ISR)
2. Air and Missile Defense
3. Maritime Security
4. Asset Protection
5. Training and Exercise
6. Logistic Support
7. Use of Facilities

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
1. Non Combatant Evacuation Operation
2. Maritime Security
3. Measure to Deal with Refugee
4. Search and Rescue
5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
6. Logistic Support
7. Use of Facilities

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
a) Operational Concept
1. Operations to Defend Air-Space
2. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile
3. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas
4. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks
5. Cross-Domain Operations

b) Operational Support Activities
1. Communications and Electronics
2. Search and Rescue
3. Logistic Support
4. Use of Facilities
5. CBRN

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
1. Asset Protection
2. Search and Rescue
3. Maritime Operations
4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile
5. Logistic Support

Collective Self-Defense

Peacetime
Gray-zone Challenges
Individual Self-Defense
Armed Attack against Japan
Maritime Security Challenges: Three Domains

• **Gray-Zone Coercion**
  - **Challenges:** Infringements of territory (water/air-space) without crossing the military threshold (NDPG, 2010/13)
  - **Need to:** develop, field, and operate military and paramilitary forces to contest Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas, without necessarily causing casualties: \(\rightarrow\) (possible) symmetric competition

• **Low-Intensity Conflict**
  - **Challenges:** Accidental crushes, limited military assaults
  - **Need to:** develop and field systems to deny Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas \(\rightarrow\) asymmetric competition (China vs neighbors)

• **A2/AD Challenges**
  - **Challenges:** High-end military confrontations
  - **Need to:** develop counter-A2/AD capability (operational access), missile defense, enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options
    \(\rightarrow\) asymmetric competition (US-China)
The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met:

1. When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2. When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and
3. When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level.

1. When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.
2. When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
3. Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.
Matrix of the Legislation for Peace and Security

Peacetime

- Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas etc. (Existing)
- Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas etc. (New)
- Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment (Existing)
- Protection of weapons/other equipment of U.S. and other countries’ armed forces (New)
- Provision of supplies/services to the U.S. Armed Forces in peacetime (Expansion)
  - Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided
- International Peace Cooperation Activities U.N. PKO (Expansion)
  - Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. protection of civilian)
  - Adoption of ROE for use of weapons (small arms) to better align with current U.N. standard
- Internationally coordinated peace and security operations (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework) (New)

Support activities (including logistics support) in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security (Expansion)
  - Support activities to armed forces of foreign countries (not only the U.S.)
  - Expand the scope of support activities
- Ship Inspection Operations (Expansion)
  - Enable operations for peace and security of the international community

Response to an armed attack against Japan (Existing)
- Response to an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival (New)
  → “Use of Force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions”

“Three New Conditions”
1. When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness,
2. When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protects its people,
3. Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary

Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC)

* Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands etc.