Crisis Communication amid the Fukushima Tragedy
— A Postmortem Analysis and Recommendations —

Presentation Material prepared for
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Purposes and Structure of Today's Presentation

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy administration, left intriguing remarks at the time of the Cuban Crisis: **"There is no longer such a thing as strategy, only crisis management."** Nonetheless, the indisputable fact is that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, under which Secretary McNamara served as one of the "Best and Brightest," encountered a series of fiascoes in crisis management as well as in strategy, including the Vietnam War. Although almost four decades have passed since the tragic Vietnam War, our society have not yet become robust or resilient enough to fend off crises, ranging from the 9/11 terrorist attack and the Enron scandal to the Fukushima disaster and the Senkaku Island dispute. **In short, crisis management is a top priority for both governments and businesses.**

1. Introduction: Preventive Measures and Novel Theories

The Significance of Crises

2. Crisis Communication in the Globalization Age

The Importance of Communication for Crisis Management and Trust Building

3. Recommendations for Better Communications

The Importance of Public-mindedness and Postmortem Analyses

1. Introduction: Preventive Measures and Novel Theories

The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis. . . .

The solution . . . had been at least partially anticipated . . . ; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored. . .

The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived.

新理論は、危機に対する直接的反応として出現する。　…

解決方法は、少なくとも部分的には予測されていた…。そして危機感が無ければ、そうした予測は無視されるものなのだ…。

危機の意義は、道具立てを変える機会が遂に到来したことを示す指標を与えることにある。

[Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962, pp. 75-76.]

Crises: A Typology: Innumerable Types of Crises

A Typology of Collective Stress Situations

	Global/National	Regional	Segmental	Local
Sudden	Nuclear war Enemy invasion Economic crash Rebellion	**Earthquake** **Tsunami** Typhoon/Hurricane Major flood **Nuclear plant meltdown** ***(Severe Accident)***	**Cyber/Mechanical malfunction** ***(Global Supply Chain)*** Ethnic massacre Corporate layoff Expropriation of property of a class	**Blackout** ***(in the Tokyo region)*** Tornado Explosion Terrorism Ghetto riot Plant closing
Gradual	Global warming Environmental decay Depression Epidemic Government breakdown	Drought Famine Price collapse Land exhaustion	Aborigines dying off Obsolete occupation Group discrimination Addictions to harmful substances	Decline of main industry Environmental pollution Land sinking Coal seam fire
Chronic	Poverty Endemic disease Wartime bombing Colonialism	Backward regions Endemic disease Civil war	Enslavement Class discrimination Persecution Gender discrimination	Slum, ghetto High crime areas

Source: The author's modification and rearrangement of a table in Allen H. Barton's article, "Disaster and Collective Stress," in *What Is A Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions*, edited by Ronald W. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli, 2005.

Post-Fukushima Nuclear Security Scheme

Opportunity to Examine Social Resilience against Nuclear Power Crises

The Fukushima tragedy is now inundated with references including major four investigation reports published by the government, the national diet, an private organization and TEPCO (cf. Nikkei, November 27, 2012).

Selected References

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Post-Fukushima Nuclear Security Scheme

Time to Examine the "Myth" about Nuclear Power Safety

Not A Feeble, Ineffective and Inefficient, Limited and Brittle, and Separate Scheme
But A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme

1. Disaster Preparedness

Difficulty of predicting tsunami impacts on NPPs
Ill-designed Crisis Management : Underestimation of Sever Accidents

2. Disaster Responses

Recovery operations amidst earthquakes and tsunami warnings
Inevitable human errors
Disruption of communications and evacuation
Difficulty of handling simultaneously occurring crises (Fukushima I and II)

3. Disaster Recovery

Long way to restore "trust" and to scrap "safely" Fukushima I NPP
Difficulty of restoring activities in radiation contaminated areas

4. Evaluations

Redesigning disaster preparedness: NPP Security System, Redesigning contingency plans
Importance of communication: Intra- and inter-organizational, and public
Importance of multi-sector collaboration: Integrated incident Command System
Elaboration of new energy and nuclear power policies

Crisis Management: Preventive Measures

Cf. Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins, *Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them*, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2008, p. 154



2. Crisis Communication in the Globalization Age

"Investigators Raise Questions About Pilots"
[国際間のコミュニケーション]

"Assisted by interpreters and flanked by South Korean crash investigators, U.S. investigators have spent hours questioning the pilots and cabin crew. The investigators spent roughly 10 hours Monday in the pilot interviews and continued them Tuesday, but the sessions have been hampered by the limited English skills of the cockpit crew, said people familiar with the matter."

[Wall Street Journal (Andy Pasztor), July 9, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323823004578595862385548612.html]

"Draghi Says ECB 'Sharpened' Communication by Pledging Low Rates"
[指導者・専門家の間でのコミュニケーション]

"European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said the Governing Council enhanced its communication last week by giving an outlook on interest rates at a time when the euro-region economy remains weak."

[Bloomberg News (Craig Stirling), July 8, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-08/draghi-says-ecb-sharpened-communication-by-pledging-low-rates.html]

2. Crisis Communication in the Globalization Age

Communication during Serious Nuclear and Radiological Crises
[深刻な核・放射線関連危機の際のコミュニケーション]

"The IAEA *Manual for First Responders to A Radiological Emergency* [published October 2006] states '[crises] resulted in the public taking some actions that were inappropriate or unwarranted, and resulted in significant adverse psychological and economic effects.'"

[David Ropeik, "Risk Communication: More than Facts,"
***IAEA Bulletin* 50-1, September 2008, p. 58. (Available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish)]**

"Journalism and Public Criticism during Serious Crises"
[危機におけるジャーナリズムや公衆の反応]

"In journalism, they keep score by toppled empires and naked emperors. The profession's calling, as it were, is to question authority in its every form. . . . Public skewerings are awful—you're indignant and enraged. But no matter how innocent you think you are, or how superbly you think your organization is handling its troubles, it doesn't matter. Reporters are not in the business of telling your side of the story.

[Jack Welch and Suzy Welch, *Winning*, New York: HarberCollins, 2005, pp. 157-158]

Nuclear Energy Is Still Aspired in Asia

Despite the Fukushima Tragedy, Asia Remains Enthusiastic about Nuclear Energy

The World's Nuclear Reactors (as of July 1, 2013)

Country	No. of Reactors				Electricity Generation
	Operable	Under Construction	Planned	Proposed	Billion kWh (2012)
World	**432**	**68**	**162**	**316**	**2,346**
United States	100	3	9	15	770.7
France	58	1	1	1	407.4
Germany	9	0	0	0	94.1
Asia					
Japan	**50**	**3**	**9**	**3**	**17.2**
South Korea	23	5	5	0	143.5
India	20	7	18	39	29.7
China	17	28	53	118	92.7
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	16	0.0
Vietnam	0	0	4	6	0.0
Turkey	0	0	4	4	0.0
Indonesia	0	0	2	4	0.0
Kazakhstan	0	0	2	2	0.0
Bangladesh	0	0	2	0	0.0
Thailand	0	0	0	5	0.0
Malaysia	0	0	0	2	0.0
North Korea	0	0	0	1	0.0

Source: World Nuclear Association (WNA)

Nuclear Energy Is Still Aspired in China

Amid the July NIMBY activism especially at Jiāngmén (江门), Japan Should Pay Attention to Plans developed by China National Nuclear Corp. (中国核工业集团 (CNNC)) and China General Nuclear Power Group (中国广核集团 (CGNPG))



Communication for Multi-Agency Collaboration

Beyond Cultural and Physical Constraints

Types	Challenges
Organization	Clear and effective leadership: Competent Incident Commander Adequate multi-agency response procedure: Smart Incident Command System Clear and reasonable role and responsibility of each agency Clear coordination principle of conflicting goals
Communication Mode	Clear common communication structure Communication of accurate, consistent, and complete information Communication with an appropriate interval
Information/Knowledge Management	Adequate knowledge/information management Clear common operational picture
Situation Awareness	Entire membership of coordinating agency Adequate common situation awareness Adequate understanding of each agency's role, capability, and resources
Equipment	Adequate and compatible communications technology Common level of sophisticated equipment
Cultural Issues	Compatible procedures Adequate understanding of each agency's organizational culture
Training	Sufficient multi-agency training exercise Each agency's working experience with other agencies

Source: The author's modification and rearrangement of a table in the article of Paul Salmon *et al*., "Coordination during Multi-agency Emergency Response: Issues and Solutions," *Disaster Prevention and Management*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 2011).

Communication Problems at Each Stage

Not A Feeble, Ineffective and Inefficient, Limited and Brittle, and Separate Scheme
But A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme

1. Disaster Preparedness: More Robust, Not Feeble

Building of A Communication System to Elaborate A Crisis Management Plan
Building of A Communication System for a Well-informed Nation or Region

2. Disaster Responses: More Effective and Efficient

Building of A Communication System within the Crisis Management Team
Building of A Communication System for Intra-Agency Collaboration
Knowledge Communication for Crisis Assessment and Monitoring
Knowledge Communication for Crisis Response to Specific Needs
Risk Communication for Disaster Mitigation and Evacuation
Mass Communication for Prevention of Ungrounded Rumors

3. Disaster Recovery: More Versatile, Resilient and Collaborative

Postmortem Analyses to Share and Restore the Lessons Learned
Knowledge Retention/Prevention of Knowledge Loss
Knowledge Dissemination to Enhance a More Resilient Nation or Region

Postmortem Analysis:
Disruption of Communications

Hypothesis: Culprit of the Exacerbated Situation Is Insufficient and Disrupted Communication?

A Feeble Communication System within the Crisis Management Team
- *TEPCO (Tokyo HQ, Fukushima I NPP & II NPPs, Thermal Power Stations, . . .)*
- *Central Gov't (Prime Minister's Office, NISA, NSC, FDMA, MOD/SDF, MEXT, . . .)*
- *Local Governments (Prefecture, Town)*

A Feeble Communication System for Intra-Agency Collaboration
- *Prime Minister's Office-NISA-NSC-TEPCO*
- *Central and Local Governments*
- *Embassies and Consulates in Japan*

Risk Communication for Disaster Mitigation and Evacuation
- *Local Governments, Residents incl. Vulnerable People during the Disaster*

Mass Communication to Prevent the Explosion of Ungrounded Rumors
- *Media both Domestic and Foreign*

Knowledge Communication for Crisis Assessment and Monitoring
- *Prime Minister's Office-NISA-NSC-TEPCO*
- *MEXT (SPEEDI, Monitoring Posts)*

Knowledge Communication for Crisis Response to Specific Needs
- *Local Governments, MOD/SDF-U.S. Forces, IAEA, U.S. NRC*

Feeble Communication System: First Responders

Amidst the Catastrophe, the Planned Scheme Was Evaporating

—Disaster response is merely the continuation of war by other means—

TEPCO: Absence of Key Incident Commanders (ICs)
Chairman (in China, retuned to TEPCO HQ on 12th at 16:00), and President (in Nara, on 12th at 09:00);
Obscure incident command system (ICS)

Governments: Serious Damage to the Off-site Center and Key Infrastructure
Ill-trained ICs (NISA) and Incompetent Advisors (NSC),
Obscure ICS and Prime Minister's Direct Intervention
Neglecting the Danger of Mobile Phone and Radio Communications

At the time of the 3/11 Crisis, the government's pre-crisis plan proved to be based on a sandy foundation (obscure ICS) with optimistic scenarios, leading to the establishment of *ad hoc* crisis management scheme



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Figure 3.2.1-1

Feeble Communication System Because of Ill-Preparedness

Impracticable Plans, Long-Shrouded in the "Safety Myth," Led to Disappearance of Trust

Government:
Perfunctory Nature of
Evacuation Plans and Exercises
Prior to the 3/11 Crisis

According to a questionnaire survey, prior to the 3/11 Crisis, most of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas **did not experience any evacuation drills**. Even in the towns of Futaba and Okuma, **less than 20% of people had experience of such drills** (See the Right Chart).



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, p. 58 (Japanese version p. 408)

Ill-Preparedness Spewed Out *ad hoc* Schemes

'Improvised' Crisis Management Emerged

Central Government: ***Serious Damage to the Off-site Center and Key Infrastructure***

Ill-trained ICs (NISA) and Obscure ICS and Govn't Silo Structure

Prime Minister Office: Direct Intervention (but division within the Office)

Local Governments: ***Serious Damages amidst Multiple Disasters***

Neglecting the Danger of Mobile Phone and Radio Communications

Amidst the complex and catastrophic crisis, the prime minister was preoccupied with the nuclear crisis, passing other parts of crisis management to the hands of his subordinates.



Cf. UK Case: Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)

Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 3.2.2.-1

Risk Communication (1)

Risk Communication: For Those Who Need Vital Information

Government: Ill-trained PIO/Team at NISA

Evacuation Guidance issued by Local Governments with varying success rates

Certainly Connected (Leaving No People Left)?

Well-Timed (Leaving Ample Time and Means to Evacuate)?

Well-Coordinated (Avoiding Traffic Jams)

Sufficient (Leaving No Problems Left Behind)?

According to a questionnaire survey, a majority of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas was helped via **risk communication organized by local governments possessing scanty information** (See the Right Chart); but the evacuees were instructed to leave their houses **expecting that evacuation would be very brief.**



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 4.2.2-2

Risk Communication (2)

Risk Communication vs. Mass Communication

Government: Ill-trained PIO/Team at NISA

Crisis information provided by Local Governments Proved to Be Ineffective

Certainly Connected (Leaving No People Left)?

Well-Timed (Leaving Ample Time and Means to Evacuate)?

Well-Coordinated (Avoiding Traffic Jams)

Sufficient (Leaving No Problems Left Behind)?

According to a questionnaire survey, a larger number of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas were depended on mass communication through TV, Radio, and Internet carrying scanty and unreliable information (See the Right Chart); accordingly evacuees were not effectively instructed where to evacuate.



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 4.2.1-2

Risk Communication (3)

Evacuation from the Invisible Danger

Misguided Evacuation Guidance

MEXT (Ministry of Education) Was Criticized for keeping the SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information) as a "White Elephant."





Source: Prof. Yukio Hayakawa; see also http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65845-12.html

Risk Communication (4)

Inadequate Evacuation Led to Ordeals of Evacuees

Evacuation Information: Was It Well-connected, Timely, Well-coordinated, and Sufficient?

According to a questionnaire survey, over 40% of Namie Town people experienced an emergency evacuation to radioactive contaminated areas based on incorrect information (See the Right Chart).





Source: NAIIC, Final Report p. 56, Table 4.2.2-6 (Japanese version p. 408)

Risk Communication (5)

Evacuation Process: Orderly? Timely? Correctly? or Adequately?

Correct and Updated Evacuation Information:
Was It Well-connected, Timely, Well-coordinated, and Sufficient?

Confusing Expression: "Nenno-tame (to make absolutely sure)"

According to a questionnaire survey, Amidst the 3/11 Crisis, evacuees closer to the NPP left their houses earlier and were forced to **migrate from one shelter to another**; over 50% of Namie Town people **experienced 5 or more evacuations** (See the Right Chart).

Experience of Evacuation by the End of March, 2011



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 2.2.2-4

Risk Communication (6)

One-Size-Fits-All Information Is Not Enough

Evacuation Information: Was It Sufficient?

Vulnerable People during the Disaster (“災害弱者”) Should Be Well Taken Care of.

Hospitals and Their Number of Patients

within a 20km Radius of the Fukushima Daiichi



People at Hospitals ②④⑤ Successfully and Swiftly Evacuated

Ordeal of Evacuation on March 14: Patients of Hospital ⑥



Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Figures 4.2.3-1 and -3.

Mass Communication (1)

Poorly trained Public Information Officers (PIOs)

Inaccurate and Unclear Information Led Only to Uncontrollable Confusion and Unallayed Suspicion

The Importance of Recognition of Strengths and Weaknesses of the Mass Media

1. The mass media play a dominant role at almost all levels of communication on nuclear emergency issues

(cf. Tanja Perko *et al*., "Media Reporting of Nuclear Emergencies: The Effect of Transparent Communication in a Minor Nuclear Event," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 52-63; IAEA, "Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency," in Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2006, pp. 1-86)

2. Nuclear events predictably induce enormous media coverage.

3. No one can control over the mass media's information distribution because of freedom of the press.

4. The mass media can have enormous audiences, but they have several limits—

(a) Even huge audiences represent only about 10% of the population and the audiences.

(b) Those large media audiences are often specific segments of the public. Public Information Officers (PIOs) must understand local media and local media audiences.

(c) The mass media, especially network media, tend to paint a broad picture. Media statements may be sufficient for a general news audience but they do little to inform persons in a specific community whether they should evacuate at the time of emergency.

(d) Some media do not carry news reports even in a community struck by disaster because of their news-value judgments.

(cf. Joseph Scanlon, "Unwelcome Irritant or Useful Ally? The Mass Media in Emergencies," in *Handbook of Disaster Research*, edited by Havidán Rodríguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, New York: Springer, 2007)

Mass Communication (2)

Special Considerations in the Globalization Age

Foreign Language Barriers for Japanese: Danger of "Lost in Translation"

1. Ill-Prepared to Disseminate Information Abroad

(a) In regard to information dissemination from the government and TEPCO after the disaster, there were issues such as delayed and conflicting information or TEPCO providing only a 100-page scientific report. As a correspondent . . . from Japan, my frustrations mounted in on-site reporting. (Kyung Lah, CNN)

(b) The German media reported that crisis management, especially information dissemination, of the Japanese government and TEPCO was inadequate. (Ulrike Scheffer, Der Tagesspiegel)

(c) There was a lack of information that explained the accident in simple terms to the general public, who did not have the necessary scientific knowledge to understand the nuclear plant accident. The foreign media was also confused. (Mohamed Abd-Ellatif Shokeir, Al Jazeera)

(Int'l Journalist Symposium, "The Great East Japan Earthquake and the Role of the Media," March 23, 2012)

2. English vs. Japanese

Japanese habitually understates. English habitually overstates. . . . An engineer may have all the vocabulary needed to talk about turbines, but will not understand an English-language film or news broadcast.

(Frank Gibney, *Japan: The Fragile Superpower*, New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1975, pp. 146-160)

3. Mistranslation: An Unavoidable Global Phenomenon

(a) Time and again commentators in the media have raised questions about misunderstanding between peoples, about misinterpretation, in short, about mistranslation.

(b) Politeness conventions operating in a northern European language and in Japanese, forms of address vary enormously according to criteria of social status, age, gender and familiarity, and to make a mistake could cause embarrassment at best, offence at worst.

(c) English readers like direct speech in quotation marks, whereas German readers prefer indirect speech. English readers like a densely information-packed opening paragraph, while German readers prefer succinct introductions, often in one short sentence.

(Bielsa Esperança, *Translation in Global News*, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 5-7, 136)

Knowledge Communication (1)

Strengths and Weaknesses of Experts

Experts Who Have In-depth professional but Narrowly-focused Knowledge
Experts Are "Prisoners of Their Experience," Disregarding New Evidence

The Importance of Recognition of Strengths and Weaknesses of Experts

1. Experts play the role in fighting against "populist" excesses

Biased reactions to risks are an important source of erratic and misplaced priorities in public policy. Lawmakers and regulators may be overly responsive to the irrational concerns of citizens, both because of political sensitivity and because they are prone to the same cognitive biases as other citizens, mesmerized by the media competing for attention-grabbing headlines.

(cf. Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, pp. 141-142; See also Cass Robert Sunstein, *On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can Be Done*, Macmillan, 2009)

2. Expert knowledge regarding low-probability hazards

Laypersons tend to be strongly preoccupied with their immediate past, seeing their future as a mirror of their past," and letting "emotionalism" stymy technological progress.

(cf. Daniel Kahneman *et al*. eds., *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 465-486)

3. Limited capability and overconfidence of experts/Deformation professionnelle because limited availability of data.

In some situations, failure to appreciate the limits of "available" data may lull people into complacency. . . . Unfortunately, experts, once they are forced to go beyond their data and rely on judgment, may be as prone to overconfidence as laypeople.

(cf. Daniel Kahneman *et al*. eds., *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 475)

Knowledge Communication (2)

Information Overload and Information Scarcity

Solutions to Information Overload:

Reducing Information Required or Enhance Information Processing Capability

Solutions to Information Scarcity:

Enhancing Communication Capability, Organizationally and Institutionally

1. Solutions to Information Overload

(a) Environmental Management (reducing uncertainty, by enhancing crisis preparedness), **(b) Increasing "Slack Resources,"** and **(c) Creation of Self-Contained Tasks** by physically aggregating specialists together for ease of communication (eliminating the need for both lateral communication across departments and vertical supervisory control) or by creating more generalists—personnel who can perform more than a single specialty.

(d) Investment in Vertical Information Systems (Organizational or Institutional Approaches): By changing the length of time between decisions, **(e) Widening the Scope of the Data Base** by using a standardized language, **(f) Establishment of Coordinating Mechanisms** (e.g., *ad hoc* task forces) across units/organizations, facilitating quite simple and informal direct contact.

(cf. James L. Bess, *Collegiality and Bureaucracy in the Modern University*, New York: Teachers College Press, 1988, pp. 36-52; See also Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Complex Organizations*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1973.)

2. Solutions to Information Scarcity

(a) Establishment of a Weberian Efficient Bureaucracy: Offering all the optimum possibility for carrying though the principle of specializing administrative functions . . . 'without regard for persons.'" (Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, English trans., 1978, pp. 975)

(b) Preventing Bureaucratic Inefficiency: "Every bureaucracy seeks further to increase through the means of *keeping secret* its knowledge and intentions. (*ibid*., p. 992)

(c) Development of Collegiate Bodies: "Collegiate bodies, as a type, emerge on the basis of the rational specialization of functions and the rule of expert knowledge. (*ibid*., p. 996; See also, Malcolm Waters, "Collegiality, Bureaucratization, and Professionalization: A Weberian Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No. 5 (March 1989), pp. 945-972)

Knowledge Communication (3)

Leaders and Intelligence Officers

Dilemmas of the Relations between Leaders and Intelligence Officers

Several Notes for Successful Knowledge Communication:

Understanding An Asymmetrical Relationship between the Leader and the the Expert:
Leader without Expertise but with Authority, Expert without Authority with Expertise

1. Dilemmas of the Relations between Leaders and Intelligent Officers

(a) Dogmatic Leaders vs. Open-minded Leaders: Appropriate "chemistry" is totally different

(b) Delicate Balance between Intimacy and Detachment: If leaders shows their honest feelings toward intelligence, intelligent officers will make unpleasant information more palatable through selective reporting or wait for the most opportune moment for reporting.

(c) Multiple Sources to Avoid Falling Victim to Leaders' Own Biases or Political Expediency

(d) Danger of Accessing to too much of "raw" intelligence; Keeping the leader status to avoid becoming his own intelligence officer

(e) Information Overload vs. Information Scarcity

(f) Clear Information vs. Ambiguous Information: It is rare that the implications of intelligence information leave the leader with only one clear option. Intelligence is ambiguous and uncertain

2. Several Notes for Successful Knowledge Communication

(a) The astute adviser will have to assume the role of tactful educator.

(b) Most people in high places have too much to read; intelligence information and judgments are best delivered orally to those who need them.

(c) When it is essential that something should appear on the record, experienced officers produce a written intelligence appreciation.

(d) Many valuable lessons learned have been forgotten or lost by the time of next crises.

(e) Success ultimately hinges upon the quality of higher level leadership.

(cf. Michael I. Handel, ed.: *Leaders and Intelligence*, Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass., 1989, pp. 5-17)

"A competent leader can get efficient service from poor troops, while on the contrary an incapable leader can demoralize the best of troops." (John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, 1931)

3. Recommendations:

The Importance of Public-mindedness and Postmortem Analyses

"The overall responsibility of power is to govern as reasonably as possible in the interest of the state and its citizens. A duty in that process is to keep well-informed, to heed information, to keep mind and judgment open and to resist the insidious spell of wooden-headedness."

権力の総合的責任とは、国家と国民の利益になるよう、出来得る限り理性的に統治するということである。この過程における義務とは、状況に十分通暁し、情報に注意し、知力と判断力に柔軟性を保ち、愚鈍・鈍感という、油断すれば今にもかかってしまう魔力に抵抗することである。

[Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, p. 32]

"For 13 days in October 1962, President John F. Kennedy faced the task of avoiding Armageddon. . . . Kennedy found himself facing off against his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, who unanimously recommended a full-scale attack and invasion of Cuba, as did other top advisers. . . . Desperate for an escape hatch, the president found one in history . . . Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August*. . . . '[The book] had a huge impact on his thinking, becoming the dominant metaphor for JFK on the crisis," says Graham Allison, a Harvard political scientist."

[Boston Globe (Jordan Michael Smith), "Did a Mistake Save the World? October 21, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/10/20/cuban-missile-crisis-did-mistake-save-world/ hYf8nEauKjnul3fmFCg3PM/story.html]

Crisis Communication amid the Fukushima Tragedy
— A Postmortem Analysis and Recommendations —

Thank You!/Arigatou Gozai-mashita/ありがとうございました。

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