Quick-Fixing: Near-Rationality in Consumption and Savings Behavior

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- Challenges for taking this further:
 - Countless ways to be "almost optimal"
 - May or may not matter for macro questions
- This paper: confronts the near-rationality hypothesis with new evidence

- Theory: consumption-savings with costly reoptimization, costless quick-fixes
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 - Quick-fixes mostly unexplained by HH characteristics, but essential for explaining MPC heterogeneity and size-dependence
- Quantification suggests that small optimization costs <u>matter for macro</u>
 - ► Tiny opportunity costs of quick-fixing: \$17 per quarter
 - ► Matters for size-dependence, front-loadedness, and incidence dependence

Today's Talk

A Simple Model

Survey Design

Empirical Results

Quantitative Model

Conclusion

1. A Simple Model

A Two-Period Problem

- Household lives for two periods $t \in \{1, 2\}$
- Receives income stream y_1, y_2
- Preferences over streams of consumption (c_1, c_2) given by:

$$u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)$$

where $\beta > 0$ and $u : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ is strictly concave

• Choice: consumption vs. saving in risk-free bond $(R = 1/\beta)$ at t = 1

Fully Rational Household Behavior

Rational Behavior

The household solves Program (R)

$$U^*(z) = \max_{c_1, c_2} u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)$$
s.t. $c_1 + \frac{c_2}{R} = y_1 + \frac{y_2}{R}$ (R)

Consumption policy function:

$$c_1^*(y_1, y_2) = \frac{R(y_1) + y_2}{1 + R}$$
 $t \in \{1, 2\}$

Near-Rationality and Quick-Fixing

• Near-rational household has a "quick-fix" consumption function c^q :

$$c_1=c^q(y_1,y_2)$$

e.g., fixing c with $c^q(y_1,y_2)\equiv \bar{c}$, fixing s with $c^q(y_1,y_2)\equiv y_1-\bar{s}$

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
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- To instead deviate and pick $c_1^*(y_1, y_2)$ costs $\kappa_q > 0$ in utility
 - Quick-fix might be easier to think about, avoid transaction costs, ...
- Household quick-fixes if and only if:


$$\underbrace{U^*(y_1, y_2)}_{\text{Rational payoff}} - \underbrace{U^q(y_1, y_2)}_{\text{QF payoff}} \le \kappa_q \tag{NR}$$




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- **Desired data**: consumption policy functions
- Survey experiments, rather than observational data, are necessary

2. Survey Design

Sampling Design and Overview

- N = 4,981 US households, October and November 2023
- Sample approximates US population in terms of gender, age, income, education, region, and broadly captures the wealth distribution Balance

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- Sample approximates US population in terms of gender, age, income, education, region, and broadly captures the wealth distribution
- Main question: spending/saving responses to 14 scenarios [next slide]
- Additional data: household size, annual income, income risk, monthly spending, liquid wealth, illiquid wealth, debt, income expectations, income autocorrelation

Introduction

In this survey, we are seeking to understand how your household reacts to unanticipated changes in income. By "household", we mean everyone who usually lives with you in your primary residence including yourself (but excluding roommates and renters).

You will be presented with various hypothetical scenarios that involve shifts in your income, and we will ask you how such changes would impact your household's spending and saving. Below, we provide a short description of what we mean by "spending" and "saving". Please read them carefully.

Spending: Spending includes all money spent on goods and services, including rent. Goods include durable goods (such as electronics, furniture, or car maintenance) and nondurable goods (such as groceries, vacations, or gasoline).

Saving: Saving means that, instead of using money today, you reserve it for future use. Examples of savings include cash reserves, money in bank accounts, retirement accounts, financial assets, or real estate. Repaying debt is also an important form of saving. By repaying debt today, you owe less money in the future, which means that more money is available for future use.

In random order: whether you see gains or losses first

On the next pages, you will consider hypothetical situations where your household unexpectedly incurs a

one-time income loss today.

That is, your household's income will be lower for one month due to a one-time income loss. The one-time income loss comes unexpectedly.

In random order: \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000, \$10,000

A one-time income loss Situation 1

Consider a hypothetical situation where your household unexpectedly incurs a

one-time income loss of \$100 today.

How would this one-time income loss cause your household to change its spending and saving over the next three months?

Note: Your responses need to add up to \$100.

Enter \$0 if your household's spending/saving would not change.

Enter negative numbers for increases in your household's spending/saving.

Decrease in spending

(By how much) would your household decrease its monthly spending over the pext three months?

0

Decrease in saving

(By how much) would your household decrease its monthly saving (which includes decreases in debt repayment or increases in debt-taking) over the part three months?

\$ 0

Total

\$ 0

In random order: \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000, \$10,000

A one-time income loss Situation 5

Consider a hypothetical situation where your household unexpectedly incurs a

one-time income loss of \$10,000 today.

How would this one-time income loss cause your household to change its spending and saving over the next three months?

Note: Your responses need to add up to \$10,000.

Enter \$0 if your household's spending/saving would not change.

Enter negative numbers for increases in your household's spending/saving.

Decrease in spending

(By how much) would your household decrease its monthly spending over the next three months?

.....

Decrease in saving

(By how much) would your household decrease its monthly saving (which includes decreases in debt repayment or increases in debt-taking) over the next three months?

Total \$ 0

In random order: whether you see gains or losses first

On the next pages, you will consider hypothetical situations where your household unexpectedly receives a

one-time payment today.

That is, your household's income will be higher for one month due to a one-time payment. The one-time payment comes unexpectedly.

In random order: \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000, \$10,000

A one-time payment

Situation 1

Consider a hypothetical situation where your household unexpectedly receives a

one-time payment of \$250 today.

How would this one-time extra income cause your household to change its spending and saving over the next three months?

Note: Your responses need to add up to \$250.

Enter \$0 if your household's spending/saving would not change.

Enter negative numbers for decreases in your household's spending/saving.

Increase	in	spending	

(By how much) would your household increase its monthly spending over the pext three months?

0

Increase in saving

(By how much) would your household increase its monthly saving (which includes increases in debt-repayment or decreases in debt-taking) over the next three months?

0

Total

0

In random order: \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000, \$10,000

A one-time payment Situation 4

Consider a hypothetical situation where your household unexpectedly receives a

one-time payment of \$5,000 today.

How would this one-time extra income cause your household to change its spending and saving over the next three months?

Note: Your responses need to add up to \$5,000.


Enter \$0 if your household's spending/saving would not change.

Enter negative numbers for decreases in your household's spending/saving.

Increase in spending (By how much) would your household increase its monthly spending over the next three months?	\$ 0
Increase in saving (By how much) would your household increase its monthly saving (which includes increases in debt repayment or <u>de</u> creases in debt-taking) over the next three months?	\$ 0
Total	¢ 0

3. Empirical Results

The Bowtie: Extreme MPCs for Small, but not Large, Shocks



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
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Savings prioritizers (14%) MPC = 0 for gain, 1 for loss. Cut back on consumption after loss, but save gains.



Why Are These Behaviors "Quick-Fixes"?

- 1. Extreme MPCs more likely for small shocks vs. large shocks ✓
 - ▶ As shocks get larger, 7% of HH "transition" from extremes to interior


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- 2. Abruptly abandoned once a critical size is reached ✓
 - ► Conditional on changing from MPC=1 (MPC=0) to the interior, the 20%-80% range of responses of MPCs is [0.25,0.60] ([0.20,0.50])
 - ▶ 93% of HH "stay in interior" for next largest shock


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 - ▶ 93% of HH "stay in interior" for next largest shock
- 3. After abandoning quick-fixes. HHs choose stable and similar policies $\sqrt{}$
 - As shock gets bigger, average absolute difference in MPCs is 0.14 (unconditionally); 0.41 when going from extremes to interior
 - ▶ Variation in interior MPCs: only 16% of cross-sectional MPC variance

Quick Fixes Explain Size and Sign Dependence in MPCs



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ullet Type distribution matters: different QF o different patterns

Quick-Fixing Helps Explain Variance in MPCs

Respondent-level regression to predict average MPC across scenarios:

$$MPC_i = \alpha + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i$$

• Model 1: "kitchen sink" of wealth, income, demographics


 $X_i = (log Monthly Spending_i, log Annual Income_i, std. Income Risk_i, Three Bins of Liquid Wealth_i, Three Bins of Illiquid Wealth_i, Three Bins of Debt_i, Education_i, Age_i, Gender_i, Household Size_i)$

• **Model 2**: X_i = dummies for four quick-fixing types

 $\mathsf{MPC} = 1$ Version Regressions

Quick-Fixing Helps Explain Variance in MPCs

Respondent-level regression to predict average MPC across scenarios:



Household Characteristics Do Not Predict Quick-Fixing


Respondent-level regression to predict quick-fixing types:

Quick-Fix Type_i =
$$\alpha + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i$$

where X_i is the "kitchen sink" of wealth, income, demographics


			C-Prioritizer	S-Prioritzier
R^2	0.057	0.017	0.020	0.020

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


Quick-Fixes Require Less Deliberation

- Follow-up survey of 517 additional US households (August 2024)
- Measure consumption-savings responses as before
- Ask additional questions to rate difficulty of making decisions
 - ► How carefully would they consider spending and saving decisions (1-6)
 - Percent chance they would assess financial situation before responding
 - Percent chance they would discuss with other household members

Within-Respondent Qualitative Evidence

Quick-Fixes Require Less Deliberation





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- Behavioral Models with Present Bias and/or Temptation and/or inattention? No: larger (or smaller) MPCs, but not the bowtie pattern of adjustment Sims (2006), Laibson, Maxted, and Moll (2021), Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002), Lian (2022)

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- Models with Infrequent Optimization and Inertia? No: many adjust behavior even in response to small shocks

Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2021)

4. Quantitative Model

A Problem with Income Fluctuations, Incomplete Markets

- Households $i \in [0,1]$ living in discrete time $t \in \mathbb{N}$
- Flow payoffs are CRRA with RRA $\gamma > 0$, discount factor $\beta \in [0,1)$
- **Income fluctuations**: income y follows a finite state Markov chain
- **Incomplete markets**: can save at interest rate $R \ge 1$ but cannot borrow
- Familiar problem for rational agents:

$$V^{R}(a, y) = \max_{a'} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E} \left[V^{R}(a', y') \mid y \right] \right\}$$

s.t. $a' = (1 + r)a + y - c$
 $a \ge 0$

The Household Problem with Quick-Fixing

- Four quick-fix policy functions from the survey, with different costs κ_q
 - ightharpoonup Additional states: reference consumption and income, \bar{c} and \bar{y}

$$\begin{split} V^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y}) &= \max_{D \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ D\left(u(c^*(a,y)) + \beta \mathbb{E}\left[V^q(a',y',c^*(a,y),y) \mid y \right] - \kappa_q \right) \right. \\ &+ \left(1 - D \right) \left(u(c^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y})) + \beta \mathbb{E}\left[V^q(a',y',\bar{c},\bar{y}) \mid y \right] \right) \right\} \\ \text{s.t. } a' &= (1+r)a + y - \left(D(c^*(a,y)) + (1-D)(c^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y})) \right) \\ a &\geq 0 \end{split}$$



The Household Problem with Quick-Fixing

- ullet Four quick-fix policy functions from the survey, with different costs κ_q
 - ightharpoonup Additional states: reference consumption and income, \bar{c} and \bar{y}
- Permanent types: justified by unpredictability in survey
- Naivety: consistent with near-rationality...and adversarial

$$\begin{split} V^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y}) &= \max_{D \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ D\left(u(c^*(a,y)) + \beta \mathbb{E}\left[V^q(a',y',c^*(a,y),y) \mid y \right] - \kappa_q \right) \right. \\ &+ \left(1 - D \right) \left(u(c^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y})) + \beta \mathbb{E}\left[V^q(a',y',\bar{c},\bar{y}) \mid y \right] \right) \right\} \\ \text{s.t. } a' &= (1+r)a + y - \left(D(c^*(a,y)) + (1-D)(c^q(a,y,\bar{c},\bar{y})) \right) \\ a &\geq 0 \end{split}$$




Calibration: Estimating Optimization Costs to Match Data


- 1. Fix standard parameters: $\gamma = 1$, r = 0.01, 5-state discretization of AR(1) earning process from Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018)
- 2. Estimate the discount factor to match MPCs of rational households ("unclassified" in survey), $\beta=0.92$
- 3. Estimate the four optimization costs to match the fraction of households that re-optimize in the data (excluding \$50 shocks):


$$\kappa_q^* \in \arg\min_{\kappa_q > 0} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{12} \left(\mathsf{ReoptFraction}_{x_i}^q - \widehat{\mathsf{ReoptFraction}}_{x_i}^q \right)^2 \right\}$$


Model Fit: Reoptimization and MPCs



Model Fit: Reoptimization and MPCs







Costs of Near-Rationality are Very Small

Panel A: Optimization costs κ_q				
Household type	% reduction in consumption	Average dollar cost		
Consumption fixer	1.10	\$176.67		
Savings fixer	0.007	\$1.47		
Consumption prioritizer	0.006	\$1.44		
Savings prioritizer	0.11	\$18.58		

Inaction regions

Costs of Near-Rationality are Very Small

Panel B: Value loss due to near rationality $V^R - V^q$ (per quarter)			
Household type	% reduction in consumption	Average dollar loss	
Consumption fixer	0.45	\$71.67	
Savings fixer	0.004	\$0.58	
Consumption prioritizer	0.003	\$0.54	
Savings prioritizer	0.06	\$8.68	




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
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Household type	% reduction in consumption	Average dollar loss		
Consumption fixer (68%)	0.45	\$71.67		
Savings fixer (53%)	0.004	\$0.58		
Consumption prioritizer (52%)	0.003	\$0.54		
Savings prioritizer (63%)	0.06	\$8.68		

Despite frequent quick-fixing (percent of quarters QF)



Near-Rationality Not Detectable from Wealth





- Savers aren't rich and spenders aren't poor
- Sharp contrast to models with behavioral hand-to-mouth (TANK) or high discounting/present bias

Variance decomposition

1. Size-dependence

2. Front-loadedness

3. Incidence dependence

- 1. Size-dependence
- 2. Front-loadedness

3. Incidence dependence

Amount	Context	MPC in Full Model	MPC in Rational Model
\$100	Survey	0.59	0.47
\$600	2001 Tax Rebate	0.42	0.44
\$1200	2020-21	0.35	0.39


Notes: Contemporaneous (one-quarter) MPCs in the quick-fixing model and the rational model.

1. Size-dependence

2. Front-loadedness

3. Incidence dependence


Can compute **iMPCs** (Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub, 2024)



1. Size-dependence

2. Front-loadedness

3. Incidence dependence




Three Implications for Macroeconomic Propagation

1. Size-dependence

2. Front-loadedness


3. Incidence dependence




Gains: more pronounced pattern

Three Implications for Macroeconomic Propagation

1. Size-dependence



3. Incidence dependence



Losses: different sign!

5. Conclusion

Our Findings in the Context of the Literature

Near-rational household behavior. Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, b); Cochrane (1989); Krusell and Smith (1996); Smith (1991); Lettau and Uhlig (1999); Ilut and Valchev (2023, 2024)

We "put these models to work" with direct empirical evidence. . .

 Evidence on the marginal propensity to consume. Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2021); Coliareti, Mei, and Stancheva (2024); Parker and Souleles (2019); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014, 2020)

... helping resolve puzzles in the empirical literature...

- "Consumption block" of heterogeneous-agent models: see summary in *Annual Review* article by Kaplan and Violante (2022)
 - ... suggesting a rather different approach to quantitative modeling.

Theory and Evidence for Near-Rational Household Behavior

1. Household behavior is well-described by a near-rational model with a few behavioral types

2. Existing models cannot explain the findings from our survey

3. Matters for macro: small costs lead to very different shock responses


Demographic and Economic Balance

Variable	ACS (2022)	Sample	
Gender			
Female	50%	50%	
\mathbf{Age}			
18-34	29%	27%	
35-54	32%	33%	
55+	38%	40%	
Household income			
Below 50k	34%	34%	
50k-100k	29%	28%	
Above 100k	37%	37%	
Education			
Bachelor's degree or more	33%	40%	
Region			
Northeast	17%	17%	
Midwest	21%	21%	
South	39%	39%	
West	24%	23%	
Sample size	1,980,550	4,981	

Variable	SCF (2022)	\mathbf{Sample}	
Liquid assets			
Below 1k	20%	29%	
1k-10k	31%	25%	
10k-100k	31%	28%	
Above 100k	19%	18%	
Illiquid assets			
Below 10k	26%	38%	
10k-100k	11%	14%	
100k-500k	34%	26%	
Above 500k	29%	22%	
Debt			
Below 1k	27%	35%	
1k-10k	10%	21%	
10k-100k	27%	25%	
Above 100k	36%	19%	
Sample size	4,602	4,981	




MPCs Conditional on Switching





MPCs Conditional on Switching





Deliberation and Extremes: Within-Respondent Variation

		Evtro	me MPC of 0 c	v 1 (binary indi	cator)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Deliberation (std	0.263*** (0.011)	-0.274*** (0.020)	-0.248*** (0.011)	-0.254*** (0.020)	-0.257*** (0.013)	-0.276** [*] (0.020)
Respondent FE Weights	√ -	√ ✓	√ -	√ √	√ -	✓
Measure	Carefully consider how to change spending			overall situation		s with members
Observations	3,619	3,619	3,619	3,619	3,080	3,080
R^2	0.740	0.761	0.723	0.744	0.711	0.719



Qualitative Survey and Results

- We surveyed 502 additional US households
- We first asked for their consumption-savings responses (as before) to \$100 and \$1000 income shocks
- 57% of households respond with an extreme MPC to the \$100 shock while only 23% do so for the \$1000 shock
- If a household switches from an extreme MPC to an interior MPC, we ask them to explain why

- 1. Differences in amounts are salient (mentioned by 86%)
 - ightharpoonup "One hundred bucks is not that much" (MPC = 0 for \$100, MPC = 0.2 for \$1,000)
 - ► "Since the amount of \$1000 is fairly significant, and we are increasing our savings by a good amount, I think taking \$100 dollars out and saving the other \$900 is fair and feels rewarding from both a long-term and short-term perspective." (MPC = 0 for \$100, MPC = 0.1 for \$1,000)

1. Differences in amounts are salient (mentioned by 86%)

- 2. Households follow habits and routines
 - "I have a budget for a reason and generally stick to it unless there are major changes" (MPC = 0 for \$100, MPC = 0.2 for \$1,000).
 - ► "\$100 is not such a big amount that it will make me change my spending habits." (MPC=0 for \$100, MPC=0.1 for \$1,000)

1. Differences in amounts are salient (mentioned by 86%)

2. Households follow habits and routines

- 3. Extreme MPCs are easier to evaluate and appreciate
 - "[\$100] is not really large enough to make an impact on our spending" (MPC = 0 for \$100)
 - ightharpoonup "the \$100 is not really enough to move the needle in saving" (MPC = 1 for \$100)

1. Differences in amounts are salient (mentioned by 86%)

2. Households follow habits and routines

3. Extreme MPCs are easier to evaluate and appreciate

- 4. Windfalls are an opportunity to treat themselves or their families
 - ► "Why not just use the unexpected \$100 to spend on something you can enjoy or something that can help you in the short-term?"

Reasons Households Give Us for Why They Act Differently

Theme (and detected freq.)	Description
Gains 199 cases where respondents Shock size (86%)	choose an extreme MPC for small shock but not for large shock. Respondent mentions the difference in the shock sizes, e.g. contrasts the two shocks or says that \$100 is little or \$1000 a lot.
Habit (16%)	Respondent mentions that they generally try to save/spend in situations with small income gains.
Does not make a difference (25%)	Respondent mentions that spending/saving the money would not make a meaningful difference to their spending or savings.
Household discipline (17%)	• MPC of 0 for \$100: Only in case of a larger amount, respondent feels comfortable to spend part of the amount, but they avoid "frivolous" spending for the small amount. • MPC of I for \$100: Respondent is fine with spending the small amount, but they argue it would be "irresponsible" to fully spend the larger amount.
Treat oneself (41%)	 MPC of 0 for \$100: Only in case of a larger amount, respondent wants to use a part to treat themselves. MPC of 1 for \$100: Respondent wants to use the \$100 to treat themselves.
Need (15%)	 MPC of 0 for \$100: Respondent argues that they do not need additional purchases. MPC of 1 for \$100: Respondent immediately needs the money for essential purchases.
Lumpy consumption plans (6%)	Respondent has a specific spending plan or need, but \$100 is not yet enough to realize it.



Reasons Households Give Us for Why They Act Differently

Buffer (49%)

184 cases where respondents choose an extreme MPC for small shock but not for large shock.

Shock size (84%) Respondent mentions the difference in the shock sizes, e.g. contrasts the

two shocks or says that \$100 is little or \$1000 a lot.

Habit (13%) Respondent mentions that they generally try to cut saving/spending in situations with small income losses.

MPC of 0 for 100: Respondent can easily draw on a buffer of savings.

• MPC of 1 for 100: Respondent can easily cut discretionary, non-

essential consumption.

Balance required (34%) Interior MPC for large loss because respondents do not want to or simply

cannot afford to reduce their spending/savings by the full 1000.

 ${\bf Budget\ already\ tight\ (8\%)}\qquad {\bf Respondent\ reports\ having\ such\ a\ tight\ spending\ budget\ they\ trefer}$

to not reduce spending any further in response to a \$100 loss.

Back

The Bellman Equation for Unanticipated Shocks

Receive shock x in "interim" after observing income y and choosing a consumption level

$$\max_{D_{x} \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ D_{x} \left(u(c^{*}(a,y+x)) + \beta \mathbb{E} \left[V^{q}(a',y',c^{*}(a,y+x),y) \mid y \right] - \kappa_{q} \right) \right.$$

$$\left. + (1 - D_{x}) \left(u(c^{q}(c^{q^{*}},x)) + \beta \mathbb{E} \left[V^{q}(a',y',\bar{c},\bar{y}) \mid y \right] \right) \right\}$$
s.t. $a' = (1+r)a + y - (D_{x}(c^{*}(a,y+x)) + (1-D_{x})(c^{q}(c^{q^{*}},x)))$

$$a \ge 0$$




Quick-Fixing Generates "Latent" Heterogeneity in the MPC

Table: Variance in MPCs Conditional on Assets and Income

Model	Overall	Conditional on $a = 0$	Conditional on $a > 0$
Quick-fixing	28%	43%	70%
Rational	0%	0%	0%




Large Tolerance for Consumption "Mistakes"




Delayed Reoptimization After Shocks

Delayed reoptimization in response to shocks





Robustness of Results to Various Scenarios





Quick-Fixing Helps Explain HtM Behavior

Respondent-level regression to predict share of MPC = 1 responses:

ShareMPC1_i =
$$\alpha + X'_i \beta + \varepsilon_i$$

• Model 1: "kitchen sink" of wealth, income, demographics

 $X_i = (\text{log Monthly Spending}_i, \text{log Annual Income}_i, \text{std. Income Risk}_i,$ Three Bins of Liquid Wealth $_i$, Three Bins of Illiquid Wealth $_i$, Three Bins of Debt $_i$, Education $_i$, Age $_i$, Gender $_i$, Household Size $_i$)

 $R^2 = 0.03$: i.e., nothing financial or demographic is a good predictor of "hand to mouth" behavior

• Model 2: X_i = dummies for four quick-fixing types $R^2 = 0.56$



Costs of Near-Rational Behavior

Proposition (Second-Order Costs of Near-Rational Behavior)

The loss from following a quick-fix c^q in state z is:

$$\mathcal{L}^q(z) = \frac{1}{2}(1+R)|u''(c^*(z))|(c^q(z)-c^*(z))^2 + O(|c^*(z)-c^q(z)|^3)$$

Back

Table B.1: Additional significance tests

Statement	t-test	Randomizatio	
	p-value	Statistic under H_0	p-value
Familiar Observations MPCs decline for larger shocks; e.g., for gains, 0.56 for \$50 gain versus 0.30 for \$10,0000 gain. Difference: 0.26.	< 0.001	0.000	< 0.001
The average MPC is larger for losses (0.54) than for gains (0.40). Difference: 0.14.	< 0.001	0.000	< 0.001
Quick Fixes From one shock to the next larger shock, a net share of 7% of households transition from an ex- treme MPC to a more moderate interior MPC.		0.000	< 0.001
Most households — namely 68% for gains and 67% for losses — switch to an interior MPC at most once and stick to interior MPCs thereafter. Average: 68%.		0.413	< 0.001
86% (for gains) and 84% (for losses) of households deviate from this pattern at most once. Average: 85%.		0.602	< 0.001
Extreme MPCs more common for small than large shocks, e.g. 74% for \$50 gain versus 0.26% for \$10,000 gain. Difference: 0.48.	< 0.001	0.000	< 0.001
Once households adopt their first interior MPC, their MPCs are relatively stable. While they con- tinue to vary, the average absolute difference is only 0.14.		0.236	< 0.001

Notes: This table reports whether the statistics reported in the statements are significantly different from the patterns we would expect to result from pure clause. The t-test column preperts p-values from two-sided t-tests that test for differences in MPCs between shocks. We also use a more flexible randomization test that derives the distribution of the statistics under the null hypothesis that there is no link between MPCs shock sizes, and valence. To achieve this, we permute the data within each household by () reshuffling MPCs within gains, and (ii) reshuffling MPCs within fosses, and (iii) randominy replacing all gain MPCs with the average value of the statistic in the permuted data sets. The cloum's "Statistic under B_c " reports the average value of the statistic in the permuted data sets. The cloum's reports the p-values of the randomization tests.

Table B.2: Exploring the variation in MPCs across households

	MPCs			Type membership					ing point
A	verage	MPC	Consump.	Savings fixer	Consump. priori.	Savings priori.	Unclass- ified	Average le	og(shock size)
(1	l)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Consumption									
Mthly spending	g (log.)	0.012*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	$0.000 \\ (0.004)$	-0.005 (0.005)		-0.091*** (0.023)
Annual income	(log.)	0.007 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.022** (0.010)		0.126*** (0.044)
Income risk (ste	d.)	0.020*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.005)	0.084*** (0.007)		0.057* (0.031)
Liquid wealth	ı: dum	mies with	reference gr	oup: [0k, 1]	k)				
[1k, 10k)		-0.052*** (0.009)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.051*** (0.019)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.046** (0.018)		-0.438*** (0.082)
[10k, 100k)		-0.069*** (0.010)	0.020 (0.015)	-0.086*** (0.020)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.026 (0.017)	0.088*** (0.019)		-0.205** (0.087)
$[100k,\mathrm{more})$		-0.072*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.020)	-0.088*** (0.026)	0.037** (0.019)	-0.045** (0.020)	0.026 (0.023)		0.052 (0.104)
Illiquid wealt	h: dur	nmies with	reference g	roup: [0k, 1	10k)				
[10k, 100k)		-0.018* (0.010)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.021)		-0.053 (0.100)
[100k, 500k)		-0.025*** (0.010)	$0.001 \\ (0.014)$	0.050** (0.020)	0.016 (0.014)	0.020 (0.016)	-0.086*** (0.019)		0.111 (0.084)
[500k, more)		-0.067*** (0.012)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.082*** (0.024)	0.003 (0.017)	0.043** (0.019)	-0.189^{***} (0.021)		0.141 (0.098)
Back									

Debt: dummies w	ith reference	group: [0k,	1k)					
[1k, 10k)	(0.009)	-0.057*** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.008 (0.012)	0.009 (0.014)	0.042** (0.018)		-0.364*** (0.083)
[10k, 100k)	(0.009)	-0.051*** (0.013)	0.046** (0.018)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.017 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.017)		-0.269*** (0.076)
[100k, more)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.039** (0.016)	0.045** (0.020)	0.034** (0.015)	0.038** (0.016)	-0.077*** (0.018)		-0.363*** (0.080)
Other character	istics							
College	0.004 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.021 (0.015)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.019* (0.011)	0.045*** (0.013)		-0.005 (0.061)
Age (in 10y)	-0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.004)		0.100*** (0.018)
Female respondent	0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.017^* (0.009)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.014 (0.012)		-0.011 (0.056)
Household size	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.013**** (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.012** (0.005)		-0.029 (0.025)
Quick-fixing typ Consump0.346 fixer (0.007)	•••						0.236*** (0.085)	
Savings 0.165** fixer (0.006)							-0.218**** (0.073)	
Consump0.094 prioritizer (0.008)							-0.555*** (0.093)	
Savings -0.073 prioritizer (0.006)								
Constant 0.492** (0.003)		0.138* (0.077)	0.134 (0.099)	0.089 (0.067)	0.324*** (0.082)	0.315*** (0.103)	7.960*** (0.059)	6.987*** (0.459)
Obs. 4,981 R ² 0,492	4,981 0,109	4,981 0,057	4,981 0.017	4,981 0.020	4,981 0.020	4,981 0.174	3,381 0.024	3,381 0.058

Adding Realistic Quick-Fixes

• As before: HH have default policy functions c^{q_i} , optimization costs κ_{q_i}

Adding Realistic Quick-Fixes

- As before: HH have default policy functions c^{q_i} , optimization costs κ_{q_i}
- New: the quick-fixing patterns uncovered by the survey: fixing consumption, fixing savings, prioritizing consumption, and prioritizing savings

Adding Realistic Quick-Fixes

- As before: HH have default policy functions c^{q_i} , optimization costs κ_{q_i}
- New: the quick-fixing patterns uncovered by the survey: fixing consumption, fixing savings, prioritizing consumption, and prioritizing savings
- New state variables: reference consumption \bar{c} and reference income \bar{y}
- Quick-fixing rules are

$$c^{CF}(\bar{c}, y - \bar{y}) = \bar{c} \qquad c^{CP}(\bar{c}, y - \bar{y}) = \bar{c} + \max\{y - \bar{y}, 0\}$$

$$c^{SF}(\bar{c}, y - \bar{y}) = \bar{c} + (y - \bar{y}) \qquad c^{SP}(\bar{c}, y - \bar{y}) = \bar{c} + \min\{y - \bar{y}, 0\}$$




Near-Rationality Generates Very Different iMPC Profiles

- Summary statistic for aggregate response to transfer shocks: intertemporal marginal propensity to consume (Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub, 2024)
- How much does a transfer at t affect consumption at horizon t + h 1?



Near-Rationality Generates Very Different iMPC Profiles

iMPC Profiles for transfers of different sizes



Delayed Reoptimization

Small Optimization Costs, Large Tolerance for Mistakes

Classic observation: losses from $c^q \neq c^*$ are second-order in $c^q - c^*$ Link

Small Optimization Costs, Large Tolerance for Mistakes (Back)

Classic observation: losses from $c^q \neq c^*$ are second-order in $c^q - c^*$

With
$$u(c) = \log c$$
 and $R = 1$,

Consumption deviation	1%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Consumption-equivalent loss	0.01%	0.25%	1.00%	2.22%	3.92%

Small Optimization Costs, Large Tolerance for Mistakes

Classic observation: losses from $c^q \neq c^*$ are second-order in $c^q - c^*$

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Consumption deviation Consumption-equivalent loss	1%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
	0.01%	0.25%	1.00%	2.22%	3.92%	
		$ \downarrow \\ $				

Small Optimization Costs, Large Tolerance for Mistakes (Back)

Classic observation: losses from $c^q \neq c^*$ are second-order in $c^q - c^*$

With
$$u(c) = \log c$$
 and $R = 1$,

Then you will tolerate any quick-fix that is within 10% of c^*

Consumption deviation 1% 5% 10% 15% 20% Consumption-equivalent loss 0.01% 0.25% 1.00% 2.22% 3.92%

If $cost = 1\%$ of c^*

Wealth Category Definitions

- Wealth, Liquid: The total value of a household's financial savings and investments, such as cash holdings, checking and savings accounts, money market funds, government/municipal bonds or treasury bills, stocks and bonds in publicly held corporations, stock and bond mutual funds.
- Wealth, Illiquid: The sum of (i) the total value of the land and real estate a
 household owns, including primary residence, second homes and other real
 estate, and (ii) the total value of a household's currently non-withdrawable
 financial savings and investments, such as the value of your retirement
 accounts (401(k)s, IRAs, thrift accounts, and future pensions), the cash
 value of life insurance policies, certificates of deposit, and saving bonds.
- Wealth, Debt: Total household debt including credit card debt, mortgages, and other debt, such as student loans, auto loans, and personal loans.



Benchmarking Familiar Facts



- High average MPC: e.g., 0.35 over one quarter for \$1000 gain
 - ► In surveys:
 - ▶ Japelli and Pistaferri, 2014 (Italy): 0.48
 - ► Christelis et al., 2019 (Netherlands): 0.39
 - ► Fuster et al., 2021 (USA): 0.07 [driven by 74% MPC = 0]
 - In observational data:
 - ▶ Borusyak et al., 2024, and Orchard et al., 2024 (2008 US Tax Rebate): 0.30
 - ▶ Boehm, Fize and Jaravel, 2024 (randomized experiment in France): 0.23 in one month for 300 Euro transfer
 - ► Ganong et al., 2019 (income shocks in US): 0.29
- MPCs decline in shock size
 - ► For gains, observed by Kueng (2018; Alaska Permanent Fund), Fagereng et al. (2021; Norwegian lottery), and Colarieti et al. (2021; survey in US)
- MPCs are larger for losses
 - ▶ Observed by Bunn et al. (2018), Christelis et al. (2021), Fuster et al. (2021), and Colarieti et al. (2021)