Heterogeneity and Aggregate Fluctuations: Insights from TANK Models

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Background

- The representative household paradigm
- The HANK revolt: focus on household heterogeneity, in the form of idiosyncratic income shocks
 - ⇒ complexity: distribution of wealth as additional state variable
 - ⇒ numerical methods, no simple intuition
- Is heterogeneity important for understanding aggregate fluctuations?
- Can a simple tractable model approximate well the aggregate properties of a HANK model?

Present Paper

- Analysis of aggregate properties of HANK models
- Focus on distinction between unconstrained and hand-to-mouth households
- Three versions of HANK:
 - I: No binding borrowing constraints + illiquid stocks + profit allocation rule
 - II: Binding borrowing constraints + illiquid stocks + profit allocation rule
 - III: Binding borrowing constraints + optimal portfolio choice
- For each HANK model we propose a tractable counterpart drawn from the TANK family, and assess its merits as an approximation
- Focus on monetary policy and technology shocks.

Preview of Findings

- Is heterogeneity important for understanding aggregate fluctuations?
 - Potentially yes, but possibly less than you may have thought (and not independently of the monetary policy rule in place)
- Can a simple tractable model approximate well the aggregate properties of a HANK model?
 - Yes, but it must be properly designed and calibrated (an off-the-shelf TANK model won't generally do).

A Baseline HANK Model

Households

ullet Continuum of infinite-lived households, $j \in [0,1]$, with preferences

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\frac{C(j)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\mathcal{N}(j)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right)$$

Period budget constraint

$$C_t(j) + B_t(j) = R_{t-1}B_{t-1}(j) + \Xi_t(j)W_tN_t(j) + F_t(j)$$

where
$$\Xi_t(j) \equiv \exp\{\zeta_t(j)\}$$
 with $\zeta_t(j) = \rho_\zeta \zeta_{t-1}(j) + \varepsilon_t^\zeta(j)$ and $\int_0^1 \Xi_t(j) dj = 1$

Borrowing constraint

$$R_t B_t(j) \ge -\Psi_t(j)$$

A Baseline HANK Model

Firms

- Monopolistic competition + quadratic price adjustment costs
- Implied New Keynesian Phillips curve

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{t+1} \} + \kappa (y_t - y_t^n)$$

where $y_t^n \equiv \frac{1+\varphi}{\sigma+\varphi} a_t$

⇒ supply block invariant to heterogeneity

Monetary Policy

Exogenous real interest rate

HANK-I

- Assumption #1: natural borrowing limit
 - ⇒ borrowing constraint not binding in equilibrium
- Assumption #2: illiquid stocks + profit allocation rule

$$F_t(j) \equiv \Theta_t(j)D_t$$

where
$$\Theta_t(j) = [\vartheta + (1 - \vartheta)\Xi_t(j)]$$

• For all t and $j \in [0, 1]$:

$$1 = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \{ (C_{t+1}(j) / C_t(j))^{-\sigma} \}$$

Aggregate consumption (Debortoli-Galí 2024):

$$\widehat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\widehat{c}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}\widehat{r}_t - \frac{\sigma+1}{2}\widehat{v}_t$$

where

$$v_t \equiv \int \frac{C_t(j)}{C_t} v_t(j) dj$$

and $v_t(j) \equiv \mathit{var}_t\{c_{t+1}(j)\}$ ("individual consumption risk")

• Aggregate consumption (RANK)

$$\widehat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\widehat{c}_{t+1}\} - rac{1}{\sigma}\widehat{r}_t$$

Aggregate consumption (HANK-I):

$$\widehat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\widehat{c}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}\widehat{r}_t - \frac{\sigma+1}{2}\widehat{v}_t$$


where


$$v_t \equiv \int \frac{C_t(j)}{C_t} v_t(j) dj$$


and $v_t(j) \equiv var_t\{c_{t+1}(j)\}$ ("individual consumption risk")

• Calibration and quantitative analysis

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






HANK-I vs RANK

- Quantitative analysis: small impact of heterogeneity
- Changes in consumption risk are concentrated in low consumption households
 - \Rightarrow small aggregate impact



HANK-I vs RANK

- Quantitative analysis: small impact of heterogeneity
- Changes in consumption risk are concentrated in low consumption households
 - ⇒ small aggregate impact
- Implication: small role of idiosyncratic income risk by itself.
 - Does it have a larger role in the presence of *occasionally binding borrowing constraints?*

HANK-II

Borrowing limit

$$\Psi_t(j) = \psi Y$$

- In any given period, two subsets of households: unconstrained and hand-to-mouth
- Unconstrained households (measure $1 \lambda_t^H$):

$$1 = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \{ (C_{t+1}(j) / C_t(j))^{-\sigma} \}$$

Average consumption:

$$\widehat{c}_t^U = \mathbb{E}_t \{ \widehat{c}_{t+1}^U \} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \widehat{r}_t - \frac{\sigma + 1}{2} \widehat{v}_t^U - \widehat{h}_t^U$$

HANK-II

• Hand-to-mouth households (measure λ_t^H):

$$C_t(j) = \Xi_t(j) W_t N_t + \Theta_t(j) D_t + R_{t-1} B_{t-1}(j) + \frac{\psi Y}{R_t}$$

where
$$\Theta_t(j) \equiv \vartheta + (1-\vartheta)\Xi_t(j)$$

Average consumption:

$$C_t^H = \left[\Xi_t^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \Theta_t^H \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t}\right)\right] Y_t - \psi Y(\widehat{R}_t + \Omega_{t-1}^H - 1)$$

where
$$\widehat{R}_t \equiv rac{R_t-1}{R_t}$$
 and $\Omega_{t-1}^H \equiv -R_{t-1}B_{t-1|t}^H/\psi Y$

- Two channels absent from RANK:
 - "interest rate exposure": $\frac{\partial C_t^H}{\partial R_t} < 0$
 - "income distribution": $\frac{\partial C_t^H}{\partial \mathcal{M}_t} > 0$, given that in equilibrium $\Xi_t^H < \Theta_t^H < 1$

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ullet Unconstrained households: identical, constant measure $1-\lambda^H$

$$\widehat{c}_t^U = \mathbb{E}_t\{\widehat{c}_{t+1}^U\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}\widehat{r}_t$$

ullet Hand-to-mouth households: identical, constant measure λ^H

$$C_t^H = \Xi^H W_t N_t + \Theta^H D_t - \psi Y \ \widehat{R}_t$$

where
$$\Theta^H \equiv \vartheta + (1 - \vartheta)\Xi^H$$

- Differences with standard TANK: $\Xi^H < 1$, $\Theta^H > 0$, $\psi > 0$
- Aggregate consumption (TANK-II):

$$C_{t} = \lambda^{H} C_{t}^{H} + (1 - \lambda^{H}) C_{t}^{U}$$

$$= \lambda^{H} \left[\Xi^{H} \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_{t}} + \Theta^{H} \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_{t}} \right) \right] Y_{t} - \lambda^{H} \psi Y \widehat{R}_{t} + (1 - \lambda^{H}) C_{t}^{U}$$

• Aggregate consumption (TANK-II):

$$C_t = \lambda^H \left[\Xi^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \Theta^H \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} \right) \right] Y_t - \lambda^H \psi Y \ \widehat{R}_t + (1 - \lambda^H) C_t^U$$

• Aggregate consumption (HANK-II):

$$C_t = \lambda_t^H \left[\Xi_t^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \Theta_t^H \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} \right) \right] Y_t - \lambda_t^H \psi Y(\widehat{R}_t + \Omega_{t-1}^H - 1) + (1 - \lambda_t^H) C_t^U$$

• Good approximation if $\lambda_t^H \simeq \lambda^H$, $\Omega_{t-1}^H \simeq 1$, $\Xi_t^H \simeq \Xi^H$, $\Theta_t^H \simeq \Theta^H$, $\hat{v}_t^U \simeq 0$


• Aggregate consumption (TANK-II):


$$C_t = \lambda^H \left[\Xi^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \Theta^H \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} \right) \right] Y_t - \lambda^H \psi Y \widehat{R}_t + (1 - \lambda^H) C_t^U$$


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
$$C_t = \lambda_t^H \left[\Xi_t^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \Theta_t^H \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} \right) \right] Y_t - \lambda_t^H \psi Y(\widehat{R}_t + \Omega_{t-1}^H - 1) + (1 - \lambda_t^H) C_t^U$$

- Good approximation if $\lambda_t^H \simeq \lambda^H$, $\Omega_{t-1|t} \simeq 1$, $\Xi_t^H \simeq \Xi^H$, $\Theta_t^H \simeq \Theta^H$, $\hat{v}_t^U \simeq 0$
- Calibration: ψ so that $\mathbb{E}\{\lambda_t^H\} = 0.30$, $\lambda^H = \mathbb{E}\{\lambda_t^H\}$, $\Xi^H = \mathbb{E}\{\Xi_t^H\}$, $\Theta^H = \mathbb{E}\{\Theta_t^H\}$
- Quantitative analysis









By contrast, in the standard TANK model (TANK-I)


$$C_t^H = W_t N_t$$

$$C_t = \lambda^H \frac{\mathcal{M}}{\mathcal{M}_t} Y_t + (1 - \lambda^H) C_t^U$$

- \Rightarrow no interest rate exposure
- ⇒ income distribution channel: wrong sign
- Quantitative analysis

Figure 5: Simple Alternatives to HANK-II

Panel (a): Impulse Responses



HANK-III

Borrowing limit:

$$\Psi_t(j) = \psi Y$$

 Optimal portfolio choice: additions/withdrawals to/from equity account subject to adjustment costs and short-sale constraint

$$E_t(j) \geq 0$$

- Two types of hand-to-mouth households:
 - (i) poor hand-to mouth (measure λ_t^P): $B_t(j) = -\psi Y$, $E_t(j) = 0$

$$C_t^P = \Xi_t^P W_t N_t - \psi Y (\widehat{R}_t + \Omega_{t-1}^H - 1)$$

(ii) wealthy hand-to-mouth (measure λ_t^W): $B_t(j) = -\psi Y$, $E_t(j) > 0$

$$C_{t}^{W} = \Xi_{t}^{W} W_{t} N_{t} + F_{t}^{W} - \psi Y (\widehat{R}_{t} + \Omega_{t-1}^{H} - 1)$$

where $F_t^W \equiv R_t^e E_{t-1}^W - E_t^W - \chi_t^W$



ullet Hand-to-mouth agents: identical, constant measure λ^H

$$C_t^H = \Xi^H W_t N_t + \Theta^H D_t - \psi Y \ \widehat{R}_t$$

where Θ^H is now decoupled from Ξ^H

• Aggregate consumption (TANK-III)

$$C_t = \lambda^H \Xi^H W_t N_t + \lambda^H \Theta^H D_t - \lambda^H \psi Y \ \widehat{R}_t + (1 - \lambda^H) C_t^U$$

Aggregate consumption (HANK-III)

$$C_t = \lambda_t^H \Xi_t^H W_t N_t + \lambda_t^W F_t^W - \lambda_t^H \psi Y \left[\widehat{R}_t + \Omega_{t-1}^H - 1 \right] + (1 - \lambda_t^H) C_t^U$$

Quantitative analysis


Endogenous Monetary Policy


A Taylor-type rule

$$i_t = r + 1.5\pi_t + 0.125\hat{y}_t + v_t$$

where
$$v_t = \rho_v v_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^v$$
.

Quantitative analysis





Endogenous Monetary Policy


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
where $v_t = \rho_v v_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^v$.


- Quantitative analysis.
- **Proposition:** under a strict inflation targeting policy (i.e. $\pi_t = 0$ for all t) equilibrium output is invariant to the presence of heterogeneity.

Proof: follows from "divine coincidence" property of NKPC



Panel (b): Simulations





Concluding Remarks

- Idiosyncratic income risk: key source of complexity in HANK, but small role in aggregate fluctuations
- Aggregate predictions of HANK models can be approximated by a suitably calibrated TANK model (qualitatively, and often quantitatively as well).
- More so if monetary policy is focused on inflation stabilization.
- HANK models potentially useful for analysis of:
 - distributional impact of aggregate shocks
 - role of inequality in optimal monetary policy design
- Future research: Can TANK models approximate HANK models' predictions on those fronts as well?

