A Technology-Gap Model of Premature Deindustrialization

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Introduction


Structural Change

As per capita income rises, employment or value-added shares

- fall in Agriculture
- rise in Services
- rise and fall in Manufacturing

From Herrendorf-Rogerson-Valentinyi (2014)

Evidence from Long Time Series for the Currently Rich Countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States) 1800-2000



Premature Deindustrialization (Rodrik, J. Econ Growth, 2016)

Late industrializers reach their M-peak and start deindustrializing

- *later* in time
- at *lower* per capita income levels
- with the *lower* peak M-sector shares,

compared to early industrializers.

By "premature" no welfare connotations intended.




Fig. 5 Income at which manufacturing employment peaks (logs)

This Paper: A Simple Model of Premature Deindustrialization (PD)

Key Ingredients

3 Goods/Sectors: 1=(A)griculture, 2=(M)anufacturing, 3=(S)ervices, homothetic CES with gross complements ($\sigma < 1$)

Frontier Technology: $\bar{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_jt}$, with $g_1 > g_2 > g_3 > 0 \Rightarrow$ a decline of A, a rise of S, and a hump-shaped of M in each country through the Baumol (relative price) effect, as in Ngai-Pissarides (2007)

Actual Technology Used: $\tilde{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(t - \lambda_j)$ due to Adoption Lags, $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)\lambda$

 $\lambda \geq 0$: Technology Gap: country-specific, as in Krugman (1985)

 $\theta_i > 0$: sector-specific, unlike Krugman (1985), common across countries

- Countries differ only in one dimension, $\lambda \geq 0$, in their ability to adopt the frontier technologies.
- $\theta_i > 0$ controls how much the technology gap affects the adoption lag and hence productivity in each sector.

$$\tilde{A}_{j}(t) = \bar{A}_{j}(t - \lambda_{j}) = \bar{A}_{j}(0)e^{-\lambda_{j}g_{j}}e^{g_{j}t} = \bar{A}_{j}(0)e^{-g_{j}\theta_{j}\lambda}e^{g_{j}t} \implies \frac{\partial}{\partial\lambda}\ln\left(\frac{\tilde{A}_{j}(t)}{\tilde{A}_{k}(t)}\right) = -\left(\theta_{j}g_{j} - \theta_{k}g_{k}\right)$$

 λ has no "growth" effect, but negative "level" effects proportional to $\theta_i g_i$ in sector-j

Key Mechanisms:

- θ_j magnifies the impact of the technology gap on the adoption lag: $\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_j} \left(\frac{\partial \lambda_j}{\partial \lambda} \right) > 0$ (supermodularity)
- g_j magnifies the (negative) impact of the adoption lag on productivity: $\frac{\partial}{\partial g_j} \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda_j} \ln e^{-\lambda_j g_j} \right) < 0$ (log-submodularity)

Main Results: PD occurs (i.e., A high- λ country reaches its peak later, with lower peak M-share at lower peak time per capita income) under the conditions:

- i) $\theta_1 g_1 > \theta_3 g_3$: cross-country productivity difference larger in A than in S. High relative price of A/low relative price of S in a high- λ country causes a delay.
- ii) $\frac{\theta_1 g_1 \theta_2 g_2}{g_1 g_2} > \frac{\theta_2 g_2 \theta_3 g_3}{g_2 g_3}$: technology adoption takes not too long in M.


Not too high relative price of M in a high- λ country keeps the M-share low.

iii) $\theta_1 < \theta_3$: Technology adoption takes longer in S than in A. Longer adoption lag in S in a high- λ country causes deindustrialization "prematurely."

Implications of the conditions for PD

i) & ii) $\Rightarrow \theta_1 g_1 > \theta_2 g_2$, $\theta_3 g_3$: cross-country productivity difference the largest in A.

ii) & iii) $\Rightarrow \theta_1, \theta_2 < \theta_3$: Technology adoption takes longest in S.




A Numerical Illustration.

 $\theta_1 = \theta_2 < \theta_3 = 1$ with $g_1 = 3.6\% > g_2 = 2.4\% > g_3 = 1.2\%$; $\sigma = 0.6$; Labor share = 2/3. We set the other parameters, w.l.o.g., so that the peak time, $\hat{t} = 0$ and the peak time income per capita, $U(\hat{t}) = 1$ if $\lambda = 0$.

Example 2a	the peak time, $t = 0$ and the peak time income per $(t, s_2(t))$	$\left(\ln U(t), s_2(t)\right)$
$\frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3} = \frac{\theta_2}{\theta_3} = 0.5 = \frac{g_3}{g_2}$ $\Rightarrow \theta_1 g_1 > \theta_2 g_2 = \theta_3 g_3$	0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100	0.34 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Ln(U)

First Extension: Adding The Engel Effect through Nonhomothetic CES (Comin-Lashkari-Mestieri)

Nonhomotheticity changes the shape of the time paths greatly, but not on how technology gaps affect the peak values.




We also show that the Engel effect *alone* could not generate PD *without counterfactual implications*.

Second Extension: Introducing Catching-up

$$\tilde{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_j(t-\theta_j\lambda_t)}$$
, where $\lambda_t = \lambda_0 e^{-g_{\lambda}t}$,

Countries differ only in the *initial* value, λ_0 , converging exponentially over time at the same rate, $g_{\lambda} > 0$



Technological laggards

- peak later in time,
- have lower peak M-shares
- have lower peak time per capita income, unless g_{λ} is too large.

Literature Review. Herrendorf-Rogerson-Valentinyi (14) for a broad survey on structural change

Related to The Baseline Model

Premature Deindustrialization, Rodrik (16)

The Baumol Effect: Baumol (67), Ngai-Pissarides (07), Nordhaus (08)

Sectoral implications of cross-country heterogeneity in technology development

- Log-supermodularity: Krugman (85), Matsuyama (05), Costinot (09), Costinot-Vogel (15)
- Productivity difference across countries the largest in A: Caselli (05), Gollin et.al. (14, AERP&P)
- *Small adoption lags in M;* Rodrik (2013)

Related to Two Extensions

The Engel Effect (Nonhomotheticity); Murphy et.al. (89), Matsuyama (92,02), Kongsamut et.al. (01), Foellmi-Zweimueller (08), Buera-Kaboski (09,12), Boppart (14), Comin-Lashkari-Mestieri (21), Matsuyama (19), Lewis et.al. (21), Bohr-Mestieri-Yavuz (21) Catching-Up/Technology Diffusion: Acemoglu (08), Comin-Mestieri (18)

The Issues We Abstract From

Sector-level productivity growth rate differences across countries: Huneeus-Rogerson (20)

Open economy implications: Matsuyama (92,09), Uy-Yi-Zhang (13), Sposi-Yi-Zhang (19), Fujiwara-Matsuyama (WinP) Endogenous growth, externalities, Matsuyama (92),

Sectoral wedges/misallocation: Caselli(05), Gollin et.al. (14 QJE) and many others

Nominal vs. Real expenditure; Employment vs. Value Added shares; Compatibility with aggregate balance growth, investment vs consumption, sector-specific factor intensities, skill premium, home production, productivity slowdown, etc.

Structural Change, the Baumol Effect, and Adoption Lags

Three Complementary Goods/Competitive Sectors, j = 1, 2, 3

Sector-1 = (A)griculture, Sector-2 = (M)anufacturing, Sector-3 = (S)ervices.

Demand System: L Identical HH, each supplies 1 unit of mobile labor at w; κ_j units of factor specific to j at ρ_j .

Budget Constraint:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{3} p_j c_j \le E \equiv w + \sum_{j=1}^{3} \rho_j \kappa_j$$

CES Preferences:

$$U(\mathbf{c}) = \left[\sum_{j=1}^{3} (\beta_j)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (c_j)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

with $\beta_i > 0$ and $0 < \sigma < 1$ (gross complementarity)

Expenditure Shares:

$$m_j \equiv \frac{p_j c_j}{E} = \frac{\beta_j (p_j)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^3 \beta_k (p_k)^{1-\sigma}} = \beta_j \left(\frac{E/p_j}{U}\right)^{\sigma-1}$$

Three Competitive Sectors: Production

Cobb-Douglas

$$Y_j = A_j (\kappa_j L)^{\alpha} (L_j)^{1-\alpha}$$

 $A_i > 0$: the TFP of sector-j; $\alpha \in [0,1)$ the share of specific factor.

Employment Share

$$s_j \equiv \frac{L_j}{L}; \qquad \sum_{j=1}^3 s_j = 1$$

Output per worker Output per capita

$$\frac{Y_j}{L_i} = \tilde{A}_j(s_j)^{-\alpha}; \qquad \frac{Y_j}{L} = \tilde{A}_j(s_j)^{1-\alpha}$$

where $\tilde{A}_j \equiv A_j (\kappa_j)^{\alpha}$.

With Cobb-Douglas, $wL_i = (1 - \alpha)p_iY_i$, implying the employment shares equal to

$$\frac{p_{j}Y_{j}}{EL} = \frac{p_{j}Y_{j}}{\sum_{k=1}^{3} p_{k}Y_{k}} = s_{j} = \frac{L_{j}}{L}$$

Equilibrium: The expenditure shares are equal to the employment and value-added shares.

$$m_j = \frac{p_j Y_j}{EL} = s_j$$

which lead to

Equilibrium Shares

Per Capita Income

where

$$s_{j} = \frac{\left[\beta_{j} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{j}\right]^{-a}}{\sum_{k=1}^{3} \left[\beta_{k} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{k}\right]^{-a}}$$

$$U = \left\{\sum_{k=1}^{3} \left[\beta_{k} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{k}\right]^{-a}\right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$$

$$U = \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{3} \left[\beta_k \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_k \right]^{-a} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$$

$$a \equiv \frac{1 - \sigma}{1 - \alpha(1 - \sigma)} = -\frac{\partial \log(s_j/s_k)}{\partial \log(\tilde{A}_i/\tilde{A}_k)} > 0,$$

which captures how much relatively high productivity in a sector contributes to its relatively low equilibrium share. α magnifies this effect by increasing α .

Productivity Growth:

$$\tilde{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(t - \lambda_j) = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_j(t - \lambda_j)} = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{-\lambda_j g_j}e^{g_j t}$$

 $\bar{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_jt}$: Frontier Technology in j, with a constant growth rate $g_j > 0$.

$$\tilde{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(t - \lambda_j); \ \lambda_j = \text{Adoption Lag in } j.$$

- g_i and λ_i are sector-specific.
- λ_i has no "growth" effect.
- λ_i has the "level" effect, $e^{-\lambda_j g_j}$, which is decreasing in λ_i and the effect is proportional to g_i

Key: Log-submodularity, $\frac{\partial}{\partial g_j} \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda_j} \ln e^{-\lambda_j g_j} \right) < 0$: g_j magnifies the negative effect of the adoption lag on productivity

A large adoption lag would not matter much in a sector with slow productivity growth. Even a small adoption lag would matter a lot in a sector with fast productivity growth.

$$U(t) = \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{3} \left[\beta_{k} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{k} \right]^{-a} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}} = \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{3} \tilde{\beta}_{k} e^{-ag_{k}(t - \lambda_{k})} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}, \quad where \ \tilde{\beta}_{k} \equiv \left(\beta_{k} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \bar{A}_{k}(0) \right)^{-a} = \left(\frac{\beta_{k} \frac{1}{1 - \sigma}}{\bar{A}_{k}(0)} \right)^{a} > 0.$$

Longer adoption lags would shift down the time path of U(t).

$$g_U(t) \equiv \frac{U'(t)}{U(t)} = \sum_{k=1}^{3} g_k s_k(t)$$

The aggregate growth rate is the weighted average of the sectoral growth rates

Relative Prices:
$$\left(\frac{p_j(t)}{p_k(t)}\right)^{1-\sigma} = \left[\left(\frac{\beta_j}{\beta_k}\right)^{-\alpha} \frac{\bar{A}_j(0)}{\bar{A}_k(0)}\right]^{-a} e^{a(\lambda_j g_j - \lambda_k g_k)} e^{a(g_k - g_j)t} \Rightarrow \frac{d \ln\left(\frac{p_j(t)}{p_k(t)}\right)}{dt} = \frac{a(g_k - g_j)}{1 - \sigma}$$

Relative Growth Effect: $p_i(t)/p_k(t)$ is de(in)creasing over time if $g_i > (<)g_k$.

Relative Level Effect: A higher $\lambda_i g_i - \lambda_k g_k$ raises $p_i(t)/p_k(t)$ at any point in time.

Note: For a fixed λ_i , a higher g_i makes the relative price of j higher (though declining faster).

Relative Shares:
$$\frac{s_j(t)}{s_k(t)} = \frac{\beta_j}{\beta_k} \left(\frac{p_j(t)}{p_k(t)} \right)^{1-\sigma} = \frac{\tilde{\beta}_j}{\tilde{\beta}_k} e^{a(\lambda_j g_j - \lambda_k g_k)} e^{a(g_k - g_j)t} \Longrightarrow \frac{d \ln \left(\frac{s_j(t)}{s_k(t)} \right)}{dt} = a(g_k - g_j)$$

Relative Growth Effect: $s_i(t)/s_k(t)$ is de(in)creasing over time if $g_i > (<)g_k$.

Shift from faster growing sectors to slower growing sectors over time.

Relative Level Effect: A higher $\lambda_j g_j - \lambda_k g_k$ raises $s_j(t)/s_k(t)$ at any point in time.

Note: For a fixed λ_j , a higher g_j makes the relative share of j higher (though declining faster).

Structural Change with the Baumol (Relative Price) Effect: Let $g_1 > g_2 > g_3 > 0$

Decline of Agriculture: $s_1(t)$ is decreasing in t, because

$$\frac{1}{s_1(t)} - 1 = \frac{s_2(t)}{s_1(t)} + \frac{s_3(t)}{s_1(t)} = \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_2}{\tilde{\beta}_1} e^{a(\lambda_2 g_2 - \lambda_1 g_1)}\right] e^{a(g_1 - g_2)t} + \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_3}{\tilde{\beta}_1} e^{a(\lambda_3 g_3 - \lambda_1 g_1)}\right] e^{a(g_1 - g_3)t}$$

Rise of Services: $s_3(t)$ is increasing in t, because

$$\frac{1}{s_3(t)} - 1 = \frac{s_1(t)}{s_3(t)} + \frac{s_2(t)}{s_3(t)} = \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_3} e^{a(\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_3 g_3)}\right] e^{-a(g_1 - g_3)t} + \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_2}{\tilde{\beta}_3} e^{a(\lambda_2 g_2 - \lambda_3 g_3)}\right] e^{-a(g_2 - g_3)t}$$

Rise and Fall of Manufacturing: $s_2(t)$ is hump-shaped in t, because

$$\frac{1}{s_2(t)} - 1 = \frac{s_1(t)}{s_2(t)} + \frac{s_3(t)}{s_2(t)} = \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} e^{a(\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_2 g_2)}\right] e^{-a(g_1 - g_2)t} + \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_3}{\tilde{\beta}_2} e^{a(\lambda_3 g_3 - \lambda_2 g_2)}\right] e^{a(g_2 - g_3)t}.$$

Hump-shaped due to the two opposing forces: $g_1 > g_2$ pushes labor out of A to M; $g_2 > g_3$ pulls labor out of M to S.

$$s_2'(t) \ge 0 \Leftrightarrow (g_1 - g_2) \frac{s_1(t)}{s_2(t)} \ge (g_2 - g_3) \frac{s_3(t)}{s_2(t)} \Leftrightarrow g_U(t) = \sum_{k=1}^3 g_k s_k(t) \ge g_2$$

Characterizing Manufacturing Peak: "^" indicates the peak.

$$s_2'(\hat{t}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow (g_1 - g_2)s_1(\hat{t}) = (g_2 - g_3)s_3(\hat{t}) \Leftrightarrow g_U(\hat{t}) = g_2$$

Peak Time: From $(g_1 - g_2)s_1(\hat{t}) = (g_2 - g_3)s_3(\hat{t})$

$$\hat{t} = \frac{\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} + \hat{t}_0, \quad \text{where } \hat{t}_0 \equiv \frac{1}{a(g_1 - g_3)} \ln \left[\left(\frac{g_1 - g_2}{g_2 - g_3} \right) \frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_3} \right]$$

Two Normalizations: Without any loss of generality,

$$\hat{t}_0 = 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{g_2 - g_3}{g_1 - g_2} = \frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_3} \equiv \left[\left(\frac{\beta_1}{\beta_3} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma}} \frac{\bar{A}_3(0)}{\bar{A}_1(0)} \right]^a$$

The calendar time is reset so that its M-peak would be reached at $\hat{t} = 0$ in the absence of the adoption lags.

$$U(0) = 1 \text{ for } \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = 0 \Leftrightarrow \sum_{k=1}^3 \tilde{\beta}_k = \sum_{k=1}^3 \left(\frac{\beta_k^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}{\bar{A}_k(0)} \right)^a = 1.$$

We use the peak time per capita income in the absence of the adoption lags as the *numeraire*.

Note: Under these normalizations, the peak time share of sector-k in the absence of the adoption lags would be $\tilde{\beta}_k$.

Then,

Peak Time

 $\hat{t} = \frac{\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3}.$

Peak M-Share

$$\frac{1}{s_2(\hat{t})} = 1 + \left(\frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} - 1\right) e^{\frac{a(g_1 - g_2)(g_2 - g_3)}{(g_1 - g_3)} \left(\frac{\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_2 g_2}{g_1 - g_2} - \frac{\lambda_2 g_2 - \lambda_3 g_3}{g_2 - g_3}\right)}$$

Peak Time Per Capita Income

$$U(\hat{t}) = \left\{ (1 - \tilde{\beta}_2) e^{-ag_1 g_3 \left(\frac{\lambda_1 - \lambda_3}{g_1 - g_3}\right)} + \tilde{\beta}_2 e^{-ag_2 \left(\frac{\lambda_1 g_1 - \lambda_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} - \lambda_2\right)} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$$

So far, we have looked at the impacts of adoption lags in a single country in isolation, without specifying the sources of the adoption lags.

Next, we introduce cross-country heterogeneity, the technology gap, which generate cross-country variations in adoption lags, and study the cross-country implications.

Technology Gaps and Premature Deindustrialization

Consider the world with many countries with

$$(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)\lambda$$

 $\lambda \geq 0$: Technology Gap, Country-specific

 $\theta_i > 0$: Sector-specific, capturing the inherent difficulty of technology adoption, common across countries

- Countries differ only in one dimension, λ , in their ability to adopt the frontier technologies.
- $\theta_i > 0$ determines how the technology gap affects the adoption lag in that sector.

$$\frac{\tilde{A}_{j}(t)}{\tilde{A}_{k}(t)} = \frac{\bar{A}_{j}(0)}{\bar{A}_{k}(0)} e^{-(\theta_{j}g_{j} - \theta_{k}g_{k})\lambda} e^{(g_{j} - g_{k})t} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda} \ln \left(\frac{\tilde{A}_{j}(t)}{\tilde{A}_{k}(t)} \right) = -(\theta_{j}g_{j} - \theta_{k}g_{k})$$

Cross-country productivity difference is larger in sector-j than in sector-k if $\theta_i g_i > \theta_k g_k$.

Peak Time

$$\hat{t} = \frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} \lambda.$$

Peak M-Share

$$\frac{1}{s_2(\hat{t})} = 1 + \left(\frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} - 1\right) e^{\frac{(g_1 - g_2)(g_2 - g_3)}{(g_1 - g_3)} \left(\frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_2 g_2}{g_1 - g_2} - \frac{\theta_2 g_2 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_2 - g_3}\right) a \lambda}$$

Peak Time Per Capita Income

$$U(\hat{t}) = \left\{ (1 - \tilde{\beta}_2) e^{-g_1 g_3 \left(\frac{\theta_1 - \theta_3}{g_1 - g_3}\right) a \lambda} + \tilde{\beta}_2 e^{-g_2 \left(\frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} - \theta_2\right) a \lambda} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$$

Figure 1: Conditions for Premature Deindustrialization (PD) only with the Baumol (Relative Price) Effect

$$\frac{\partial \hat{t}}{\partial \lambda} > 0 \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow \theta_1 g_1 > \theta_3 g_3.$$

With $\theta_1 g_1 > \theta_3 g_3$, the price of A is high and the price of S is low relative to M in a high- λ country, which delays structural change.

$$\frac{\partial s_2(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0 \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_2 g_2}{g_1 - g_2} > \frac{\theta_2 g_2 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_2 - g_3}$$


With a low θ_2 , which has no effect on \hat{t} , the price of M is low relative to both A & S in a high- λ country, which keeps the M-share low.

Under the above condition,

$$\frac{\partial U(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0 \text{ for a sufficiently large } \lambda \Leftrightarrow \theta_1 < \theta_3 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\hat{t}}{\lambda} = \frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} < 1$$

$$\frac{\partial U(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0 \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow 0 < (1 - \Theta) \left(1 - \frac{\theta_2}{\theta_3}\right) < \left(1 - \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3}\right),$$
 where $g_3/g_1 < \Theta < 1$.

These conditions jointly imply $\theta_1 g_1 > \theta_2 g_2$, $\theta_3 g_3$ (productivity differences the largest in A) and θ_1 , $\theta_2 < \theta_3$ (adoption lag the longest in S).



Some Examples

Example 1: No Premature Deindustrialization (PD)

Uniform Adoption Lags, as in Krugman (1985)

$$\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \theta_3 = 1 \iff \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = \lambda > 0$$


 $\implies \hat{t} = \lambda; \quad s_2(\hat{t}) = \tilde{\beta}_2; \quad U(\hat{t}) = 1$


- The country's technology gap causes a delay in the peak time, \hat{t} , by $\lambda > 0$.
- The peak M-share & per capita income at the peak time unaffected.

Each country follows exactly the same development path of early industrializers with a delay. No PD!!

Thus, the technology gap must have differential impacts on the adoption lags across sectors.


Example 2a-2c: Numerical Illustrations. In all three examples, $\theta_1 = \theta_2 < \theta_3 = 1$ and we use $g_1 = 3.6\% > g_2 = 2.4\% > g_3 = 1.2\%$; $\alpha = 1/3$, and $\sigma = 0.6$ (hence $\alpha = 6/13$). $\tilde{\beta}_i = 1/3$ for $j = 1,2,3 \Rightarrow s_2(\hat{t}) = \tilde{\beta}_2 = 1/3$; $\hat{U}(\hat{t}) = 1$; $\hat{t} = 0$ for $\lambda = 0$.






Some Limit Cases

For
$$g_3/g_1 \to 0$$
; $g_3/g_2 \to 1 \Longrightarrow \Theta \to 1 - \tilde{\beta}_2$



For
$$g_3/g_1 \to 0$$
; $g_3/g_2 \to 0 \implies \Theta \to 0$



Introducing the Engel Effect

The Engel Law through Isoelastic Nonhomothetic CES; Comin-Lashkari-Mestieri (2021), Matsuyama (2019)

$$\left[\sum_{j=1}^{3} (\beta_j)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{c_j}{U^{\varepsilon_j}}\right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\delta}{\sigma-1}} \equiv 1$$

Normalize $\varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 + \varepsilon_3 = 3$; with $\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 = \varepsilon_3 = 1$, we go back to the standard homothetic CES. With $\sigma < 1$, $0 < \varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2 < \varepsilon_3 \Rightarrow$ the income elasticity the lowest in A and the highest in S.

By maximizing U subject to $\sum_{j=1}^{3} p_j c_j \leq E$,

Expenditure Shares

$$m_{j} \equiv \frac{p_{j}c_{j}}{E} = \frac{\beta_{j} \left(U^{\varepsilon_{j}}p_{j}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^{3} \beta_{k} (U^{\varepsilon_{k}}p_{k})^{1-\sigma}} = \beta_{j} \left(\frac{U^{\varepsilon_{j}}p_{j}}{E}\right)^{1-\sigma} \Longrightarrow \frac{m_{j}}{m_{k}} = \frac{\beta_{j}}{\beta_{k}} \left(\frac{p_{j}}{p_{k}}U^{\varepsilon_{j}-\varepsilon_{k}}\right)^{1-\sigma}$$

Indirect Utility Function:

$$\left[\sum_{j=1}^{3} \beta_{j} \left(\frac{U^{\varepsilon_{j}} p_{j}}{E}\right)^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \equiv 1$$

Cost-of-Living Index:

$$\left[\sum_{j=1}^{3} \beta_{j} \left(\frac{U^{\varepsilon_{j}-1} p_{j}}{P}\right)^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \equiv 1 \iff U \equiv \frac{E}{P}$$

Income Elasticity:

$$\eta_{j} \equiv \frac{\partial \ln c_{j}}{\partial \ln(U)} = 1 + \frac{\partial \ln m_{j}}{\partial \ln(E/P)} = 1 + (1 - \sigma) \left\{ \varepsilon_{j} - \sum_{k=1}^{3} m_{k} \varepsilon_{k} \right\}$$

Structural Change with the Engel (Income) Effect: Let $0 < \varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2 < \varepsilon_3 = 3 - \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2$. Then, even with constant relative prices,

Decline of Agriculture: $s_1(t) = m_1(t)$ is decreasing in U(t), because

$$\frac{1}{s_1(t)} - 1 = \frac{m_2(t)}{m_1(t)} + \frac{m_3(t)}{m_1(t)} = \frac{\beta_2}{\beta_1} \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1} U(t)^{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1}\right)^{1 - \sigma} + \frac{\beta_3}{\beta_1} \left(\frac{p_3}{p_1} U(t)^{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1}\right)^{1 - \sigma}$$

Rise of Services: $s_3(t) = m_3(t)$ is increasing in U(t), because

$$\frac{1}{s_3(t)} - 1 = \frac{m_1(t)}{m_3(t)} + \frac{m_2(t)}{m_3(t)} = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_3} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_3} U(t)^{\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_3}\right)^{1 - \sigma} + \frac{\beta_2}{\beta_3} \left(\frac{p_2}{p_3} U(t)^{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_3}\right)^{1 - \sigma}$$

Rise and Fall of Manufacturing: $s_2(t) = m_2(t)$ is hump-shaped in U(t), because

$$\frac{1}{s_2(t)} - 1 = \frac{m_1(t)}{m_2(t)} + \frac{m_3(t)}{m_2(t)} = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_2} \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2} U(t)^{\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2} \right)^{1 - \sigma} + \frac{\beta_3}{\beta_2} \left(\frac{p_3}{p_2} U(t)^{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2} \right)^{1 - \sigma}.$$

Hump-shaped due to the two opposing forces: $\varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2$ pushes labor out of A to M; $\varepsilon_2 < \varepsilon_3$ pulls labor out of M to S.

$$s_2'(t) = m_2'(t) \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow (\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1) \frac{m_1(t)}{m_2(t)} \geq (\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2) \frac{m_3(t)}{m_2(t)} \Leftrightarrow \eta_2 \geq 1$$

with constant relative prices.

The production side is the same as before. By following the same step, we obtain

Equilibrium Shares

$$s_{j} = \frac{\left[\beta_{j} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{j}\right]^{-a}}{\left[U^{\varepsilon_{j}}\right]^{-a}}, \quad \text{where } \sum_{k=1}^{3} \frac{\left[\beta_{k} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \tilde{A}_{k}\right]^{-a}}{\left[U^{\varepsilon_{k}}\right]^{-a}} \equiv 1$$

With
$$\tilde{A}_j(t) = \bar{A}_j(t - \lambda_j) = \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_j(t - \theta_j\lambda)}$$

$$\frac{1}{s_2(t)} = U(t)^{a(\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2)} \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} e^{a(\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_2 g_2)\lambda} \right] e^{-a(g_1 - g_2)t} + 1 + U(t)^{a(\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2)} \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_3}{\tilde{\beta}_2} e^{a(\theta_3 g_3 - \theta_2 g_2)\lambda} \right] e^{a(g_2 - g_3)t}$$

$$U(t): \qquad \qquad U(t)^{a\boldsymbol{\varepsilon_1}}\tilde{\beta}_1 e^{-ag_1(t-\theta_1\lambda)} + U(t)^{a\boldsymbol{\varepsilon_2}}\tilde{\beta}_2 e^{-ag_2(t-\theta_2\lambda)} + U(t)^{a\boldsymbol{\varepsilon_3}}\tilde{\beta}_3 e^{-ag_3(t-\theta_3\lambda)} \equiv 1$$

$$s_{2}'(t) = 0: \begin{cases} (g_{1} - g_{2}) = (g_{2} - g_{3}) U^{a(\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{2})} \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_{3}}{\tilde{\beta}_{1}}\right] e^{a(\theta_{3}g_{3} - \theta_{1}g_{1})\lambda} e^{a(g_{1} - g_{3})t} \\ + \frac{\left\{(\varepsilon_{1} - \varepsilon_{2}) + (\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{2}) U^{a(\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{1})} \left[\frac{\tilde{\beta}_{3}}{\tilde{\beta}_{1}}\right] e^{a(\theta_{3}g_{3} - \theta_{1}g_{1})\lambda} e^{a(g_{1} - g_{3})t}\right\} \left\{g_{1} U^{a(\varepsilon_{1} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{1} e^{-ag_{1}(t - \theta_{1}\lambda)} + g_{2} \tilde{\beta}_{2} e^{-ag_{2}(t - \theta_{2}\lambda)} + g_{3} U^{a(\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{3} e^{-ag_{3}(t - \theta_{3}\lambda)}\right\} \\ + \frac{\varepsilon_{1} U^{a(\varepsilon_{1} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{1} e^{-ag_{1}(t - \theta_{1}\lambda)} + \varepsilon_{2} \tilde{\beta}_{2} e^{-ag_{2}(t - \theta_{2}\lambda)} + \varepsilon_{3} U^{a(\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{3} e^{-ag_{3}(t - \theta_{3}\lambda)}}{\varepsilon_{1} U^{a(\varepsilon_{1} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{1} e^{-ag_{1}(t - \theta_{1}\lambda)} + \varepsilon_{2} \tilde{\beta}_{2} e^{-ag_{2}(t - \theta_{2}\lambda)} + \varepsilon_{3} U^{a(\varepsilon_{3} - \varepsilon_{2})} \tilde{\beta}_{3} e^{-ag_{3}(t - \theta_{3}\lambda)}}$$

 \hat{t} and \hat{U} solve the equation for U(t) and the equation for $s_2'(t) = 0$, simultaneously. Then, \hat{s}_2 can be obtained by plugging \hat{t} and \hat{U} into the equation for $s_2(t)$

(Analytically Solvable) "Unbiased" Case

$$0 < \mu \equiv \frac{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1}{g_1 - g_2} = \frac{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2}{g_2 - g_3} < \frac{1}{g_1 - \bar{g}},$$

where
$$\bar{g} \equiv \frac{g_1 + g_2 + g_3}{3}$$

Peak Time

$$\hat{t} = \frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} \lambda - \ln \left\{ \left(1 - \tilde{\beta}_2 \right) e^{-g_1 g_3 \left(\frac{\theta_1 - \theta_3}{g_1 - g_3} \right) a \lambda} + \tilde{\beta}_2 e^{-g_2 \left(\frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} - \theta_2 \right) a \lambda} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a} \left(\frac{\mu}{1 + \mu \bar{g}} \right)}$$

$$\frac{1}{s_2(\hat{t})} = 1 + \left(\frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} - 1 \right) e^{\frac{(g_1 - g_2)(g_2 - g_3)}{(g_1 - g_3)} \left(\frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_2 g_2}{g_1 - g_2} - \frac{\theta_2 g_2 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_2 - g_3} \right) a \lambda}$$

Peak M-Share

$$U(\hat{t}) = \left\{ (1 - \tilde{\beta}_2) e^{-g_1 g_3 \left(\frac{\theta_1 - \theta_3}{g_1 - g_3}\right) a \lambda} + \tilde{\beta}_2 e^{-g_2 \left(\frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} - \theta_2\right) a \lambda} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \mu \bar{g}}\right)}$$


 $\frac{\partial s_2(\hat{t})}{\partial x_1} < 0$; $\frac{\partial U(\hat{t})}{\partial x_2} < 0$ under the same condition; $\frac{\partial \hat{t}}{\partial x_2} > 0$ under a weaker condition. With g_1, g_2, g_3 fixed, a higher μ has

- No effect on \hat{t} , $s_2(\hat{t})$, $U(\hat{t})$ for the country with $\lambda = 0$.
- A further delay in \hat{t} for every country with $\lambda > 0$.
- No effect on $s_2(\hat{t})$ for every country with $\lambda > 0$.
- A smaller decline in $U(\hat{t})$ for each country with $\lambda > 0$.

(Analytically Solvable) "Unbiased" Case: A Numerical Illustration


$$g_1 = 3.6\% > g_2 = 2.4\% > g_3 = 1.2\%, \theta = 0.5, a = 6/13; \tilde{\beta}_j = 1/3 \text{ for } j = 1,2,3.$$

In this case, $g_1 - g_2 = g_2 - g_3 = \bar{g} = 1.2\% > 0 \implies \varepsilon_1 = 1 - \epsilon < \varepsilon_2 = 1 < \varepsilon_3 = 1 + \epsilon \text{ for } 0 < \epsilon = (1.2\%)\mu < 1$



(Empirically More Plausible) Biased Case:

$$\varepsilon_1 = 1 - \epsilon < \varepsilon_2 = 1 + \frac{\epsilon}{3} < \varepsilon_3 = 1 + \frac{2\epsilon}{3}$$
 for $0 < \epsilon < 1 \Rightarrow \frac{g_1 - g_2}{g_2 - g_3} = 1 < \frac{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2} = 4$, as in CLM (2021).




PD $(\frac{\partial \hat{t}}{\partial \lambda} > 0, \frac{\partial s_2(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0, \frac{\partial U(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0)$. Relative to the frontier country, a higher ϵ causes a high- λ country to have

- A further delay in \hat{t}
- A larger decline in $s_2(\hat{t})$.
- A smaller decline in $U(\hat{t})$.

Stronger nonhomotheticity changes the shape of the time paths significantly.

It does not change the implications on PD, i.e., how technology gaps affect \hat{t} , $s_2(\hat{t})$, and $U(\hat{t})$.



Premature Deindustrialization (PD) through the Engel (Income) Effect Only

What happens if we rely *entirely* on the Engel effect, by removing the Baumol effect with $g_1 = g_2 = g_3 = \bar{g} > 0$, while keeping $0 < \varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2 < \varepsilon_3 = 3 - \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2$?

Peak Time

$$\hat{t} = \frac{1}{a\bar{g}} \ln \left\{ \left(1 - \tilde{\beta}_2 \right) e^{\frac{(\varepsilon_3 \theta_1 - \varepsilon_1 \theta_3)}{(\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1)} a\bar{g}\lambda} + \tilde{\beta}_2 e^{\left(\theta_2 + \frac{(\theta_1 - \theta_3)}{(\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1)} \varepsilon_2\right) a\bar{g}\lambda} \right\}$$

Peak M-Share

$$\frac{1}{s_2(\hat{t})} - 1 = \left(\frac{1}{\tilde{\beta}_2} - 1\right) e^{\frac{\varepsilon_3 \theta_3}{(\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1)} \left[\left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3}\right) \left(1 - \frac{\theta_2}{\theta_3}\right) - \left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon_2}{\varepsilon_3}\right) \left(1 - \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3}\right) \right] a \bar{g} \lambda}$$

Peak Time Per Capita Income

$$\ln U(\hat{t}) = \frac{\theta_1 - \theta_3}{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1} \bar{g}\lambda$$

with the two normalizations

$$\left(\frac{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2}\right) \frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_3} = 1; \ \tilde{\beta}_1 + \tilde{\beta}_2 + \tilde{\beta}_3 = 1$$

which ensures $U(\hat{t}) = 1$ and $\hat{t} = 0$ for $\lambda = 0$.

Conditions for Premature Deindustrialization (PD) only with the Engel Effect

$$\frac{\partial U(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0 \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3} < 1$$


With a low θ_1 and a high θ_3 , the price of the income elastic S is high relative to the income inelastic A in a high- λ country, which make it necessary to reallocate labor to S at earlier stage of development.

$$\frac{\partial s_2(\hat{t})}{\partial \lambda} < 0 \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\theta_1 - \theta_2}{\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1} > \frac{\theta_2 - \theta_3}{\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_2}$$

With a low θ_2 , which has no effect on $U(\hat{t})$, the price of M is low relative to both A & S in a high- λ country, which keeps the M-share low.

Under the above condition,

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial \hat{t}}{\partial \lambda} &> 0 \; \text{ for a sufficiently large } \lambda \Leftrightarrow \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3} > \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3} \\ \frac{\partial \hat{t}}{\partial \lambda} &> 0 \; \text{ for all } \lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow \left(\Theta_E - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3}\right) \left[1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon_3}{\varepsilon_2}\right) \frac{\theta_2}{\theta_3}\right] < \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_3} - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3} < 1 - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_3} \end{split}$$
 where $\varepsilon_1/\varepsilon_3 < \Theta_E < 1$.



With $g_1 = g_2 = g_3 = \bar{g}$, PD occurs only if $\theta_1 \bar{g}$, $\theta_2 \bar{g} < \theta_3 \bar{g}$, that is, when cross-country productivity difference is the largest in S.

Introducing Catching Up

Narrowing a Technology Gap

We assumed that λ is time-invariant. This implies

The sectoral productivity growth rate is constant over time & identical across countries.

[In contrast, the aggregate growth rate, $g_U(t) \equiv U'(t)/U(t) = \sum_{k=1}^3 g_k s_k(t)$, declines over time, $g'_U(t) = g_1 s'_1(t) + g_2 s'_2(t) + g_3 s'_3(t) = (g_1 - g_2)s'_1(t) + (g_3 - g_2)s'_3(t) < 0$, the so-called Baumol's cost disease.]

What if technological laggards can **narrow a technology gap**, and hence achieve a higher productivity growth in each sector?

Countries differ only in the *initial* value of lambda, λ_0 , converging exponentially over time at the same rate,

$$\begin{split} \tilde{A}_j(t) &= \bar{A}_j(0)e^{g_j\left(t-\theta_j\lambda_t\right)}, \quad \text{where} \quad \lambda_t = \lambda_0 e^{-g_\lambda t}, \quad g_\lambda > 0. \\ &\Rightarrow \frac{1}{s_2(t)} = \left(\frac{\tilde{\beta}_1}{\tilde{\beta}_2}\right)e^{a\left[(\theta_1g_1-\theta_2g_2)\lambda_t-(g_1-g_2)t\right]} + 1 + \left(\frac{\tilde{\beta}_3}{\tilde{\beta}_2}\right)e^{a\left[(\theta_3g_3-\theta_2g_2)\lambda_t+(g_2-g_3)t\right]} \end{split}$$

Again, by setting the calendar time such that $\hat{t}_0 = 0$ for the frontier country with $\lambda_0 = 0$,

Peak Time

$$\hat{t} = \frac{\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_3 g_3}{g_1 - g_3} \lambda_{\hat{t}} + D(g_{\lambda} \lambda_{\hat{t}})$$

Peak Share

$$\frac{1}{s_2(\hat{t})} = 1 + \left(\frac{\tilde{\beta}_1 + \tilde{\beta}_3}{\tilde{\beta}_2}\right) \left[\frac{(g_2 - g_3)e^{a(g_2 - g_1)D(g_\lambda\lambda_{\hat{t}})} + (g_1 - g_2)e^{a(g_2 - g_3)D(g_\lambda\lambda_{\hat{t}})}}{g_1 - g_3}\right] \left[e^{\frac{a(g_1 - g_2)(g_2 - g_3)}{(g_1 - g_3)}}\right]^{\left(\frac{\theta_1g_1 - \theta_2g_2}{g_1 - g_2} + \frac{\theta_3g_3 - \theta_2g_2}{g_2 - g_3}\right)\lambda_{\hat{t}}}$$


Peak Time Per Capita Income

$$U(\hat{t}) = \left\{ \left(\tilde{\beta}_{1} e^{-ag_{1}D(g_{\lambda}\lambda_{\hat{t}})} + \tilde{\beta}_{3} e^{-ag_{3}D(g_{\lambda}\lambda_{\hat{t}})} \right) e^{-a\frac{(\theta_{1} - \theta_{3})g_{1}g_{3}}{g_{1} - g_{3}}\lambda_{\hat{t}}} + \left(\tilde{\beta}_{2} e^{-ag_{2}D(g_{\lambda}\lambda_{\hat{t}})} \right) e^{-a\frac{(\theta_{1} - \theta_{2})g_{1}g_{2} + (\theta_{2} - \theta_{3})g_{2}g_{3}}{g_{1} - g_{3}}\lambda_{\hat{t}}} \right\}^{-\frac{1}{a}}$$

where

$$D(g_{\lambda}\lambda_{\hat{t}}) = \frac{1}{a(g_1 - g_3)} \ln \left[\left(\frac{g_1 - g_2 + (\theta_1 g_1 - \theta_2 g_2) g_{\lambda} \lambda_{\hat{t}}}{g_2 - g_3 - (\theta_3 g_3 - \theta_2 g_2) g_{\lambda} \lambda_{\hat{t}}} \right) \left(\frac{g_2 - g_3}{g_1 - g_2} \right) \right].$$

For $g_{\lambda} = 0$, $D(g_{\lambda}\lambda_{\hat{t}}) = D(0) = 0$, and all the parts in red disappear, and we go back to the baseline model.



Technological laggards

- peak later in time,
- have lower peak M-shares
- have lower peak time per capita income, unless g_{λ} is too large: Comin-Mestieri (2018)

Concluding Remarks

A simple model of Rodrik's (2016) PD based on

- Differential productivity growth rates across complementary sectors, as in Baumol (67), Ngai-Pissarides (07).
- Countries heterogeneous only in their technology gaps, as in Krugman (1985).
- Sectors differ in the extent to which technology gap affects their adoption lags, unlike in Krugman (1985)

We find that PD occurs for

- cross-country productivity difference larger in A than in S.
- technology adoption takes not too long in M.
- Technology adoption takes longer in S than in A. which implies that cross-country productivity difference the largest in A; that technology adoption the longest in S.


The baseline model assumes **homothetic CES** (to focus on the Baumol effect) and **no catching up** (to isolate the level effect from the growth effect).

In two extensions, we showed that the results are *robust* against introducing

- The Engel effect with income-elastic S & income-inelastic A, using nonhomothetic CES: CLM(21), Matsuyama(19) The Engel effect changes the shape of the time paths, but not the implications on technology gaps on PD The Engel effect *alone* could not generate PD w/o counterfactual implications on cross-country productivity differences
- Narrowing a technology gap to allow technological laggards to catch up unless the catching-up speed is too large.

Appendix

Appendix: Non-agricultural share as another measure of development, $1 - s_1(\hat{t}) = s_2(\hat{t}) + s_3(\hat{t}) \equiv s_n(\hat{t})$ Baseline Homothetic Case:



Nonhomothetic Cases:

