# Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective

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Fiscal Policy and Debt

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- Japan faces two significant challenges
  - High debt to output ratio
  - Aging population
    - Projected Inreases in Government Expenditures
- View issue through lens of neoclassical growth model.
- How big is the problem and what are the consequences of possible solutions?

# Two Significant challenges faced by Japan 1. High Debt



# Two Significant challenges faced by Japan 2. Aging Population



### Two Significant challenges faced by Japan Implications of the Aging Population: Fukawa and Sato (2009)



- Measure the size of fiscal adjustment needed
- Calculate the effects of two alternative fiscal policies designed to achieve fiscal balance

- Economic actors know the future, including futures changes in government policy.
- Exogenous: total factor productivity, tax rates, government spending, transfer payments, and population levels.
  - Actual values for 1981-2008, forecasts (Fukawa and Sato (2009)) after.
- Model determines: Output, hours, investment, consumption, capital stock, interest rates, and government debt.

- Implement a debt sustainability rule. Once an ad hoc threshold is reached, debt is reduced toward assumed long run level.
- Compute required revenue to reduce debt given projected government expenditures.
- Compute two alternative fiscal policy transitions
  - Consumption tax
  - Labor income tax

The policies considered are not "optimal" policies. We are motivated by two considerations:

- Politically there is likely an incentive to put off any reform as long as possible. This is why we use a debt to output trigger.
- We focus on consumption and labor income tax rates because of their simplicity. Further research should explore things like increasing the retirement age, other reforms of entitlement programs, encouraging immigration, encourage female labor supply, etc.

- Very large additional revenues needed to finance the projected increases in government expenditures due to aging
  - About 30% of aggregate consumption each year
- If the government uses the consumption tax to finance the expected burden due to aging, then the consumption tax rate needs to increase from its current level of 5% to about 35%.
- If the labor income tax is used, then the tax rate will nearly double from its current level of 30% to about 60%.
- The welfare cost of using the labor income tax is 3.22% of consumption, which is more than twice that of using the consumption tax to restore fiscal balance.

### Model

- Endogenous:
  - Hours worked  $(h_t)$ , per capita consumption  $(C_t)$ , output  $(Y_t)$ , the stock of capital  $(K_{t+1})$ , tax revenues, government debt  $(B_{t+1})$ , and the price of government bonds,  $(q_t)$ , from 1981 into the infinite future
- Population:  $N_{t+1} = \eta_t N_t$ .
- Exogenous:
  - Tax rates  $\tau_{h,t}, \tau_{k,t}, \tau_{b,t}, \tau_{c,t}$
  - Government purchases  $G_t$
  - Transfer payments  $TR_t$
  - Working age population  $N_t$
  - TFP  $A_t$ ,
- Use actual time series 1981-2008; forecasts and assumptions for 2009 and beyond.
- Eventually, the tax rates,  $G_t/Y_t$ ,  $TR_t/Y_t$ , growth rates of  $N_t$  and  $A_t$  are all constant; economy converges to a balanced growth path.

### Revenue Required to Stablilize Debt

Government

Budget Constraint:

$$G_{t} + TR_{t} + B_{t} = \eta_{t}q_{t}B_{t+1} + \tau_{c,t}C_{t} + \tau_{h,t}W_{t}h_{t}$$
(1)  
+  $\tau_{k,t}(r_{t} - \delta)K_{t} + \tau_{b,t}(1 - q_{t-1})B_{t}.$ 

Debt Sustainability Rule:

$$D_t = \kappa \iota_t (B_t - B_t),$$

$$\iota_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } B_s / Y_s \ge b_{\max} & \text{for some } s \le t, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Replace  $TR_t$  with  $TR_t^* = TR_t - D_t$ 

- Tax rate on Capital Income: Updated version of Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
- Tax Rate on Labor Income: Updated version of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar(1994)
- Tax Rate on Consumption:
  - 0% 1981-1988
  - 3% 1989-1996
  - 5% 1997-2008
- For 2009 and beyond, we assume that tax rates are constant at their 2008 levels.

### Calibration Tax Rates



#### Figure 4. Tax Rates

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#### Actual Values used for 1981-2009

Table 3. Calibration of TFP and Population Growth Rates							
	1981 - 2009	2010 - 2050	$2051 - \infty$				
$\gamma_t$	Actual Values	$1.02^{(1- heta)}$	$1.02^{(1- heta)}$				
$\eta_t$	Actual Values	Government Projections	1.0				

Projections	by	Fukawa	and	Sato	(2009)	
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Table4. Calibration of $G/Y$ and $TR/Y$							
	1981 - 2009	2010 — 2050	$2051 - \infty$				
G/Y	Actual Values	linear increase from 0.198 to 0.238	0.238				
TR/Y	Actual Values	linear increase from 0.148 to 0.188	0.188				

Image: Image:

### Calibration TFP, Population Growth Rates, Expenditure Ratios



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Image: Image:

 $\kappa$ ,  $b_{\max}$ , and  $\overline{b}$ 

$$\iota_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } B_s / Y_s \ge b_{\max} \text{ for some } s \le t, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$D_t = \kappa \iota_t (B_t - \overline{B}_t)$$
,

- For the debt to output ratio along the balanced growth path,  $\overline{b}$ , we use a value of 60%.
- For  $b_{\max}$ , the debt to output ratio that triggers tax increases, we used 150% and 200%.
- For  $\kappa$ , see next slide.

# Calibration

#### Revenue Requirements:

 $b_{\max} = 150\%$ 



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## Calibration

#### Revenue Requirements:

 $b_{\rm max}=200\%$ 



E ▶.

# **Quantitative Findings**

#### Benchmark Results



# Quantitative Findings

#### Benchmark Results



# Quantitative Findings

#### Benchmark Results



### Using a Distorting Tax Instead of Lumpsum Reduction in Transfers Transition Policy

Fiscal policy is assumed to follow

$$\tau_{x,t} = \begin{cases} \tau_{x,2009} & \text{if } B_s / Y_s \leq b_{\max} \text{ for all } s \leq t \\ \overline{\tau}_x + \pi & \text{if } B_s / Y_s > b_{\max} \text{ for some } s \leq t \text{ and } B_t / Y_t > \overline{b} \\ \overline{\tau}_x & \text{if } B_t / Y_t \leq \overline{b}. \end{cases}$$

### Using a Distorting Tax Instead of a Lumpsum Tax Consumption Tax



Figure 13. Consumption Tax Rate

# Using a Distorting Tax Instead of a Lumpsum Tax Labor Income Tax



Figure 14. Labor Income Tax Rate

#### Comparis<u>on</u>



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# Transition

#### Comparison



$$(1- au)=(1- au_h)/(1+ au_c)$$
 which implies  $au=( au_c+ au_h)/(1+ au_h)$ 



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Figure 18. Output Effects

What percentage *decrease* in consumption each period would give someone in the benchmark (lump sum tax) economy the same lifetime utility as someone living in an economy where increases in the consumption tax or labor tax is used to achieve fiscal stability?

$$\lambda_c = 1.41\%$$
  
 $\lambda_h = 3.22\%$ 

- Fiscal day of reckoning is soon-2017-2022.
- A nearly PERMANENT increase in consumption tax rate of about 30 percent.
- A nearly PERMANENT increase in labor income tax rate of about 30 percent.

- Other possibilities:
  - social security reform
  - immigration
  - fertility
  - encourage female labor force participation
  - reduce spending