


# Agricultural Policy Reform & Free Trade

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# Mega-FTAs



# The relationship between WTO and TPP

## WTO

SCM  
(Subsidies)


Tariffs  
Service  
SPS  
TBT  
TRIP  
Government  
Procurement

## FTA(TPP)

Trade and Labor  
Trade and Environment  
Trade facilitation  
competition  
State owned enterprises  
(SOE)  
Investment

# The function of SOE

## the Price of Japanese rice in Tokyo and Beijing




# Japan and the TPP negotiations

- The Diet agricultural committees have adopted resolutions urging the government to have Japan's rice, wheat, beef and pork, dairy products and sugar exempted from the tariff elimination under TPP agreement and to leave the negotiating table if unable to do so.
- In Japanese politics, rice is sacrosanct. But making an exception requires compensation. An additional tariff-rate quota with zero in-quota tariff for TPP countries might be imposed on Japan.
- Very disappointing TPP!

# Some tariffs are prohibitively high

## Japanese tariffs on agricultural products




source)MAFF

# Comparison of agricultural policies

Country	Japan	US	EU
Decoupled direct payments	No	Yes/No	Yes
Environmental direct payments	Partial	Yes	Yes
Direct payments for less favorable regions	Yes	No	Yes
Production restriction program for price maintenance	Yes	No	No
Tariffs* over 1000%	1 (tubers of konnyaku)	None	None
Tariffs of 500-1000%	2 (rice, peanuts)	None	None
Tariffs 300-500%	2 (butter, pork)	None	None
Tariffs of 200-300%	6 (wheat, barley, skim milk powder, starch, beans and raw milk)	None	None

\* Specific tariffs are applied to tariffed products in Japan. Here, these specific tariffs are estimated as their equivalents of ad valorem tariff rates, taking into account international prices.

# From Price Support to Direct Payment: Consumer Burden Disappears






# Who blocks TPP negotiations and agricultural policy reform?

- JA (agricultural cooperatives) is the only legal person in Japan which can make any kind of business including sales of farm inputs and products, insurance, and banking.
- By pegging the rice price high with tariffs, JA could not only get high commission in proportion to price but maintain a lot of small-scale part-time farmers who have been the sources of JA's political power and have deposited their earned income in JA. JA is now the second largest bank in Japan.


# Farmers are better off




source:MAFF, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications "Household economy survey"

# How inefficient the Japanese rice industry is!

## The number of farmers




## The value of production



# Distorted rice farming due to high rice price

(thousand yen)



# The proposed reform of JAs by the deregulation committee

- Delete from the Agricultural Cooperative Law the provisions concerning the national and prefectural unions of JAs (the national union is called JA-Zenchu, the headquarters of JA's political activities) which are authorized under the law to collect money from them. This reduces JA-Zenchu's political power.
- Convert the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations (Zen-Noh), which engages in the processing and sale of agricultural produce collected from local JAs, into a joint-stock corporation. Without legal status of a cooperative it is no longer exempted from the Anti-Monopoly Law .

# A reform was made

- Last year the proposal was watered down and reform is left to the initiatives or judgments of JAs after the consultation between the government and the ruling party which is greatly influenced by JAs.
- But JAs were not able to control the process because **the PM Abe insisted on substantial reform of JA-Zenchu. And it was done.**

# What is the reform?

- The government **weakens the authority of JA's peak body, JA-Zenchu**, to conduct audits of local cooperatives, and **reorganise it into a general incorporated association** like other industry organisations.
- But Zen-noh will probably not be converted into a joint-stock company.

# Japanese agriculture needs Free Trade

- The Japanese population is aging and decreasing. The domestic market for Japanese agriculture protected by high tariffs will be shrinking.
- The average age for farmers in Japan exceeds 65, because they cannot find successors due to unprofitable farming activities.
- In order to survive, Japanese agriculture has to **create overseas market. Free trade agreements** which eliminate tariffs on Japanese farm products **are indispensable for Japanese agriculture.**



# Japanese agriculture is not competitive?

- The Japanese agricultural sector claims that it is too small to compete with those of other countries. Scale is certainly advantageous when other conditions are equal.
- But there are large differences among countries in terms of the crops they grow, the fertility of their soil, crop yields, and quality. **Scale cannot be the only criterion for comparison.**


# Scale is not everything

- Even the average farm size in U.S., the world's largest exporter of farm products, is only 1/20th that of Australia.
- The agricultural scale of the EU might be 10 percent that of the US and 0.5 percent that of Australia, yet thanks to high productivity and direct government payments, the EU can export grain. The wheat yield of the United Kingdom is five times higher than in Australia.

# Japanese agriculture is not competitive?

- Just as there are sizable price differences among various types of cars, so too are there price differences among various types of rice, reflecting the **quality** of rice.
- In Japan, Koshihikari rice grown in the Uonuma district of Niigata Prefecture sells for a price 1.5 times higher than that produced in other areas. It is a mistake to argue that high-grade rice cannot compete with rice of inferior quality because it is so much more expensive.

# Japanese rice is highly evaluated



# The rice paddy set-aside program

- The high rice price has been maintained by the set-aside program. While **paying the subsidy of 400 billion yen** to entice rice farmers to join the program, the government **forces consumers to pay an additional amount of 600 billion yen** for the price artificially inflated by limiting supply through the program. It's **doubly wasteful**.
- As a result, Japanese citizens **pay one trillion yen to support rice farming**, total production of which amounts only to 2 trillion yen.


# The program increased costs

- The larger the farm size, the less the production cost per unit area. But many small-size part-time inefficient rice farmers in Japan continue to grow rice by high rice price. Full-timers cannot accumulate land.
- The larger the unit rice yield, the smaller the production cost. But the rice paddy set-aside program is designed to reduce rice yield and production. Average rice yield in Japan at the moment is about 40% smaller than that in California.

# The set-aside policy change

- The government paid the gap between the sale for direct human consumption and sale for flour or feed, 800,000 yen per hectare as a set-aside subsidy for a farmer producing rice for flour or feed so that he or she may not be worse off.
- LDP increased the amount to 1,050,000 yen equal to the sale revenue for direct human consumption in order to induce farmers to produce more rice for flour or feed.
- The rice price for direct human consumption dropped to 800,000 yen in 2014. More incentives to produce rice for flour or feed in 2015.

# The comparison of the revenue of rice between for direct human consumption and for feed use







# What might happen in 2015

- The increase of rice for feed or flour **replaces substantial corn import from U.S.** which amounts to 10 million tons. The production of rice for flour **replaces wheat import from U.S.** which amounts to 3.6 million tons.
- This subsidy is regarded as actionable or causing serious prejudice in the meaning of Article 6 of WTO's SCM Agreement. **U.S. could retaliate on Japan by imposing high tariffs on imported industrial products such as automobiles from Japan.**


# The larger the size, the more farm income




# Fill ratio of rice tariff rate quota



# Price differential between internal and external rice disappears



# A Desirable Policy



# What should be done?

- Reduction of the price of rice makes import duties unnecessary and we do not need to claim an exemption of rice from elimination of tariffs in the TPP negotiations.
- The future of Japan's agriculture rests on whether we can successfully abolish the rice paddy set-aside program. The dissolution of JA which has backed the program helps achieve this goal.