

Lynchpin Ally Germany?

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I. Germany's International Role Redefined

- ▶ **Munich Security Conference 2014**; Speech by President Gauck: *„What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”*
- ▶ similar statements by FM Steinmeier and DM von der Leyen
- ▶ Review 2014 (Foreign Office); Defence White Paper 2015/16 (MoD)



► **Drivers of Change:**

► Changes in US policy: Domestic Priorities, Rebalancing towards Asia

► Domestic Priorities of traditional European powers/ Repercussion of the financial crisis: UK/ F

► Be careful, what you wish for - German foreign policy rhetoric works

II. The political-societal background

- ▶ wide spread state-building disillusionment in Germany: Kosovo; Bosnia; Afghanistan.
- ▶ Disengagement - 2014: 60% argue in favour of a restricted German role in international security (1994: 37%) 37% argue for a more active role (1994: 62%).
- ▶ Germany has already enough problems to be taken care of first (73%); Lessons of WWII and the Nazi regime (50%); Germany simply does not have the necessary influence to make a difference in international security (37%).
- ▶ 82% argue in favour of less military missions (across all ages, East/West)

However - support for:

- ▶ humanitarian missions
- ▶ UN peacekeeping
- ▶ prevention of genocide or WMD proliferation
- ▶ if peace and security in Europe is threatened/ collective defense

III. Still Collective Security

Still German commitment to UN-mandated operations:

- ▶ Resolute Support (Afghanistan): 800 soldiers (since 2001 as ISAF)
- ▶ KFOR (Kosovo): 670 soldiers (since 1999)
- ▶ Atalanta (Horn of Africa): 280 soldiers (since 2008)
- ▶ UNIFIL (Lebanon): 130 soldiers (since 2006)

Today 2467 soldiers deployed abroad (June 15, 2015), compared to almost 11.000 some years ago.

IV. From Security Provider to Security Consultant

Focus on „Enhancing and Enabling“

- ▶ aims at empowering global partners to take more responsibility for regional security and to strengthen international crisis prevention through the provision of training, advice, and, if necessary, equipment.
- ▶ EUTM Mali: 153 soldiers
- ▶ Training Mission Iraq: 90 soldiers
- ▶ EUTM Somalia: 8 soldiers

V. The Return of Collective Defense

- ▶ focus on NATO collective defense and preservation of the interoperability experiences gained in Afghanistan already **before** the Ukraine/Russia crisis
- ▶ reduction of international military engagements as much as possible
- ▶ Iraq engagement as a exception
- ▶ reinforcement of this development due to the Ukraine crisis
- ▶ Rediscovery of NATO; active role within NATO´ s response to Russia (Wales summit; VJTF)
- ▶ Diplomatic focus on the European neighborhood as well (Normandie format; Minsk agreements)
- ▶ Implications for the German Defence White Book as well as the European Security Strategy

VI. Conclusion - still a lynchpin?

- ▶ Moderate increase in defence spending: 2015: **33 bn Euro**; 2016: **34,2 bn Euro**; 2019 **35 bn Euro**
- ▶ Rediscovery of NATO's collective defence; but no appetite for international crisis management
- ▶ Focus more on NATO's political role than its military capabilities
- ▶ Open questions: Germany's role in integrated military structures