


Global Allies: Comparing Alliance in Europe and Asia
June 24-25, 2015 CIGS, Tokyo



U.S.-Japan Alliance under the New Defense Cooperation Guideline



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U.S.-Japan Alliance and Asian Security

Security Environment in Asia

1990s: regional contingencies (DPRK/Taiwan), humanitarian crisis

2000s: rise of asymmetrical threats (AQ), proliferation of WMD

2010s: (re)rise of power politics (CHN), (re)rise of extremism (ISIS)

2020s : global shift of balance of power (CHN)

U.S: “Contested” Global Power

Withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan

“Rebalancing” to Asia

Reluctant engagement (fiscal constraints..etc)

Ukraine Crisis
rise of ISIS
spread of extremism

Mismatch between
strategy and reality

flawed consensus after
the mid-term election

Japan: Strategic Realignment

Balancing China : NDPG(2013), “Gray-Zone” challenges, A2/AD challenges

Diversifying strategic partnership: Australia, ASEAN, India, NATO, Russia...etc

Reforming legal basis of security policy: NSS, defense equipment transfer, CSD...etc

Fiscal constraints

Abenomics, Tax reform, TPP, energy policy...etc



Agendas for U.S.-Japan Alliance


Revising U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline : All-Phases/Seamless Cooperation?

Asian security order: maritime stability through “asymmetrical equilibrium?”

Whither strategy towards China?: US-Japan strategic coordination?

Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Armed Attack Against Japan



Regional Level


National Level

Korean Peninsula

Taiwan Straits

1996 US-JPN Joint Declaration on Security
1997 US-JPN Defense Cooperation Guideline
1999 Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

周辺事態と後方地域支援



Japan's Defense and Security Policy Developments Under the Abe Administration



National Security Strategy (2013.12)

National Defense Program Guideline (2013.12)

National Security Bureau (2014.1)

Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (2014.4)

Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation (2014.7)

New U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline (2015.4)

New U.S.-JPN Defense Cooperation Guideline

Previous Guideline (1997)

- Cooperation under normal circumstances
- Actions in response to the armed attack against Japan
- Cooperation in **situation in areas surrounding Japan**

} 3 situational division

Keywords: Seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses

*Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan's peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to **ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved.** In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.*

The Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)

Gray-zone Challenges

Infringements of territory (water/air-space) without crossing the military threshold

A2/AD Challenges

A2 prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations. AD aims to prevent freedom of action in the more narrow confines of the area under an enemy's direct control.

Peacetime

Gray-zone Challenges

Low-end Contingency

High-end Contingency

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan



"Seamless" Concept in the New Guideline



A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

1. Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance (ISR)
2. Air and Missile Defense
3. Maritime Security
4. Asset Protection
5. Training and Exercise
6. Logistic Support
7. Use of Facilities

Peacetime

Gray-zone Challenges

Individual Self-Defense

Armed Attack against Japan

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

1. Non Combatant Evacuation Operation
2. Maritime Security
3. Measure to Deal with Refugee
4. Search and Rescue
5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
6. Logistic Support
7. Use of Facilities

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

a) Operational Concept

1. Operations to Defend Air-Space
2. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile
3. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas
4. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks
5. Cross-Domain Operations

b) Operational Support Activities

1. Communications and Electronics
2. Search and Rescue
3. Logistic Support
4. Use of Facilities
5. CBRN

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

1. Asset Protection
2. Search and Rescue
3. Maritime Operations
4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile
5. Logistic Support

Collective Self-Defense

Maritime Security Challenges: Three Domains



- **Gray-Zone Coercion**

- **Challenges:** Infringements of territory (water/air-space) without crossing the military threshold (NDPG, 2010/13)
- **Need to:** develop, field, and operate military and paramilitary forces to contest Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas, without necessarily causing casualties: → ***(possible) symmetric competition***

- **Low-Intensity Conflict**

- **Challenges:** Accidental crashes, limited military assaults
- **Need to:** develop and field systems to deny Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas → ***asymmetric competition (China vs neighbors)***

- **A2/AD Challenges**

- **Challenges:** High-end military confrontations
- **Need to:** develop counter-A2/AD capability (operational access), missile defense, enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options

→ ***asymmetric competition (US-China)***

Newly determined three conditions for the “use of force” as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution



Previous 3 Conditions for Self-Defense

The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met:

1. When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2. When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and
3. When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level.



New 3 Conditions for Self-Defense


(July 1, 2014)

1. When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or **when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan** occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.
2. When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
3. Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.

Matrix of the Legislation for Peace and Security

Red = New legislation

Blue = Expansion of current legislation



Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC)

* Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands etc.