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Japan-China Military Confidence Building Measures (Part II)

—The Role of the Future Japan-China *Chu-sei-kon* CBM to Avoid Competitive Irrationality—

Abstract

A spectacular rise of China, setting aside the issue of being peaceful or oppositely clamorous, has changed the image of China held by surrounding countries because of its sheer size and the rapid pace of its economic development and military modernization. Japan, the United States, and China have long searched for amicable paths for their military-to-military relationships through their confidence building measures (CBMs) since the end of the Cold War. The three countries have to transform the current state of competitive irrationality to competitive rationality by discouraging escalatory confrontations. To date, however, these paths have been fragile and sometimes unfruitful. This short essay tries to briefly review military-to-military CBMs among the three countries to overcome the asymmetric nature of the trilateral relationships. First, the essay examines briefly the current geopolitical backdrops to gain a better understanding of the trilateral CBMs. Then it assesses the effectiveness of U.S.-China CBMs, and analyzes factors ascribable to CBM successes and failures. Having understood the difficulties associated with the CBMs, it tries to identify the significance of Japan-China CBMs, with a special emphasis of the current and future role of the *Chu-sei-kon* (中政懇) (short for the *Chugoku Seikei Kondankai* (中国政経懇談会), or the Council on Political and Economic Affairs of China).²

1. Introduction: Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)—Asymmetric Trilateral Relationship

1.1 The Japan-U.S.-China Trilateral CBMs: Abnormal and Irregular by Global Standards

As Francis Fukuyama, a prominent American politico-economic scholar at Stanford University, emphasizes in his book entitled *Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity*, trust is one of the most important elements for peace and prosperity. Sunzi (Sūnzǐ/孙子), an ancient Chinese strategist, says, “The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”³ Accordingly, trust in military-to-military relationship is of extreme importance. In order to maintain and promote the peace and prosperity in the Western Pacific region and a stable global politico-economic climate, trust is a *sine qua non* among major powers—notably Japan, the United States, and China. Unfortunately, however, trust itself is invisible, elusive, easily destructive, and hard to keep effective.

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² As for the establishment and brief history of the *Chu-sei-kon*, see Toshimichi Nagaiwa and Jun Kurihara, “Japan-China Military Confidence Building Measures (Part I)—History, Politico-Economic Environment, and Evaluation—,” *Tokyo-Cambridge Gazette*: Politico-Economic Commentaries No. 7, Tokyo: Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), October 11, 2011.

³ Sunzi, *The Art of War*, an English translation by Lionel Giles; original Chinese version is that “兵者、國之大事、死生之地、存亡之道、不可不察也。”

The complex Sino-American geopolitical rivalry, and deep-seated animosities of the World Wars and colonization harbored in the region have long hindered ordinary military-to-military exchanges, multilateral and bilateral, centering on the partnership of Japan and China, compared with cases developed by Japan with other countries including the United States and other Asian countries (see Table 1). Still, these military-to-military contacts among the three countries are of extremely importance. Successes and failures of these military CBMs have great influence on the peace and prosperity of the entire world as well as the Asia/Pacific region. Therefore, Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, puts his finger on the gist of international relations surrounding the rise of China by describing the military-to-military contacts with China as a “proverbial canary in the coalmine.”⁴

Table 1 Conceptual Typology regarding Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges

	Types	Examples
Multi-Lateral	Security Dialogue	ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting-Plus(ADMM-Plus) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
	Multilateral Exercises and Seminars	Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)
Bilateral	Exchange between Defense Ministers and High-ranking Officials	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (two-plus-two)
	Regular Defense Consultation	Japan-India High-Level and Working-Level Regular Consultations
	Exchange between Units	Unit-to-Unit Exchanges between Japan and the Philippines
	Exchange of Students	Exchange of Students between Japan and Singapore
	Joint Research Activities	Japan-U.S. Joint Research on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Source: the authors.

1.2 Differences in Strategic Thinking and *Modus Operandi*, and A Changing Balance of Power

In order to compensate for the lack of the above activities, Japan and China have tried to devise irregular forms of dialogues and exchanges including the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM.⁵ Generally speaking, Japan and the United States have consistently insisted the lack of transparency regarding China’s security strategy and military budget. This view held by the Japan-U.S. alliance derives partly from the difference in conceptualization of strategy and behavioral pattern between the alliance and China, partly originating from China’s strategic ambiguity including the oft-quoted equivocal guiding policy, i.e., “*tāoguāng yǎnghuì* (韬光养晦/bide our time, while building up capability)” theorized by Deng Xiaoping (Dèng Xiǎopíng/邓小平). This phrase is notoriously ambiguous not only outside China but also within China. Therefore, its meaning remains a matter of debate among Chinese commentators.⁶

In addition to China’s ambiguous strategy, the authors look seriously to a logical chasm lying between the Japan-U.S. alliance and China. Major General Chen Zhou (Chén Zhōu/陈舟), a senior researcher at the Academy of Military Science (AMS) (Jūnshì Kēxué Yánjiūyuàn/军事科学研究院), emphatically stated a theoretical gap between China and the United States when China’s *Defense White Paper* («Zhōngguóde Guófáng» Báipíshū/«中

⁴ Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from 1995-1999,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 180.


⁵ As for the history of military-to-military contacts between Japan and China, see, for example, Masahiro Akiyama and Zhu Feng, eds., *Nitchu Anzen Hoshō-Boei Koryū no Rekishi, Genjo, Tembo* [『日中安全保障・防衛交流の歴史・現状・展望』/Japan-China Defense and National Security Exchange: Its History, Current Situation, and Future Prospects], Tokyo: Akishobo, 2011 (Its Chinese translation is also available. *ZhōngRì Ānquán yǔ Fāngwù Jiāoliú: Lìshǐ, Xiànzhuàng yǔ Zhǎnwàng* [«中日安全与防务交流: 历史、现状与展望»], Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe (世界知识出版社), 2012).

⁶ See, for example, William A. Callahan, *China: Pessimist Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

国的国防»白皮书) was released: “Western militaries that seek transparency as the premise for military mutual trust, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn/中国人民解放军) sees trust as the requirement for transparency.”⁷ This difference between the West’s primacy of transparency and China’s primacy of trust requires an unfathomable time and energy to reach an agreement.

A combined set of these differences in strategic conceptualization and the logical chasm is a major culprit for the prevalent asymmetric nature of the military-to-military contact among the three countries.⁸ Despite the aforementioned differences, however, the Japan-U.S. alliance and China bear commonly the responsibility to establish an environment for the peace and security in the Western Pacific, not only by defusing tensions among the countries but also by devising approaches to other geopolitical treats including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the intensification of Russian military action, the changing balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, and the de-escalation of territorial disputes in the South China Sea (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region



Source: Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.


⁷ Quoted by Shirkly A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” RL32496, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), July, 2014. The original statement made by Major General Chen Zhou is that “西方一些人把军事透明说成是建立军事互信的前提，这是一种误导。透明可以成为增加互信的一种手段，但它同时也要以互信为前提。没有互信的透明没有什么实际意义，不可能真正消除威胁与恐惧,” *Jiefangjun Bao* [《解放军报》/Liberation Army Daily], April 1, 2011.

⁸ The asymmetric nature of the trilateral politico-military relationships is especially accentuated when the current disputes over the South China Sea are put into consideration. See, for example, Sam J. Tangredi, *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

The deficiency of normal and regular security dialogues and defense exchanges among the three countries has also accentuated security dilemma in the Asia/Pacific region. And the epicenter of such burgeoning security dilemma is now located in China by many Western experts. For example, in April 2014, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a Swedish think tank, issued a report entitled “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013.” The report states that “Most of the increase in the [Asia/Pacific] region in 2013 was due to a 7.4 per cent increase by China.”⁹ Furthermore, it continues to state “While military spending fell in Oceania (chiefly Australia), it increased in Central and South Asia and in East Asia, although the latter increase was almost entirely due to China. In particular, military expenditure in South East Asia rose by 5.0 per cent, led by increases in Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, the latter two prompted to a significant extent by tensions with China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.”¹⁰

Therefore, despite its publicized strategy of a harmonious world of sustained peace and common prosperity (Nǚlì jiànshè chǐjiǔ héping, Gòngtóng fánróngde héxié shìjiè/努力建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界), medium-sized and smaller countries in the Asia/Pacific region are being overwhelmed by growing Chinese military strength (see Figure 2).¹¹

Figure 2 Military Strength Comparisons among Major Asian Countries



- Notes: 1. Source: The Military Balance 2014 and others. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size.
 2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY2011; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).
 The Japanese national defense budget is the initial budget excluding the cost of the SACO and the reduction of the local burden among the U.S. forces realignment costs.
 3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister's Budget Report to the National People's congress in 2013.
 4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from the ROK National Defense White Paper 2013.
 5. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2013 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 82 yen to 1 dollar, 13 yen to 1 yuan, and 76 yen to 1,000 won.
 6. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2013 figures using the FY2013 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 82 yen to 1 dollar.

Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

⁹ Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013,” SIPRI Factsheet, Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, April 2014.


¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” statement by H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China, at the United Nations Summit, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, September 15, 2005, (www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/.../china050915eng.); see also, 人民网-理论频道, October 28, 2012, “胡锦涛同志首先提出这一主张,” (<http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1028/c350806-19413174.html>).

Though international comparison poses a wide variety of difficulties—especially qualitative comparison is extremely troublesome, Figure 2 shows China’s military dominance in the region. In economic terms, China’s military expenditure is 88% of the combined amount of Japan, South Korea and the entire Southeast Asia. China’s air strength, measured by the number of combat aircraft, is 1.4 times that of Japan, South Korea, and entire Southeast Asia combined; China’s naval strength calculated by tonnage is 1.2 times that of the combined forces of the above three. Only the strength of ground forces counted by the number of officers and soldiers makes China possess an inferior position.

Thus China’s increasingly dominating military strength and the resulting rapidly changing balance of power in the Asia/Pacific region have invited growing concerns held by Asia/Pacific countries and more serious U.S. efforts. Accordingly, the United States disproportionately deploy its forces to the Asia/Pacific region with a special emphasis of its air power (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3 Global Situation of U.S. Forces Deployment



Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2013) and other materials.

2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.


Source: Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

Figure 3 shows that the United States dramatically decreased its overseas military presence compared with the situation in 1987. The number of U.S. military personnel in Europe for 1987 was approximately 354,000; now it decreased to around 67,000, a staggering drop of over 80%. U.S. personnel stationed in homeland in 1987 was approximately 2,170,000; now it decreased to about 1,357,000, a 37% decrease. On the other hand, the Asia/Pacific region registered only 27% decrease to stave off the expansion of a Sino-centric sphere in the Asia/Pacific region, reflecting the U.S. strategic concerns especially about China’s A2/AD strategy.¹²

¹² See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia*, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014.

Figure 4 shows that China's neighboring countries are raising their defense concerns vis-à-vis a militarily mightier China, and posing a hedging and balancing stance along with the United States.

Figure 4 Enhanced U.S. Military Presence in the Asia/Pacific Region



Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

1.3 Asymmetric Nature of CBMs

The abovementioned changing balance of power in the region that looks favorable for China and unfavorable for the United States has complicated the nature of the trilateral CBM. Under the current circumstances, in addition to the differences in strategic thinking and *modus operandi* that were explained at the outset, it becomes extremely difficult to devise conciliatory discussions that would produce a virtuous cycle in which confidence begets confidence as time goes by.

In this connection, it would be noteworthy that we look very briefly to three arguments developed by Western scholars with respect to China's growing assertive attitude toward the CBMs among the tree countries. First of all, many scholars, especially those who are liberal institutionalist, argue that growing interdependence will make both the Japan-U.S. alliance and China constrain their aggressive behavior.¹³ Those who hold realist doctrine, however, immediately refute this optimistic view. "Trade may continue to dampen any tendencies toward conflict and perhaps in time could help to draw the United States and China closer than they are today," argues Aaron L. Friedberg, a political scientist at Princeton University. He continues to say "But there are

¹³ See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 87, No. 1 (January/February).

grounds for skepticism. Unfortunately, there is little reason in theory or historical experience to believe that economic links alone are sufficient to create lasting stability.”¹⁴ Friedberg also says that “Even if interdependence helps suppress mutual hostility, it will not necessarily constrain nations from engaging in various forms of competitive behavior, including arms races and the construction of opposing alliances.”¹⁵

Second, with respect to the mindset held by the elite class in a rising country, there is an intellectually stimulating argument elaborated by Dominic Johnson, a political scientist at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. He suggests that continued successes in the politico-economic domain, as well as well a military one, as demonstrated by the PLA, generate positive illusions that “comprise—exaggerated self-perceptions, illusions of control over events, and overly optimistic expectations about the future.” He continues to hint that the PLA’s top echelon who make it to the top of political hierarchies tend to be those who have especially pronounced self-esteem, confidence in their ability to change things, and optimism that they can make a difference,” and that “they require a character that can shoulder major burdens, accept numerous setbacks, and withstand constant criticism, and yet still get up every day believing they are right.”¹⁶

Third, with respect to organizational interplays within domestic politics, it would be intriguing to look at an argument developed by Jack L. Snyder, a political scientist at Columbia University, that “Though militarists may not want war *per se*, their interest in organizational growth, wealth, prestige, and autonomy is usually served by ideas and policies that tend to create war as their ‘waste byproduct.’”¹⁷

Setting aside the issue of nailing precisely down the root causes of China’s growing assertive attitude, Tokyo and Washington have already encountered their Chinese counterparts filled with their audacious valor. Many experts often associate such growingly assertive Chinese attitude with the 2009 testimony by Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the US Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¹⁸ In his testimony, he said the watershed was the year of 2007 as for China’s assertive attitude especially regarding the South China Sea, by stating that “Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China.”¹⁹

Several observers had detected a prelude to such a sea change in China’s assertive language and audacious behavior. In December 2006, at the 10th Communist Party Congress for the PLA Navy, President and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao (Hú Jǐntāo/胡锦涛) underscored the need “to build a powerful

¹⁴ Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2011, p. 46.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Dominic D.P. Johnson, *Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions*, Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 24; it is equally interesting to look to the lines in *Thinking, Fast and Slow* written by Daniel Kahneman, an economist and Nobel Prize winner: “different experts in mind. . . . trust experts know the limits of their knowledge. . . . [but] there are many pseudo-experts who have no idea that they do not know what they are doing (the illusion of validity), and that as a general proposition subjective confidence is commonly too high and often uninformative.” (Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 239).

¹⁷ Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 33.

¹⁸ See, for example, Sarah Raine and Christian Le Mière, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, Abingdon, Oxon, 2013, p. 48.

¹⁹ Scot Marciel, “Testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, July 15, 2009.

People's navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”²⁰ Furthermore, several researchers had found one of the harbingers of the 2006 remarks of President Hu Jintao, i.e., an article entitled “Hǎishàng Zhúlù [海上逐鹿/Hunting Deer in the Central Plain, figuratively meaning ‘Attempting to Seize the Throne],” carried by the July issue of a weekly magazine *Liàowàng* [«眺望»/Outlook] (the authors are Zhang Xiaofeng (Zhāng Xiǎofēng/張曉峰), Head of Naval Ship Power Engineering, Naval University of Engineering (Hǎijūn Gōngchéng Dàxué Chuánbó yǔ Dòngli Xuéyuàn/海军工程大学船舶与动力学院), and Duan Yanzhi (Duàn Yánzhì/段延志)), a professor at the Naval Command College (Hǎijūn Zhīhuī Xuéyuàn/海军指挥学院).

Therefore, under the current circumstances, some experts find that China's rising influence has reduced U.S. influence especially in the Asia/Pacific region in relative terms. Others say the power and leadership of the United States remain dominant in absolute terms. Generally speaking, U.S. power and influence are still valued by many Asia/Pacific countries to balance and hedge against China, hoping that the United States can make China as a peaceful, responsible, and rules-based *status quo* power. However, some China experts detect that China's reduced appreciation for military-to-military contacts at times has been accompanied by its rising assertiveness. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for foreign observers to accurately assess the width and depth and sometimes direction of Chinese attitude.

One unanimously agreed observation among is that China's increasingly overbearing stance toward negotiation with other countries is backed by popular nationalism.²¹ In this connection, it would be worth noting comments made by David L. Shambaugh, a prominent Sinologist at the George Washington University: “it is likely to become less diverse and more polarized, as Realist (Xiànrshí Zhǔyì/现实主义)/Nativist (Běntǔ Zhǔyì/本土主义) views may well harden.”²²

2. Successes and Failures of U.S.-China CBMs

2.1 Mixed Results of the Past U.S.-China CBMs

U.S.-China CBMs have experienced innumerable vicissitudes since the 1972 rapprochement under the Nixon-Mao leadership and left a general impression of their mixed results. Postwar U.S.-China CBMs date back to January 1980, when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China as the first US Secretary of Defense to visit China since 1949. The defense secretary's visit seemed to lay the groundwork for a relationship with the PLA and tried to establish a strategic dialogue and reciprocal exchanges, and even explored the possibility of arms sales. Later that year, Vice-Chief of the PLA General Staff, Liu Huaqing (Liú Huáqīng/刘华清) and Vice-Premier Geng Biao (Gěng Biāo/耿飚) led a Chinese military delegation. Since then, U.S.-China CBMs

²⁰ Xinhua Agency, “Hú Jǐntāo Qiángdiào Duànzào Shìyìng Lìshǐ Shǐmìng Yāoqiúde Qiángdà Rénmín Hǎijūn [胡锦涛强调锻造适应历史使命要求的强大人民海军/President Hu Jintao Emphasizes the Importance of Building a Strong Navy commensurate with China's historic mission],” December 27, 2006, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/27/content_5539079.htm); see also, Reuter, “China's Hu Calls for Powerful, Combat-Ready Navy,” Wednesday, December 27, 2006, (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/27/AR2006122701888.html>).

²¹ As for the difficulty to assess China's strategy by monitoring both authoritative and quasi-authoritative sources even for seasoned China watchers, see, for example, Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,” *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, July 2014.

²² David L. Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 2011), p.25.

gradually advanced their scope and depth of activities.

Unfortunately, the 1989 tragedy of the Tiananmen Square made the United States suspend all its military contacts with its Chinese counterparts, leading to a series of bilateral politico-military gyrations. For example, in September 1992, President George Bush announced a decision to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan for “defensive” purposes. In the first year of the Clinton administration, a possible rapprochement emerged in November 1993 to salvage the soured U.S.-China relation, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin (Jiāng Zémín/江泽民) visited Seattle to attend the informal Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Yàzhōu Tàipíngyáng Jīngjì Hézuò Zǔzhī/亚洲太平洋经济合作组织) summit meeting. However, several incidents and misunderstanding persisted between the two countries, including the U.S. decision to give the permission that Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) could pay a private visit to the United States in 1995, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the U.S. bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the publication of the redacted “Cox Report (Kǎokèsī Bàoào/考克斯报告)” that accused China of stealing US nuclear technology in 1999. To describe the turbulent situation during the late 1990s, Kurt Campbell says “military ties displayed the greatest volatility.”²³

2.2 Evaluations of Major U.S.-China CBMs

In the United States, there are those who take a supportive stance toward CBMs. At the same there are equally a large number of skeptical policymakers and strategists toward U.S.-China CBMs. They embrace an impression of being betrayed, because they have been frustrated by responses from the Chinese side. Generally speaking, there are three strands of thought regarding future U.S.-China CBMs. First, some observers advocate that the United States should stay the course in pursuit of a more matured U.S.-China military relationship to reduce miscalculations and misperceptions (the *status quo* school). Second, frustrated by the current mixed results, several policymakers enthusiastically try to accelerate the pace of and widen the scope of the current U.S.-China CBMs in order to avoid future confrontations or crises with China (the activist and positivist school). Third, policymakers and strategists who hold a realist perspective, and feel frustrated by the current situation like the positivist school, try to have more critical approaches toward the PLA (the skepticist and prudentialist school).²⁴ According to Shirley Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Some skeptics say strategy focuses on goals, while the ‘relationship’ is not the end in itself.” This section tried to briefly enumerates pros and cons regarding the current U.S.-China CBMs.

(1) Exchange between Defense Ministers and Highest-ranking Officers

In the post-Tiananmen Incident period, William J. Perry became the first American secretary of defense to visit China after a long-period of the absence of high-level visits. In response to an interview with the *New York Times*, a senior Pentagon official said, “[W]e’ve really got to talk to the People’s Liberation Army, which has a significant voice in how these Chinese policies are being formulated.”²⁵ During the visit to China in January

²³ Campbell and Weitz, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

²⁴ Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

²⁵ *New York Times*, October 17, 1994, (<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/17/world/perry-visit-seeks-to-rebuild-ties-with-chinese-military.html>).

1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen signed an agreement designed to prevent accidents and confrontations between the U.S. and Chinese Navies. The Pentagon announced that the agreement was “historic.”²⁶ However, after the second visit of Defense Secretary William Cohen in 2000, his successor, Donald Rumsfeld did not visit China until October 2005, which was long sought by the PLA for the perceived full resumption of the military relationship. In July 2006, CMC Vice Chairman and the PLA’s highest ranking officer, General Guo Boxiong (Guō Bóxióng/郭伯雄) visited the United States in July 2006, the first such visit since General Zhang Wannian’s (Zhāng Wǎnnián/张万年) visit in 1998 (see Table 2).

The beginning of the 21st century continued to witness a series of military tensions between the United States and China. In April 2001, a collision between a PLA Navy F-8 fighter and a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea took place. The EP-3’s crew made an emergency landing on Hainan Island (Hǎinán Dǎo/海南岛), and was forced to stay there for 11 days. In June, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reported to Congress that military exchanges for 2001 would be reviewed by Secretary Rumsfeld and selectively conducted on a case-by-case basis. In 2002, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Vice President Hu Jintao visited the United States, the 5th the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) (Fángwù Cuōshāng Huitán/防务磋商会谈) was resumed after a suspension of over one year.

Table 2 US-China Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges: Post-Tiananmen Incident Period

Exchange between Defense Ministers and Highest-ranking Officers	
1994	Defense Secretary William Perry (Oct.)
1995	
1996	Defense Minister Chi Haotian (Chí Hàotián/迟浩田) (Dec.)
1997	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili (May)
1998	Defense Secy William Cohen (Jan.); Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Wannian (Zhāng Wǎnnián/张万年) (Sept.)
1999	
2000	Defense Secretary William Cohen (Jul.); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton (Oct.)
2001	
2002	
2003	Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan (Cáo Gāngchuān/曹刚川) (Oct.)
2004	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (Jan.)
2005	Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (Oct.)
2006	Vice Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC) Guo Boxiong (Guō Bóxióng/郭伯雄) (Jul.)
2007	Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Nov.); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Marine Gen. Peter Pace (Mar.)
2008	
2009	
2010	
2011	Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Jan.), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen (Jul.)
2012	Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (Liáng Guāngliè/梁光烈) (May), Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (Sept.)
2013	Chang Wanquan (Cháng Wànquán/常万全) (Aug.), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey (Apr.)
2014	Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (Apr.)

Source: Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” RL32496, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), July, 2014, p. 8.

In April 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel met with Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan (Cháng Wànquán/常万全) and then a larger group of defense officials in Beijing. At a news conference at the end of his visit to China, the two defense leaders revealed at a news conference a new model for U.S.-China military-to-military relations; “One focus of our discussion today was how we develop a new model of military-to-military relations,” said Defense Secretary Hagel.²⁷

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), “Historic Agreement Marks Secretary’s China Visit,” January 21, 1998, (<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsparticle.aspx?id=41535>).

²⁷ See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), “Hagel, China’s Defense Minister Build Military Relations Model,” April 8, 2014,

(2) Multilateral Exercises and Seminars

Recently, the PLA has expanded its participation or observer status in bilateral and multilateral military training exercises. For example, in 2013, the PLA conducted seven bilateral and multilateral exercises with foreign militaries.²⁸ Many observers understand that the PLA's engagement activities "assist its modernization through the acquisition of advanced weapon systems and technologies, increased operational experience, and access to foreign military practices, doctrine, and training methods."²⁹ Such skeptical views are pervasive on the U.S. side as the 2013 version of the "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" suggests:³⁰

"PLA participation or observer status in military training exercises of nations in possession of U.S. military equipment, systems, and weapons may, in certain circumstances, have unintended consequences that could result in the unauthorized disclosure of defense articles, technical data, or defense services to China. Public Law 101-246—the Tiananmen Sanctions—prohibits the transfer or disclosure of U.S.-origin defense articles, defense services, technical data, and/or technology to China. Additionally, Public Law 94-329—the Arms Export Control Act—and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations list China as a nation for which U.S. policy denies the transfer or export of defense articles (including technical data) and defense services."

(a) Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)

Multilateral exercises in which the PLA participate include Gulf of Aden Counter-piracy Exercise (Zài Yādīngwān jùxíngde Liánhé Fǎn-Hǎidào Yǎnxí/在亚丁湾举行的联合反海盗演习), Disaster Management Exchange (Zāihài Guǎnlǐ Jiāoliú/灾害管理交流) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Field Exchange (Réndào Zhūyì Jiùyuán Jǎnzāi Jiāoliú/人道主义救援减灾交流) in China, and the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) (Huán Tàipíngyáng Jūnshì Yǎnxí/环太平洋军事演习) 2014. Here, it places a focus on RIMPAC, the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise. This biennially-held exercise started in 1971 under the leadership of the United States.

In 2012, China did not hide its frustration when RIMPAC invited Russia and India to take part while China was not. At the time, China had sent observers only to RIMPAC98. In June 2012, United States Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander Admiral Samuel Locklear III visited China for the first time in four years as a PACOM commander to meet with Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie (Liáng Guāngliè/梁光烈) of the Central Military Commission and General Ma Xiaotian (Mǎ Xiǎotiān/马晓天). During his 4-day visit to China, the Admiral Locklear was asked about why the PLA Navy was not invited to the U.S.-led RIMPAC 2012.

In 2013 the United States sent an invitation to China; Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter acknowledged China had agreed to participate in RIMPAC during a speech in Jakarta on March 20, 2013 by saying that "We seek to strengthen and grow our military-to-military relationship with China, which matches and follows our growing political and economic relationship."³¹ On April 3, 2013, the Pentagon officially announced that China officially accepted an invitation to participate in RIMPAC in 2014. The U.S. Navy invited PLAN to

(<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122006>).

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2014," p. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," p. 23.

³¹ See, for example, Reuters, "China to attend major U.S.-hosted naval exercises, but role limited" March 22, 2014, (<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/us-usa-china-drill-idUSBRE92L18A20130322>).

join at least five warfare RIMPAC 2014 areas: (1) drills on surface warfare (limited to surface gunnery); (2) counter-piracy; (3) humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and military medicine; search and rescue; and (5) dive and salvage involved in explosive ordnance disposal.

In the meantime, there are many policymakers and strategists who oppose China's RIMPAC participation. For example, Randy Forbes, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces (R-Va.), revealed his suspicion toward China: "Given China's recent disregard for principles like freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, it was already a stretch to reward Beijing with an invite to such a prestigious event like RIMPAC."³² At the same time, many observers try to monitor closely the behavior of the PLA Navy (PLAN), when PLAN's auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ship (*Běijīngxīng Hào*/北极星号) is dispatched off the coast of Hawaii. With respect to this AGI ship, Andrew Erikson, an associate professor at the Naval War College made the following comments.³³

"*Beijixing* is the most experienced vessel from the PLAN's most advanced class of AGI. Based on Internet photos and Japanese government and other media reports, *Beijixing* is China's most well-traveled AGI, having operated frequently near and within Japan's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). . . . The Dongdiao-class off Hawaii is operating inside the U.S. EEZ but not in territorial waters The Chinese Navy AGI ship's presence is in accordance with international law regarding freedom of navigation."

(b) Multilateral Seminars: Shangri-La Dialogue

The Asia Security Summit, or better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue (*Xiānggélílā Duihuà*/香格里拉对话), sponsored by the London-based Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) is one of the most important multilateral security conference. Unlike the aggressive participation in multilateral military exercises, the PLA has not enthusiastically taken part in the Dialogue. Until 2011, China had sent delegations of only lesser rank, e.g., deputy chief of the General Staff (Foreign Affairs and Intelligence)³⁴; in 2011, for the first time, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie attended the 10th Dialogue. Many observers, however, concur with James Mulvenon, a Sinologist at Stanford University, on the evaluation of Minister Liang's remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue:³⁵

"The cognitive dissonance between Chinese official remarks at Shangri-La and regional perceptions of Beijing's intentions strongly highlights the PRC's continuing failures at strategic communications and crisis management in the region and beyond. China, quite simply, is trapped in a narrative of principles and rhetoric from the 1950s that no longer suits a regional and emerging global power."

The PLA did not send the Defense Minister to the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012, 2013, and 2014. As for the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014, Lieutenant General Wang Guangzhong (*Wáng Guānzhōng*/王冠中), Deputy Chief, General Staff Department led the Chinese delegation.

³² Sam LaGrone, "China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC," *USNI News*, July 18, 2014, (<http://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac>).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ See, for example, James Mulvenon, "Give Us Another Chance? China and the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue," *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 35.

³⁵ Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

(c) Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)

The biennial Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) (Xī-Tàipíngyáng Hǎijūn Lùntán/西太平洋海军论坛) is a multilateral mechanism in which chiefs of navy from Western Pacific countries get together to promote CBMs in the region. The first WPNS was held in Sydney and China was one of the WPNS founding countries; both the United States and Japan held the WPNS twice in Hawaii (1992 and 2006) and in Tokyo (1996 and 2002) respectively. Prior to 2000, i.e., the 7th symposium, China sent only its naval attachés to the WPNS. In 2000, the PLAN started to send officers of relevant military ranks to attend the working group meetings and annual meetings of the WPNS.³⁶

In 2014, PLAN hosted the 14th WPNS in Qingdao (Qīngdǎo/青岛). In his closing address, Admiral Wu Shengli (Wú Shènglì/吴胜利), Commander of PLAN, stated that the event had met its goals of “broadening horizons, enhancing mutual understanding and deepening friendship (开阔了视野, 增进了了解, 深化了友谊, 实现了预期目标).”³⁷ A concrete step made at the Qindao WPNS was the unanimous approval of a maritime communications agreement, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) (Hǎishàng Yìwài Xiāngyù Guīzé/海上意外相遇规则) that had been proposed over ten years. At the last WPNS held in Kuala Lumpur in 2012, China was the sole country opposing CUES.

(3) Bilateral Defense Consultation

Here, (a) the U.S.-China Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC), and (b) a collective set of the following exchange programs, i.e., the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT), are briefly reviewed and evaluated.

(a) Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC)

In October 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry visited Beijing, he and PLA General Ding Henggao (Dīng Hénggāo/丁衡高), Director of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) (Guófáng Kēxué Jìshù Gōngyè Wēiyuánhui/国防科学技术工业委员会) agreed to set up the U.S.-China Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC) (ZhōngMěi Liánhé Fángwù Zhuǎnhuàn Wēiyuánhui/中美联合防务转换委员会). Its stated goal was to facilitate economic cooperation and technical exchanges and cooperation in the area of defense conversion.

However, there emerged grave concerns from Congress about this U.S.-China cooperative exchange. For example, on June 1, 1995, the House National Security Committee issued H. Rept. 104-131 (for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Guófáng Shòuquán Fǎ'àn/国防授权法案) for FY1996) and expressed concerns that the commission led to U.S. assistance to PRC firms with direct ties to the PLA and possible subsidies to the PLA. Furthermore, in early 1999, under the Clinton Administration, the *Washington Times* reported the existence of a “Gameplan for 1999 U.S.-Sino Defense Exchanges,” and Pentagon spokesperson

³⁶ See, for example, the PLA Navy (PLAN), “Brief history of China's participation in WPNS,” April 21, 2014, (http://wpns.mod.gov.cn/2014-04/21/content_4504532.htm).

³⁷ See, for example, the *People's Daily* (Rénmínwǎng/人民网) “Dì-14-jì Xī-Tàipíngyáng Hǎijūn Lùntán Niánhuì Bì mù Wú Shènglì Zhì Bì mù Cí [第14届西太平洋海军论坛年会闭幕 吴胜利致闭幕词/End of the 14th WPNS, Admiral Wu Shengli Gave his Closing Address],” April 23, 2014, (<http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0423/c1011-24934463.html>).

Kenneth Bacon confirmed that an exchange program had been under way for years.³⁸ In response to these congressional concerns, the PLA objected to the U.S. law as an “obstacle” to the military-to-military relationships and tried to put the blame on the U.S. side. However, in 2014, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, suggested that Congress might relax the restrictions, depending on engagements with the PLA and its participation at RIMPAC.³⁹

(b) Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT)

The Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) (Fángwù Cuōshāng Huitán/防务磋商会谈), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (Hǎishàng Jūnshì Ānquán Cuōshāng Jīzhìde Xiédìng/海上军事安全磋商机制的协定), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) (Fángwù Zhèngcè Xiétíáo Huitán/防务政策协调会谈) were first convened in 1997, 1998, and in 2006 respectively.

The first DCT was held at the Pentagon in December 1997, and a meeting was held in January 1998, which was not officially called a DCT, between Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai (Xióng Guāngkǎi/熊光楷) and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe.⁴⁰ During these meetings both sides briefed each other on humanitarian relief missions and search-and-rescue operations. The 2nd DCT was held in Beijing October 1998. Unfortunately, the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 made the 3rd DCT suspended for one year. Then, the 3rd and 4th DCTs were held in 2000 in Washington and in Beijing respectively. However, the 5th DCT was suspended for two years by the United States following the April 2001 incident in which a PLA Navy F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the South China Sea. Accordingly, the 5th DCT was held in Washington in December 2002, and for consecutive years since 2004, every year, a DCT was held; the 6th (Beijing, in February 2004); the 7th (Washington in April 2005); the 8th (Beijing in June 2006), and the 9th (Washington in December 2007). Since 2009, in every year a DCT was held; the 10th (Beijing in June 2009); the 11th (Washington in December 2010); the 12th (Beijing in December 2011); the 13th (Washington in December 2012); the 14th (Beijing in September 2013).

In January 1998, Secretary Cohen traveled to Beijing, where he signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), an agreement designed to reduce the chances of confrontation between the two militaries in the air and on the sea. The April 2001 EP-3 incident resulted in the U.S. and China convening their first special meeting under the MMCA on Guam in September 2001 to discuss how to prevent similar incidents. In July 2008, the first plenary meeting of the MMCA was held in Washington. However, even after the establishment of the MCCA, U.S. Forces have faced challenges regarding operational safety and freedom of navigation.

³⁸ Bill Gertz, “Military Exchanges with Beijing Raises Security Concerns,” *Washington Times*, February 19, 1999.; See also, Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³⁹ Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Kevin Pollpeter, “U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004, pp. 19-20.

Because the MMCA talks stalled, the U.S. and China set up a Special Policy Dialogue in early 2005 to address defense policy issues not covered by the MMCA, which led to the establishment of formal Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in December 2006. U.S.-China military-to-military relations were derailed again after the USNS *Impeccable* incident in March 2009. Since then, China began to demand that the United States address three obstacles in order for military-to-military relations to progress—(1) termination of arms sales to Taiwan, (2) repealing provisions of the FY2000 NDAA prohibiting twelve areas of military cooperation, and a halt to close-in reconnaissance by U.S. aircraft and ships in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (zhuānshǔ jīngjìqū/专属经济区). China also downgraded the DPCT to a working level.

Having reviewed the history of bilateral defense consultation described above, Carl Thayer, a political scientist and Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales, concludes that “after sixteen years of efforts to negotiate an agreement on maritime and air safety there is little evidence that military-to-military consultations and strategic dialogue have reduced strategic mistrust and raised transparency. A wide gulf continues to separate China and the United States and future encounters of naval vessels and military aircraft in and over the South China Sea could result in further mishaps.”⁴¹ There are many observers who agree with Thayer, but referring to other assumptions; first, rather than misperception or misunderstanding, China embraces different national interests—the PLA has tried purposefully to keep U.S. military operations farther from China and restrict them even beyond the PRC’s territorial seas; second, the past crises including the 2001 EP-3 incident have shown the severe limits against the United States when U.S.-China CBMs tried to pursue trustworthy personal relationships with PLA leaders.

In 2000, Randy Schriver, a former official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, describes lessons learned during the Clinton Administration and considers the MMCA a successful CBM (before the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis less than one year later in April 2001). He also calls for the PLA’s participation in multilateral fora, and exposing younger PLA officers to American society. However, Schriver admits the United States “failed miserably” in gaining a window on the PLA’s modernization, gaining neither access as expected nor reciprocity.⁴² In 2007, Schriver noted in 2007 that military engagement has continued to pursue the “same modest, limited agenda that has been in place for close to 20 years.” In 2011, however, Schriver called for reducing military contacts, confiding his ambivalent feelings.⁴³

Finally, it should be noted that several observers still stress the importance of the U.S.-China military CBMs by stating “the U.S. military does learn something about the PLA from every visit,” and “the most effective way to ascertain developments in China’s military and defense policies is to have face-to-face contact at multiple levels over an extended period of time.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ Carl Thayer, “USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust Between U.S. and China,” *The Diplomat*, December 17, 2013, (<http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident-reveals-strategic-mistrust-between-u-s-and-china/>).

⁴² Stephen Yates *et al.*, “The Proper Scope, Purpose, and Utility of U.S. Relations with China’s Military,” *Heritage Lectures*, October 10, 2000.

⁴³ Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Allen and Eric McVadon, “China’s Foreign Military Relations,” Stimson Center, October 1999; see, also Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

(4) Future Options for the United States

Based on the aforementioned bitter experiences, future options are being discussed, setting aside the issue of widening or narrowing the scope of the current U.S.-China CBMs. Here, approaches that are expected to gain results more effectively and efficiently are discussed—(a) from bilateral to multilateral, (b) from separate to integrated, and (c) pliable to firm approaches.

(a) Bilateral Approaches vs. Multilateral Approaches

Given the limited economic resources available for the United States for the U.S.-China CBMs, coupled by growing uncertainties in the rest of the world including those in the Middle East and in Ukraine, the United States can sophisticate their CBMs vis-à-vis China by mobilizing such allies as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and so forth.

As stated above, at the 14th WPNS in Qingdao in April 2014, China's PLAN finally approved CUES (changed to Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea) to set procedures for safety, and communication at sea. The CUES stated that WPNS navies are expected to comply with the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) (Guójì Hǎishàng Bìmiǎn Dǐchù Guīzé Gōngyuē/国际海上避免抵触规则公约). China's neighboring countries including the United States and Japan have not yet fully convinced that the PLAN's and China Coast Guard's adherence to the COLREGS as well as CUES. But, in this case, a multilateral approach seems to have produced a better result.

(b) Separate Approaches vs. Integrated Approaches

Before the January 2011 visit to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer, stated in a speech that military contacts should be a critical component of bilateral engagement and stressed that any setbacks to the military contacts could result in heavy costs to the overall security, economic, and political relationship. There also could be a risk that military mistrust could drive the bilateral relationship.⁴⁵

At the time of the G-20 summit in London on April 1, 2009, Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao agreed to improve the military CBM, and set up the U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) (ZhōngMěi Zhànlüè yǔ Jīngjì Duìhuà/中美战略与经济对话). The S&ED is planned to upgrade the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) (Zhànlüè Jīngjì Duìhuà/战略经济对话) that was established in 2006 by the Bush Administration, keeping it as an “Economic Track,” chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. This “Economic Track” is now connected with the Senior Dialogue (Gāocéng Duìhuà/高层对话) chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, as “Strategic Track,” previously chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, and now by the Secretary of State. The term of the S&ED is developed because the Chinese like such words as “strategic” instead of “senior” dialogue, and elevated the Secretary of State to a co-chair. At the first S&ED held in Washington in July 2009, President Obama stressed military contacts to diminish disputes with China, starting the integration of military

⁴⁵ Michael Schiffer, “Building Cooperation in the US-China Military-to-Military Relationship,” speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, (IISS) see Video of C-SPAN.org, (<http://www.c-span.org/video/?2297360-1/uschina-relationship>).

talks within the framework of the S&ED.

With regard to the S&ED, some experts refer to a 2007 report published from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), whose editors were Dennis C. Blair, a retired admiral and PACOM Commander, and Carla A. Hills, former U.S. Trade Representative. The report recommend that “The United States should initiate a sustained high-level military strategic dialogue to complement the Senior Dialogue launched at the deputy secretary-vice foreign minister level in 2005 and the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) launched by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. in 2006.”⁴⁶

(c) Pliable but Lethargic vs. Firm and Strenuous Approaches

Given the differences in logical reasoning and in decorum and manners as well as languages lying between the two countries as briefly mentioned above, U.S.-China military CBMs have often fallen into the realm of insipid formalities. In order to avoid such ineffective and unproductive CBMs, some experts stress the importance of firm and strenuous approaches rather than pliable but lethargic approaches by leaving no possibility of evasive and deceptive tactics on the side of foreign counterparts.

A case in point would be Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s response at the time of the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2010, when Secretary Gates attended the Shangri-La Dialogue, he was so disappointed to learn that his Chinese counterpart was Deputy Chief of General Staff and Air Force General Ma Xiaotian, a lower-level official. The defense secretary stressed the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military CBMs by saying “what both Presidents Obama and Hu want [as agreed in Washington in April]: sustained and reliable military-to-military contacts at all levels that reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and miscalculation. There is a real cost to the absence of military-to-military relations. I believe they are essential to regional security and essential to developing a broad, resilient US-China relationship that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in scope.”⁴⁷ Three months later, the U.S. Defense Department warned the Chinese side about its elusive and unclear attitude. Prior to Secretary Gates’s visit to Asia in attending the first ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Hanoi on October 11-12, 2011, Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary cautioned on September 9:⁴⁸

“I would remind you, this is *not engagement for the sake of engagement* (emphasis added by the authors). We’re not just looking for a reciprocal visit by Secretary Gates. What we are looking for is a resumption of productive, transparent, military-to-military engagement, so that we can both gain a better understanding of what our ambitions are, what our intentions are, when it comes to our military budgets, how we operate, where we operate and so forth. And . . . in addition to the fact that the secretary just believes, that these kinds of exchanges are just very helpful in avoiding misunderstandings, miscalculations and so forth.”

In response to firm and strenuous response from the U.S. side, the Chinese side changed its attitude—First,

⁴⁶ Dennis C. Blair and Carla A. Hills, eds., “U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task Force,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, p. 83.

⁴⁷ Robert M. Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific,” Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2010 First Plenary Session, June 5, 2010, (<http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2010-0a26/first-plenary-session-722b/dr-robert-m-gates-5086>).

⁴⁸ Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary, “DOD News Briefing,” September 9, 2010, (<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4683>).

Minister Liang Guanglie invited Secretary Gates to China in January 2011, ending the freeze on high-level defense contacts imposed by China in January 2010 in reaction to the sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan. Then, on June 3-5, 2011, the PLA finally dispatched for the first time the Defense Minister to the Shangri-La Dialogue; Defense Secretary Gates held a meeting with General Liang Guanglie.⁴⁹ In May 2012, the PLA sent a CMC Member and the Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie to Washington. General Liang met with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and agreed to launch a joint anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden.

However, such firm and strenuous attitudes from the U.S. side have not always achieved completely the U.S. strategic goals—to reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and miscalculation by enhancing transparency. Since 2012, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the PLA had sent delegation with lower rank officials. Within the framework of a firm and strenuous approach, “picking up the telephone” is also of vital importance. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his visit to Beijing in July 2011, wished that he could “pick up the phone” in a crisis by stating that “the first thing I do in a crisis is call my counterpart from that nation because it is precisely in times of crises that miscalculation and miscommunication can occur. It is crisis which most often reveals the true character of a government and a military. What we have learned over time is that one of the best ways to credibly change the problem of judging intentions is through deep, broad and continuous military-to-military engagement.”⁵⁰ Actually, in November 2007, despite various unresolved issues, Secretary Robert Gates visited China, and the PLA agreed to a long-sought U.S. goal of a “hotline.” Whether this hotline is functional or not still remains to be seen.

In sum, the second part of the essay has examined and evaluated effectiveness of the past U.S.-China military CBMs. In short, the past U.S. experience suggest the bilateral CBMs have found limited successes and have identified multilateral, integrated, and firm and strenuous approaches should be incorporated for the future in order to gain more transparency, reduce misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and miscommunication, avoid overestimation of hostility and weakness of the opposite side and underestimation of costs of war. Therefore, the United States welcomes and needs active Japan-China military CBMs if these activities can dovetail those of the United States. Accordingly, the closer and stronger collaborative efforts will be needed on the Japan-U.S. side.

3. Challenges Facing Japan-China CBMs

3.1 The Gathering Storm in the West Pacific?


As responsible powers in the West Pacific, Japan and China should avoid unexpected collisions in waters and airspace, and prevent unforeseen consequences from escalating into military clashes or political problems. However, the rapidly expanding and modernizing PLA has fueled grave concerns among Asia/Pacific states including Japan. As stated at the outset of this essay, unfortunately, political and ideological obstacles, closely complicated by historical memories, have made the window of opportunity narrower to proceed with Japan-China CBMs to reduce misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and miscommunication.

⁴⁹ Kan, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “On U.S.-China Relations,” speech at Renmin University, July 10, 2011, (<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/07/20110712154723su0.2862622.html#axzz3Aiiu3wro>).

In the meantime, Tokyo has perceived an increasing risk of unintended mishaps, having experienced aggressive Chinese activities in waters and in airspace near Japan (see Figures 5 and 6).


Figure 5 Recent Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan



Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

Especially, Tokyo is extremely concerned about the growing number of close contacts between Japanese and Chinese aircraft in the East China Sea (see Figures 6 and 7).


Figure 6 Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan



Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

On November 1, 2009, Xinhua News Agency carried an article entitled “Zhù Lántiān Gāngtiě Chángchéng [筑蓝天钢铁长城/Building the Great Wall of Steel in the Blue Sky] based on an interview with the commander of the PLAAF, Xu Qiliang (Xǔ Qíliàng/许其亮).”⁵¹ In November 23, 2013, China announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (fāngkōng shíbié qū/防空识别区) in the East China Sea with coverage that included the Senkaku Islands, and overlapped with previously established Japanese, South Korean and Taiwan zones.

Figure 7 Air Defense Identification Zones for Japan and Other Countries



Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

3.2 A Pressing Need for Multi-layered Japan-China Military CBMs

Table 3 on the next page shows recent developments of Japan-China security dialogues and defense exchanges. In June 2011, At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Conference, both Ministers agreed that promoting defense exchange between Japan and China in a stable manner through calm dialogues between the defense authorities of the two countries would develop the basis for the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests (Zhànlüè Hùhùi Guānxi/战略互惠关系).”⁵²

⁵¹ Xinhuanet, November 1, 2009, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-11/01/content_12364603.htm); See also, Jun Osawa, “China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: A ‘Great Wall in the Sky’?,” December 17, 2013, (<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa>).

⁵² See, for example, “Guówù Wěiyuán jiān Guófáng Bùzhǎng Liáng Guāngliè 4-ri Hùijiàn Riběn Fāngwèi Dàchén [国务委员兼国防部长梁光烈 4

Of special note is a personal relationship developed through Defense Ministerial Conferences between Defense Ministers Toshimi Kitazawa and Liang Guanglie. During the entire period when Kitazawa was Defense minister (September 2009~September 2011), his Chinese counterpart was Minister Liang Guanglie who kept the ministerial position (March 2008~March 2013). Though it would be very dangerous to oversimplify and overestimate the importance of personal relations among high-ranking officials, it is worth noting that Defense Ministers Kitazawa and Liang met at least three times as Table 3 shows. If we still embrace trust in statesmanship, such a long-term relationship will make a contribution to smoother and more peaceful relations between states.⁵³ In June 2012, at the third Joint Working Group meeting in Beijing, it was agreed that the maritime communication mechanism would be constructed, consisting of (1) annual meetings and experts meetings; (2) high-level hotlines between the defense authorities of Japan and China; and (3) direct communications between naval vessels and aircraft.⁵⁴

Table 3 Japan-China Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges in Recent Years

Year	Mo.	Exchange between Ministers and High-ranking Officers
2008	Feb.	SDF Chief of the Joint Staff Office Admiral Takashi Saito (齋藤隆)
	May	Tokyo Summit: Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (福田康夫) and President Hu Jintao Hu Jintao (胡锦涛/胡锦涛)
	Sept.	PLAAF Commander General Xu Qiliang (徐其亮/许其亮)
	Oct.	PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利/吴胜利)
2009	Feb.	PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Ge Zhenfeng (葛振峰/葛振峰)
	Mar.	Defense Ministerial Meeting between Yasukazu Hamada (浜田靖一) and Liang Guanglie (梁光烈/梁光烈)
	Jul.	MSDF Chief of Staff Admiral Keiji Akaboshi (赤星慶治)
2010	Nov.	Defense Ministerial Meeting between Toshimi Kitazawa (北澤俊美) and Liang Guanglie; ASDF Chief of Staff General Ken'ichiro Hokazono (外薮健一朗)
	Feb.	GSDF Chief of Staff General Yoshifumi Hibako (火箱芳文)
	Oct.	Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi, ADMM-Plus) between Kitazawa and Liang
2011	Jun.	Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, Shangri-La) between Kitazawa and Liang
	Jul.	PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Ma Xiaotian (马晓天/马晓天)

Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD).

However, as Table 3 shows, China's increasingly flamboyant manner in its military conduct stymied the Japan-China security dialogues and defense exchanges. The year of 2013 witnessed a series of China's pugnacious conduct, leading to a temporary halt of Japan-China talks at various levels. Such pugnacious conduct includes (1) the Chinese frigate *Jiangkai I* (江凯/江凯) locked its fire-control radar on an SH-60K helicopter from the destroyer JS *Onami* (「おおなみ(Dàbō/大波)」). setting off the helicopter's threat-alarm system on January 19, 2013, (2) the Chinese frigate *Jiangwei II* (江卫/江卫) locked its fire-control radar onto the destroyer JS *Yudachi* (「ゆうだち(Xīlǐ/夕立 or Zhòuyǔ/骤雨)」) on January 30, 2013. The two incidents, coupled with the Cowpens incident on December 5, 2013 where a PLAN amphibious assault ship swung across the bow of the cruiser USS *Cowpens*, raised concerns among China's neighboring countries.⁵⁵

In addition, the number of scrambles by the JASDF against Chinese aircraft has been dramatically increasing since 2010 (see Figure 8). The year 2012 is a watershed when the number of scramble against Chinese aircraft exceeded the figure against Russia. At the same time, Chinese aircraft have been diversifying their flight

日会见日本防卫大臣/],” June 4, 2011, (http://www.gov.cn/lhdh/2011-06/04/content_1877623.htm).

⁵³ The authors have heard that such kind of personal relationship does have some influence on a smoother and more stable relationship between organizations, even in military fields as well as in politico-economic fields.


⁵⁴ See, for example, the Government of Japan, Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, Tokyo, 2014.

⁵⁵ As for the Cowpens incident, see, for example, Robert Farley, “USS Cowpens Incident: Rule Bending in the South China Sea: The incident stems in part from a desire in China to push back against the United States,” *The Diplomat*, December 25, 2013, (<http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident-rule-bending-in-the-south-china-sea/>).

patterns. For the time being, this tendency does not seem to change.

According to the Japan's Ministry of Defense, in January 2013, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made public the fact that Chinese military aircraft regularly conducted warning and surveillance activities and that Chinese fighters conducted activities believed to be Combat Air Patrols (CAP) (Zhàndòu Kōngzhōng Xúnluó/战斗空中巡逻) in the East China Sea. Accordingly there have been growing concerns about unexpected dangerous encounters between the SDF and PLA forces with call for calm and judicious approaches to defuse tensions and reduce uncertain contingencies.⁵⁶

Figure 8 The Number of Scrambles since the Cold War Period



Note: The Peak of the period of the cold war

Source: Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2014*, July 2014.

Though there has been no direct top echelon contact between SDF and PLA recently, in April 2014, at the time of the 14th WPNC held in Qingdao, MSDF Chief of Staff Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano (河野克俊) met PLAN Commander Wu Shengli, the first time meeting for the commanders of Japanese and Chinese Navies since July 2009 when Admiral Akaboshi met with Admiral Wu in Beijing.

Under such circumstances, ominous symptoms are still pervasive between Japan and China—unbridled popular nationalism, misunderstanding and emotional interpretations of the past tragedies, and unintended collisions between defense forces. Accordingly, there is a pressing need for multi-layered Japan-China CBMs to grab every sort of opportunity to thaw the precarious Japan-China relations.

3.3 The *Chu-sei-kon* CBM—Flexible, Influential, Traditional, and Complementary

The aforementioned observations reiterated the importance of continued, diversified, all-available means to develop military CBMs between Japan and China, along with a collaborative scheme in which Japan can communicate with its major partners including the United States, South Korea, and Australia and so on.

⁵⁶ See, for example, Toshimichi Nagaiwa, "Higashi Shina-kai Joku-fukin ni okeru Toppatsu-teki Shototsu no Risuku [東シナ海上空付近における突発的衝突のリスク/Looming Risks of Unexpected Aerial Collisions over the East China Sea and its Environs]," *Gaiko* [『外交』/Diplomacy], No. 27, (forthcoming, September 2014).

Accordingly, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM, led by retired Japanese top-brass, is expected to have an important role (see Table 4).

Table 4 List of Heads of the *Chu-sei-kon* Delegations (1977~2014)

Year		Head of Delegation with His Status at the Time of His Statutory Retirement	Delegation Size
1977	1 st	Kenjiro Mitsuoka (三岡健次郎) (GSDF) Commander, the 9th Division	6
1978	2 nd	Kenjiro Mitsuoka (三岡健次郎) (GSDF) Commander, the 9th Division	7
1979	3 rd	Kiyoshi Takanami (高波惇) (ASDF) Vice Commandant, Air Officer Candidate School	6
1980	4 th	Ryuhei Nakamura (中村龍平) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
1981	5 th	Yasuhiro Ueda (上田泰弘) (ASDF) Chief of Staff, ASDF	6
1982	6 th	Motoharu Shirakawa (白川元春) (ASDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	5
1983	7 th	Kenjiro Mitsuoka (三岡健次郎) (GSDF) Commander, the 9th Division	5
1984	8 th	Hirozumi Imamura (今村博純) (ASDF) Commandant, Air Staff College	7
1985	9 th	Yasuhiro Ueda (上田泰弘) (ASDF) Chief of Staff, ASDF	6
1986	10 th	Ryuhei Nakamura (中村龍平) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	7
1987	11 th	Eiichi Uemura (植村英一) (ASDF) Commander, Flying Training Command	9
1988	12 th	Takehiko Takashina (高品武彦) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
1989	13 th	Kimio Ito (伊藤公雄) (ASDF) Commander, Technical Training Command	6
1990	14 th	Tsugio Yata (矢田次夫) (MSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	7
1991	15 th	Sumio Murai (村井澄夫) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	7
1992	16 th	Osamu Namatame (生田目修) (ASDF) Chief of Staff	7
1993	17 th	Takehiko Takashina (高品武彦) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
1994	18 th	Eiichi Tsunehiro (常広栄一) (MSDF) Commandant, Yokosuka District	7
1995	19 th	Masao Ishii (石井正雄) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	7
1996	20 th	Hitoshi Omura (大村平) (ASDF) Chief of Staff, ASDF	7
1997	21 st	Taizo Terashima (寺島泰三) (GSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	7
1998		Did not hold the CBM, not because of politico-military tensions, but because of disagreement regarding itinerary	
1999	22 nd	Atsushi Shima (志摩篤) (GSDF) Chief of Staff	7
2000	23 rd	Akio Suzuki (鈴木昭雄) (ASDF) Chief of Staff	7
2001	24 th	Noboru Kimishima (君嶋信) (GSDF) CG, North Eastern Army	7
2002	25 th	Makoto Yamamoto (山本誠) (MSDF) CINC, Self Defense Fleet	7
2003	26 th	Hikaru Tomizawa (富澤暉) (GSDF) Chief of Staff	7
2004	27 th	Shigeru Sugiyama (杉山蕃) (ASDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	5
2005	28 th	Kazuya Natsukawa (夏川和也) (MSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
2006	29 th	Yuji Fujinawa (藤縄祐爾) (GSDF), Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
2007	30 th	Takao Sakamaki (酒巻尚生) (GSDF), CG, North Eastern Army	6
2008	31 st	Toru Ishikawa (石川亨) (MSDF) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff	6
2009	32 nd	Koichi Furusho (古庄幸一) (MSDF) Chief of Staff	6
2010	33 rd	Tsutomu Mori (森勉) (GSDF) Chief of Staff	7
2011	34 th	Hiroshi Inoue (井上廣司) (GSDF) CG, North Eastern Army	7
2012	35 th	Naoto Hayashi (林直人) (GSDF) CG, Western Army	6
2013	36 th	Yoji Koda (香田洋二) (MSDF) CINC, Self Defense Fleet	8
2014	37 th	Ken'ichiro Hokazono (外薮健一朗) (ASDF), Chief of Staff	10

Note 1: The abbreviations in the tables are as follows: CG: Commanding General; CINC: Commander-in-Chief

Note 2: Although the year 2013 marked the 38th anniversary of the *Chu-sei-kon* CBMs, the 2014 CBMs is regarded as the 37th annual event. Not because of a strained politico-economic relationship, but because of disagreement on time scheduling, the both sides missed the CBMs event one time in 1998.

Source: The authors based on the *Chu-sei-kon*'s materials.

There are four reasons why the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM has an indispensable and irreplaceable role to play. First, the Japanese side of the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM comprises retired generals and admirals. In the middle of intensified tensions between Japan and China in which a window of opportunity to develop formal military-to-military contacts is almost closed, Japan's retired top brass and its Chinese counterparts have several advantages of being flexible to conduct dialogue uninterruptedly with rich experience and knowledge and with time and financial resources to a lesser extent. They have accumulated their experiences and expertise; at the same time, there are not necessarily limited by the time constrained or sometimes by strict budgetary constraint caused by rigorous inquiries from government auditing agencies, though the *Chu-sei-kon* organization does not necessarily secure sufficient funding sources.

Second, the retired but public-spirited generals and admirals have keen and cool-headed patriotic mind, and their attitude undeniably exert an influence on future policymakers in Japan and China. Accordingly, they can make a significant contribution to sophisticate the *Chu-sei-kon* CBMs. Each year, a report has been made by the delegation since 1977, and the information stored in the reports made by predecessors, which is original and not available elsewhere, provides ample source for lessons learned for the successors. In other words, there is much resource with which organizational learning can be formulated if it is better utilized. Accordingly, at the end of this analysis, we have to touch on the issue how to better utilize the past information in order to sophisticate the future *Chu-sei-kon* CBM.

Third, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM has established a tradition; it also gained an unexpectedly huge pressure on any persons associated with this CBM so as not to stop it. Surprisingly enough, this CBM has never been disrupted by any political problems including the Senkaku disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine problem, and the history issues as well as disagreements in interpretation regarding such military operations as the April 2010 close encounter by a PLAN helicopter to the JS *Suzunami* (「すずなみ/(Liángbō Hào/凉波号)」) and the November 2004 passage of a PLAN Han-class submarine (‘Hàn-jí’ 091-xíng Héqióntǐng/‘汉级’091 型核潜艇) through the Ishigaki Strait (石垣海峡) to name a few.

After accumulating the experience of over 37 years, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM has gained a sort of “soft power” to develop channels to exchange information between the two countries. In June 2013, at the time of the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM’s Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2013 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2013/中日东北亚安全论坛 2013),” the Japanese side presented an expert explanation of the ADIZ to help the Chinese side understand the setting of the zone better, which unfortunately prove to be of no avail. In this sense, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM will have to exert its effort for further sophistication.

A fourth advantage is potential complementarity of the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM. As stated in the section of U.S.-China CBMs, multilateral approaches serve sometimes better than bilateral approaches. Accordingly, this *Chu-sei-kon* CBM, if properly coordinated with other approaches of CBMs vis-à-vis China both inside and outside Japan, could have complementary effects to achieve strategic goals such as gaining more transparency, and avoiding misperception, misunderstanding, and miscalculation.

This year, the *Chu-sei-kon* delegation was led by General Ken’ichiro Hokazono (外薗健一郎). As Table 3 shows, he visited China as an official defense exchange as ASDF Chief of Staff in 2009, which demonstrates that information and knowledge of the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM are shared within the Japanese defense community.

In sum, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM, with four advantages of being flexible, influential, traditional, and complementary, is expected play a larger role. This year, the delegation made a concrete step to upgrade the quality of the CBM. The Japanese side has long asked to change the composition of the Chinese representatives. Historically, the Chinese members have had professional records being associated with politico-military administration, not military command. Under the current tense circumstances, the Japanese delegations have

sincerely and earnestly asked active discussion from the perspective of the Chinese top echelon whose professional records are associated with military command, not with politico-military administration. Fortunately, the Chinese side came to understand the request and responded cooperatively especially during the 2013 and 2014 *Chu-sei-kon* CBM.

Now, the flexible, influential, traditional, and complementarity-oriented *Chu-sei-kon* CBM successfully invited an understanding of the Chinese side. This year's CBM activity put more emphasis on exchanging candidly expert views between retired generals and admirals (see Table 5).

Table 5 Major Events of the *Chu-sei-kon* Delegation Visits and Their Politico-Economic Backdrop

Year	<i>Chu-sei-kon</i> : Notable Events/Visits	Politico-Economic Backdrop
1977/SS2 1 Set. 26 ~ Oct. 18	Sept. 27: Meeting with Jīn Lǐ/金黎 to discuss a possibility of U.S.-Soviet hostilities and the strategy of “Shēngdōng jīxī/声东击西/聲東擊西 {deception and disinformation strategy}” Oct. 7: Meeting with Dēng Xiǎopíng/邓小平 to discuss overall Japan-China relations, accompanied by Chinese people including Liào Chéngzhì/廖承志, Wáng Xiǎoyún/王晓云, Sūn Pínghuā/孙平化.	Oct. 29, 76: National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) (防衛計画の大綱) Nov. 5, 76: Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability for the Time Being (当面の防衛力整備について) Jan. 20, 77~Jan. 20, 81: Carter Administration
1978 2 Apr. 4 ~ 25	Apr. 18: Meeting with Xú Xiàngqián/徐向前 to discuss military modernization	Apr. 12: Senkaku Islands Dispute Aug. 12: Treaty of Peace and Frishedship between Japan and China, signed Oct: Dēng Xiǎopíng's visit to Japan, meeting with Emperor Showa and Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda Dec. 7, 78~Jul. 17, 80: Ohira Cabinet (大平内閣)
1979 3 Apr. 28 ~ May 20	Apr. 28: Meeting with Sūn Pínghuā/孙平化 to discuss military confidence building Apr. 29: Meeting with Jīn Lǐ/金黎 to discuss Sino-Soviet relations and the Sino-Vietnam War	U.S. Alignment Strategy II (A. Friedberg) Feb. 17~Mar. 16: Sino-Vietnam War Dec. 24: Soviet Intervention of Afghanistan
1980 4 Apr. 21 ~ May 13	Apr. 22, 25: Meeting with Jīn Lǐ/金黎 to discuss Sino-Soviet relations and the Sino-Vietnam War Apr. 26: Meeting with Wǔ Xiūquán/伍修权 to China's relations with the USSR and Vietnam Apr. 29: Meeting with Wáng Zhèn/王震 to discuss a possibility to visit an aircraft factory in Xian May 8: Visit to the aircraft factory in Xian	Jul. 17, 80~No. 27, 82: Suzuki Cabinet (鈴木内閣)
1981 5 Apr. 22 ~ May 15	Apr. 24: Meeting with Liào Chéngzhì/廖承志 to discuss Sino-Soviet relations Apr. 28: Meeting with Gēng Biāo/耿飚 to discuss China's geographical position located between the USSR and Vietnam	Jan. 20, 80~Jan. 20, 89: Reagan Administration
1982 6 Apr. 23 ~ May 11	Apr. 26: Visit to the Headquarters of a PLA division (警卫第3师). Apr. 26: Meeting with Gēng Biāo/耿飚 to discuss world politics especially, with respect to the USSR, Afghanistan, and Vietnam	June 26: Xinhua criticizes Japan's history textbooks Jul. 20~23: Japan's LDP parliamentary members led by Masumi Edano visit Taiwan. Sept. 11, 82~Jan. 15, 87: Hú Yàobāng: CCP General Secretary Nov. 10: Death of Leonid Brezhnev Nov. 12, 82~9 Feb. 84: Yuri Andropov: General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party Nov. 27, 82~Nov. 6, 87: Nakasone Cabinet (中曾根内閣)
1983 7 Apr. 18 ~ May 5	Apr. 18: Meeting with Sūn Pínghuā/孙平化 in which Mr. Sun makes critical comments regarding Nakasone's remark on “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and the 1982 July LDP mission to Taiwan	Jan. 14: Japan decides to transfer its military technology to the U.S. as an exception to the Three Principles of Arms Exports. Jan. 17~20: Prime Minister Nakasone visits United States
1984 8 Apr. 27 ~ May 17	May 2: Meeting with Yú Qiūlǐ/余秋里 to discuss Sino-U.S. relation in addition to the situation regarding the USSR and Vietnam. May 5: Visit to Harbin Weijian Aircraft Manufacturing Corp. (哈尔滨伟建飞机制造厂)	Feb. 13, 84~Mar. 10, 85: Konstantin Chernenko: General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party Apr. 26~May 1: President Reagan visits China
1985 9	Apr. 27: Meeting with Wáng Shǒudào/王首道 to discuss the growing	Mar. 11, 85~Aug. 24, 91: Mikhail Gorbachev: General

Apr. 27 ~ May 17	importance of the two countries' relations. Apr. 29: Meeting with Wáng Zhèn/王震 to discuss the Sino-Soviet relation May 2: Meeting with Yú Qiūli/余秋里 to discuss the situation of the USSR. May 3: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Secretary of the USSR Communist Party Aug. 11: People's Daily criticizes Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Aug. 15: Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, established Sept. 18: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
1986 Apr. 26 ~ May 12	Apr. 26 and 28: Meeting with Wáng Shǒudào/王首道 and Wáng Zhèn/王震 to discuss the growing importance of the two countries' relations. Apr. 29: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) Apr. 29: Meeting with Yú Qiūli/余秋里 to discuss world politics. May 5: Visit to Bǎoshān Iron and Steel (宝山钢铁).	
1987 Apr. 24 ~ May 7	Apr. 24: Meetings with Wáng Shǒudào/王首道 and Jīn Lǐ/金黎 to discuss world politics. Apr. 27: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) Apr. 29: Meeting with Yú Qiūli/余秋里 to discuss the past history of the <i>Chu-sei-kon</i> .	Jan. 24: Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability in the Future (今後の防衛力整備について) Apr. 17: Wáng Shǒudào/王首道 visits Japan, meeting with Yasuhiro Nakasone. Nov. 1, 87~Jun., 23, 89: Zhào Ziyáng: CCP General Secretary Nov. 6, 87~Jun. 3, 89: Takeshita Cabinet (竹下内閣)
1988 Sept. 21 ~ Oct. 5	Sept. 21: Meetings with Wáng Shǒudào/王首道 and Yuè Fēng/岳枫 (second son of Yè Jiànyīng/叶剑英) to discuss world politics. Sept. 23: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet General Zhāng Zhèn (张震) Oct. 4: Visit to Bǎoshān Iron and Steel (宝山钢铁)	Jan. 13, 88~May 20, 00: Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Taiwanese president Mar. 14: the Johnson South Reef Skirmish between China and Vietnam Aug. 25~30: Prime Minister Takeshita visits China, meeting with Dèng Xiǎopíng and Lǐ Pēng U.S. Congagement Strategy (A. Friedberg)
1989/ H1 May 20 ~ Jun. 1	May 23: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and Major General Chéng Míngqún (程明群) May 26: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Jan. 7: Death of Emperor Showa Jan. 20, 89~Jan. 20, 93: Bush Administration Apr. 12: Premier Li Peng visit Japan, meeting with the Emperor, and Prime Minister Takeshita Jun. 3~Aug. 10: Uno Cabinet Jun. 3~5: Mikhail Gorbachev visits China Jun. 4: Tiananmen Incident Jun. 6: China and Mongolia restore exchanges long suspended for more than 20 years Jun. 24, 89~Nov. 15, 02: Jiāng Zémín: CCP General Secretary Aug. 10, 89~Nov. 5, 91: Kaifu Cabinet
1990 May 12 ~22	May 14: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet General Zhāng Zhèn (张震)	Mar. 15, 90~Dec. 25, 91: Mikhail Gorbachev: President of the USSR Dec. 20: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
1991 May 13 ~ 27	May 13: Meeting with Vice Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact Huáng Huá (黄华) May 14: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Lt. General Huáng Yùzhāng (黄玉章) May 14: Meeting with General Liú Huáqīng (刘华清)	Jan. 17~Feb. 28: Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War Nov. 5, 91~Aug. 9, 93: Miyazawa Cabinet Dec. 19: Concerning the Basic Approach to the Defense program from FY1991 (平成3年度以降の防衛計画の基本的考え方について) Dec. 25: Collapse of the USSR
1992 May 13 ~ 24	May 13: Meeting with Vice Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact Huáng Huá (黄华) May 15: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Lt. General Huáng Yùzhāng (黄玉章) May 18: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Feb. 25: China's Law Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (领海及毗连区法) Jun. 19: Japan's Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. Oct. 23~28: The Emperor's visit to China Dec. 18: Mid-term Defense Program, revised (中期防修正)
1993 Apr. 29 ~ May 11	Apr. 30: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Lt. General Huáng Yùzhāng (黄玉章) Apr. 30: Meeting with Vice Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact Huáng Huá (黄华)	May 29~30: North Korean missile (Nodong-1) test Jun. 11-15: The Emperor visits the U.S. Aug. 9, 93~Apr. 28, 94 Hosokawa Cabinet
1994 Apr. 13 ~ 23	Apr. 13: Meeting with Vice Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact Huáng Huá (黄华) Apr. 15: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Lt. General Huáng Yùzhāng (黄玉章) Apr. 18: Xi'an Satellite Control Center (XSCC) (西安卫星测控中心)	Aug. 12: Advisory Group on Defense: "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan" Apr. 28~Jun. 30: Hata Cabinet Jun. 30, 94~Jan. 11, 96: Murayama Cabinet (村山内閣)
1995 Apr. 12 ~ 24	Apr. 13: Meeting with General Liú Huáqīng (刘华清) Apr. 15: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet General Zhū Dūnfǎ (朱敦法) Apr. 15: Meeting with General Xú Xìn (徐信), Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会)	Jan.: The Mischief or Meiji Reef Incident Feb: U.S. DoD: "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" May 22: US government decides to grant Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui permission to visit America Aug. 15: War apology statement made by Prime Minister Murayama (村山談話) Nov. 28: National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) (大綱),

			for the first time since 1976 Dec. 7: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
1996 May 13 ~ 23	20	May 15: Meeting with General Xú Xìn (徐信), Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) May 16: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet General Xíng Shìzhōng (邢世忠)	Jan. 11, 96~Jul. 30, 98: Habimoto Cabinet (橋本内閣) March 8~15: PLA missile test leading to the Taiwan Strait Crisis Apr. 17: President Clinton visit Japan and unveils "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century." Apr. 24-26: President Boris Yeltsin visits China and agrees to develop a "partnership of strategic coordination oriented toward the 21st century"
1997 May 19 ~ 29	21	May 20: Meeting with General Xú Xìn (徐信), Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) May 20: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Lt. General Hé Dàoquán (何道泉) May 20: Visit to Defense Minister Chí Hàotián (迟浩田)	Feb. 19: Death of Dèng Xiǎoping July 1: Hong Kong Handover Aug. 11: Amid the Asian Financial Crisis, August 1997, the IMF unveils a rescue package for Thailand. Oct. 26~Nov. 3: President Jiāng Zémín visits the United States Dec. 19: Mid-term Defense Program, revised (中期防見直し)
1998			Apr. 21~26: Vice President Hú Jìntāo visits Japan, meeting with the Emperor Jun. 25~Jul. 3: President Clinton visits China Jul. 30, 98~Apr. 5, 00: Obuchi Cabinet (小渊内閣) Aug. 31: North Korean missile (Taepodong-1) test Nov. 25~30: President Jiāng Zémín visits Japan, meeting with the Emperor and Prime Minister Obuchi
1999 May 16 ~ 24	22	May 17: Meeting with General Xú Yímín (徐毅民), Vice Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) May 18: Visit to Defense Minister Chí Hàotián (迟浩田) May 18: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Major General Pān Zhènniáng (潘振强) May 20: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	May 7: U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade Dec. 20: Return of sovereignty of Macau to China
2000 May 28 ~ Jun. 7	23	May 29: Visit to the PLA Academy of Military Science (解放军军事科学院) May 29: Visit to Defense Minister Chí Hàotián (迟浩田) May 30: Meeting with General Xú Yímín (徐毅民), Vice Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会) Jun. 2: Visit to Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company (DSIC/大连船舶重工) Jun 4: Meeting with Wāng Dàohán (汪道涵), President of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS/海峡两岸关系协会)	Apr. 5, 00~Apr. 26, 01: Mori Cabinet (森内閣) May 20, 00~May 20, 08: Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Taiwanese president Oct. 12~17: Premier Zhū Róngjī visits Japan meeting with the Emperor and Prime Minister Mori Oct. 30: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), created. Dec. 15: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
2001 May 22 ~ Jun. 1	24	May 22: Visit to Defense Minister Chí Hàotián (迟浩田) May 23: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Rear Admiral Yáng Yì (杨毅), Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies (战略研究所) May 24: Meeting with Cài Bǐngkuí (蔡炳魁), Vice Chairman of the China International Institute for strategic Society (中国国际战略学会)	Apr. 1: Hainan Island Incident Apr. 26, 01~Sept. 26, 06: Koizumi Cabinet (小泉内閣) Jun. 14: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), founded. Aug. 13: Prime Minister Koizumi visits Yasukuni Sept. 11: the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
2002 May 22 ~ 31	25	May 23: Visit to the 196th Infantry Brigade May 24: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Senior Colonel Zhū Chénghū (朱成虎) May 25: Meeting with Lt. General Táng Tiānbāo (唐天标), Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部副主任)	Nov. 15, 02~Nov. 15, 12: Hú Jìntāo, CCP General Secretary
2003 Oct. 13 ~ 22	26	Oct. 14: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2003 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2003/中日东北亚安全论坛 2003)" Oct. 15: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Vice President Major General Xú Zhìgōng (许志功)	Mar. 20, 03~Dec. 15, 11: Iraq War Aug. 10~13: Foreign Minister Lǐ Zhàoxīng visits Japan, meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi Aug. 30~Sept. 10: NPC Standing Committee Chairman Wú Bāngguó visits Japan, meeting with the Emperor and Prime Minister Koizumi Dec. 19: On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures (彈道ミサイル防衛システムの整備等について)
2004 May 23 ~ Jun. 1	27	May 24: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Vice President Lt. General Wén Róng (文荣) May 22: Visit to Defense Minister Cáo Gāngchuān (曹刚川) May 25: Visit to the Beijing 6th Artillery Brigade May 25: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2004 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2004/中日东北亚安全论坛 2004)" May 29: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Dec. 10: National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) (大綱) Dec. 10: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
2005 Jun. 8 ~ 15	28	Jun. 8: Visit to the Beijing 6th Artillery Brigade Jun 8: Meeting with China-Japan Friendship Association's Liáng Shì (梁澁) Jun. 9: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2005 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2005/中日东北亚安全论坛 2005)" Jun. 10: Visit to the PLA Academy of Military Science (解放军军事科学院)	Feb. 19: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) Jul. 18: the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Apr. 9: Rioters attempt to storm the Japanese embassy in Beijing

		Jun. 10: Meeting with General Táng Tiānbāo (唐天标), Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部副主任) Jun. 10: Dinner with former Defense Minister Chí Hàotián (迟浩田)	Oct. 29: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2)
2006 Jun. 10 ~ 15	29	Jun. 10: Meeting with China-Japan Friendship Association's Chén Wèipíng (沉卫平) Jun. 11: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2006 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2006/中日东北亚安全论坛 2006)" Jun. 11: Dinner with General Fù Quányǒu (傅全有), former head of the PLA General Staff Department (总参谋部) Jun. 12: Meeting with General Xú Cǎihòu (徐才厚), Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC/中央军委) Jun. 13: Visit to the Beijing 6th Artillery Brigade Jun. 14: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Feb. 9: US DoD: "Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report" May 1: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) Sept. 26, 06~Sept. 26, 07: Abe Cabinet (安倍内閣) Oct. 9: North Korean nuclear test
2007 May 21 ~ 30	30	May 22: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2007 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2007/中日东北亚安全论坛 2007)" May 22: Reception in celebration of the 30th anniversary May 23: Speech of Chu-sei-kon Chairman Atsushi Shima (志摩篤) at National Defense University (解放军国防大学) May 23: Meeting with General Xú Cǎihòu (徐才厚), Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC/中央军委) May 25: Visit to Qingdao Naval Base (PLAN Harbin (DD112) (哈尔滨号))	May 1: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) May 13~17: Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating visits China, meeting with CMC vice chairman Guō Bóxióng and Foreign Minister Yáng Jiéché. Jul. 5: North Korean missile (Taepodong-2) test Sept. 26, 07~Set. 24, 08: Fukuda Cabinet (福田内閣)
2008 May 20 ~ 28	31	May 21: Visit to Defense Minister Liáng Guāngliè (梁光烈) May 22: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2008 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2008/中日东北亚安全论坛 2008)" May 23: Visit to the Headquarters of the North Sea Fleet (NSF) (北海舰队)	May 20, 08~: Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Taiwanese President Sept. 15: Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. Sept. 24, 08~Sept. 16, 09: Aso Cabinet (麻生内閣) Dec. 20: Mid-term Defense Program, revised (中期防見直し)
2009 May 19 ~ 28	32	May 19: Dinner with Lǐ Zhàoxīng (李肇星), Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) (Zhōngguó Guójì Yóuhǎo Liánluòhuì/中国国际友好联络会) May 20: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2009 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2009/中日东北亚安全论坛 2009)" May 21: Visit to Defense Minister Liáng Guāngliè (梁光烈) May 21: Visit to National Defense University (解放军国防大学) and to meet Vice President Major General Rèn Hǎiquán (任海泉) May 25: Visit to PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 28th Attack Division (第28强击师)	Mar. 8: the USNS Impeccable Incident Mar. 26: The sinking of the ROKS <i>Cheonan</i> (天安号) May 25: North Korean nuclear test Jul. 28-29: the first U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) takes place in Washington. Sept. 16, 09~Jun. 8, 10: Hatoyama Cabinet (鳩山内閣) Nov. 13~18: President Obama visits Japan, Singapore, and China. Dec. 10~13: 143 Japanese parliamentary members led by Ichoro Ozawa visit China, meeting with President Hú Jǐntāo Dec. 17: Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability (平成22年度の防衛力整備等について)
2010 Jun. 2 ~ 11	33	Jun. 3: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2010 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2010/中日东北亚安全论坛 2010)" Jun. 4: Visit to PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 24th Fighter Division (第24歼击师) Jun. 4: Meeting with General Liú Zhènrǐ (刘振起), Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部副主任) Jun. 8: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Feb. 1: U.S. DoD: "Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report," providing a new "Joint Air Sea Battle Concept (JASBC)" May 21: the activation ceremony of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) May 28: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) Jun. 8, 10~Sept. 2, 11: Kan Cabinet (菅内閣) Sept. 7: Senkaku Boat Collision Incident Nov. 23: North Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Dec. 17: new National Defense Program Guideline (new NDPG) (新大綱) Dec. 17: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)
2011 Jun. 7 ~ 16	34	Jun. 7: Dinner with Lǐ Zhàoxīng (李肇星), Chairman of the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) (Zhōngguó Guójì Yóuhǎo Liánluòhuì/中国国际友好联络会) Jun. 8: Visit to Beijing Military Region, the 6th Armored Division (北京军区坦克6师) Jun. 9: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2011 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2011/中日东北亚安全论坛 2011)" Jun. 10: Visit to Defense Minister Liáng Guāngliè (梁光烈) Jun. 10: Visit to PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 24th Fighter Division (第24歼击师) Jun. 13: Visit to Xi'an Aircraft Industrial (西安飞机工业)	Mar. 11: the Great East Japan Earthquake Jun. 21: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) Sept. 2, 11~Dec. 26, 12: Noda Cabinet (野田内閣) Nov. 11: U.S. DoD announces the establishment of the Air Sea Battle Office (ABSO). Nov. 16: President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the deployment of Marines to Darwin and Northern Australia. Dec. 17: Death of Kim Jong-il
2012 Jun. 4 ~ 13	35	Jun. 5: "Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2012 (ZhōngRì Dōngběiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2012/中日东北亚安全论坛 2012)" Jun. 6: Visit to Beijing Military Region, the 6th Armored Division (北京军区坦克6师) Jun. 6: Meeting with General Lǐ Jìnài (李继耐), a Member of the Central Military Commission (CMC/中央军委), and Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部主任) Jun. 12: Visit to PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 28th Attack Division (第28强击师)	Jan. 17: U.S. DoD: "Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)" Apr. 27: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2) Aug. 10: President Lee Myung-bak pays visits Takeshima/Dokdo Island. Sept. 12: Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands Nov. 15, 12: Xi Jinping CCP General Secretary Dec. 26, 12~: Abe Cabinet (安倍内閣)

2013 Jun. 6 ~ 14	<p>Jun. 6: “Sino-Japan Security Forum for Northeast Asia 2013 (ZhōngRì Dōngbèiyà Ānquán Lùntán 2013/中日东北亚安全论坛 2013)”</p> <p>Jun. 7: Visit to Beijing Military Region, the 6th Armored Division (北京军区坦克 6 师)</p> <p>Jun. 7: Meeting with General Zhāng Yáng (张阳), a Member of the Central Military Commission (CMC/中央军委), and Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部主任)</p> <p>Jun. 13: Meeting with Lt. General Liú Lúnxián (刘伦贤), former Deputy Commander of Jinán Military Region (济南军区副司令员)</p>	<p>Jan. 19: the Chinese frigate <i>Jiāngkǎi</i> I (江凯) locked its fire-control radar on an SH-60K helicopter from the destroyer JS <i>Onami</i>.</p> <p>Jan. 25: Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability in 2010 (平成 25 年度の防衛力整備等について).</p> <p>Jan. 30: the Chinese frigate <i>Jiāngwèi</i> II (江卫) locked its fire-control radar onto the destroyer JS <i>Yudachi</i>.</p> <p>Oct. 3: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2)</p> <p>Nov. 23: China’s Announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (fāngkōng shíbié qū/防空识别区).</p> <p>Dec. 5: a PLAN amphibious assault ship swung across the bow of the cruiser USS <i>Cowpens</i>.</p> <p>Dec. 17: National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) (大綱)</p> <p>Dec. 17: Mid-term Defense Program (中期防衛力整備計画)</p>
2014 Jun. 4 ~ 13	<p>Jun. 4: Exchange between retired generals and admirals</p> <p>Jun. 5: Exchange between retired generals and admirals</p> <p>Jun. 5: Meeting with General Zhāng Yáng (张阳), a Member of the Central Military Commission (CMC/中央军委), and Director of the PLA General Political Department (总政治部主任)</p> <p>Jun. 6: Exchange between retired generals and admirals</p> <p>General Zhū Wénquán (朱文泉), former Commander of Nánjīng Military Region (南京军区司令员)</p> <p>Lt General Fēng Zhāojū (冯兆举), former Deputy Commander of Jinán Military Region (济南军区副司令员)</p> <p>Lt. General Qián Hǎihào (钱海皓), former Deputy Director, Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院副院长)</p> <p>Rear Admiral Liào Shìníng (廖世宁), former Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN (海軍副參謀長)</p> <p>Rear Admiral Dù Xīpíng (杜希平), former Deputy Commander of the North Sea Fleet (NSF) (北海舰队副司令员)</p>	<p>Apr. 22-23: the 14th WPNS</p> <p>Jun. 26-Aug.1: RIMPAC 2014</p>

Source: The authors based on the *Chu-sei-kon*'s materials.

Conclusion: From Competitive Irrationality to Competitive Rationality

This essay has briefly reviewed military-to-military CBMs among the three countries. First, it identified strategic, logical, and behavioral chasms lying between the Japan-U.S. alliance and China and understood the changing balance of power in the Asia/Pacific Region. Second, it traced briefly the history of U.S.-China CBMs. Finally, the essay elucidated the current tense circumstances surrounding Japan-China military CBMs. Among other things, the *Chu-sei-kon* CBM with its history of almost 40 years, is now expected to play a greater role to reduce misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and miscommunication and gain more transparency. And the 2014 *Chu-sei-kon* CBM clearly confirmed a desired direction.

Under the current tumultuous circumstances, the three countries, for the purposes of securing peace and prosperity, have to transform the current state of competitive irrationality to that of competitive rationality by discouraging escalatory confrontations. Competitive irrationality, according to managerial economists, “refers to a situation in which two parties engage in an activity that is clearly irrational in terms of the expected outcomes to both sides, despite the fact that it is difficult to identify specific irrational actions by either party.”⁵⁷

Even in the economic arena, this competitive irrationality is pervasive and there is substantial evidence that managers in a company set prices too aggressively and thereby forego profits not only for their own company but also for themselves personally.⁵⁸ In the security arena, pervasive competitive irrationality, e.g.,

⁵⁷ As for the definition of competitive irrationality, see, for example, Max H. Bazerman and Don A. Moore, *Judgment in Managerial Decision Making*, seventh edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p. 111.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Lance E. Brouthers *et al.*, “Competitive Irrationality in Transitional Economies: Are Communist Managers Less Irrational?” *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 83, No. 3 (2008), pp. 397-408.

demonstrated by a frigate captain or a squadron leader, would lead to disastrous hostilities. Therefore, in the state of competitive irrationality, Japan and China might find a politico-military opportunity by aggressive behavior in the short run. However, such an opportunity proves to be a quagmire accompanying a huge politico-economic cost on both sides.

Japan and China are now witnessing a growing popular nationalism, which might instigate emotional escalation, though differences in pervasiveness and the nature of nationalism between the two countries should be carefully examined and those nationalisms should not be overstated. Therefore, the Japan-U.S. alliance should be sensitive not to antagonize and provoke these nationalist and xenophobic elements in China. David L. Shambaugh, by quoting an ancient Chinese proverb “a lot of thunder but little rain (léishēng dǎ yǔ diǎn xiǎo/雷声打雨点小),”⁵⁹ suggests that the alliance should proceed calmly, serenely, and unemotionally with building a harmonious relationship.

For the very reason, Japan-China *Chu-sei-kon* CBM will play a larger role in the future to stave off emotionally escalatory military behavior on both sides. It will help competitive irrationality transform itself to competitive rationality. Today, the world is closely observing how the two countries can demonstrate their profound wisdom to promote an environment for peace and prosperity.

⁵⁹ Shambaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 22.