

**An Asiatic “Quadruple Alliance” or “Stately Quadrille”?:  
Today’s Sino-American Geopolitical Rivalry and Shifting Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region**

**Abstract**

A sea change in relative power between the United States and China has bewildered policy makers and strategists on the globe. While heavily dependent on China as an unparalleled and irreplaceable engine of economic growth, Japan has become more vigilant against China’s power projection capability. In the meantime, the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are now perturbed by an agonizing question of how to court Washington without offending Beijing. Therefore there have emerged not a small number of policy makers and strategists who are inclined to cogitate over a Sinocentric system in the Asia-Pacific region by breaking decades-long ties with a doddering America and adopting bandwagon policies toward a rising China. Thus the combination of America’s waning influence and China’s assertive posture has made a prominent scholar to suggest an Asiatic “Quadruple Alliance” comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, to better balance against China.<sup>2</sup> Based upon the above observations, this material tries to capture the gist of the argument developed in a newly published book titled *A Contest for Supremacy*,<sup>3</sup> and argue its implications for Japan’s global strategies.

**1. Introduction: A Special Seminar on Sino-American Rivalry in Tokyo**

On December 9, 2011, the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) had the honor of welcoming Aaron L. Friedberg, a professor at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and held a special seminar “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” i.e., the title of his most recent book. The professor’s speech offered a wonderful opportunity for a Tokyoite audience to think about Japan’s global strategies.

**1-1. A Contest for Supremacy: Providing Western Perspectives and Interpretations That Asians Fail to Recognize**

Friedberg’s book looks like a marvelous and inexhaustible fountain of knowledge and wisdom regarding today’s Sino-American rivalry. Especially the Japanese reader finds the book filled with novel perspectives and interpretations that Westerners would have when they react to Chinese thought and action (see Table 1). At the same time, the book provides the reader with insightful quotations ranging from Thucydides and Karl Marx to François Jullien and Yan Xuetong/Yán Xuétōng (阎学通). It also has appendixes for gleaning accurate and in-depth information so as not to be deceived by perfunctory and stereotyped information often conveyed heedlessly by mediocre writers.

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<sup>2</sup> A quadruple alliance is an oft-used term in Europe’s balance-of-power politics to describe a four-power alliance to contain a competing power, especially during the 18th century; the Stately Quadrille is a term to describe shifting alliances prior to the establishment of the 18th century Franco-Anglo bipolar system. See, for example, Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire*, New York: Basic Books, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.

**Table 1. An Anatomy of Friedberg's *A Contest for Supremacy***

Chapters	Structure, and Impressive and Memorable Lines
Intro- duc- tion	<p><b>A Contest for Supremacy</b></p> <p>*The United States and the People's Republic of China are today locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia but around the world. [p. 1]</p> <p>*Throughout history, relations between dominant states and rising ones have been uneasy and often violent. . . . These age-old patterns are clearly visible today in the behavior of the United States and China. [p. 1]</p> <p>*Ideological differences add a crucial extra measure of mistrust and volatility to this mix. [p. 1]</p> <p>*China's current rulers see the United States as the most serious external threat to their continued rule that they feel the need to constrict its military presence and diplomatic influence in the Western Pacific. [p. 2]</p> <p>*In addition to the powerful ideological and geopolitical forces impelling the United States and China toward rivalry, there are clearly other, countervailing factors at work. . . . at least for the moment, Washington and Beijing both appear to believe that time is on their side. American policy makers remain confident that in the long-run China's economic growth will pave the way for political liberalization and lasting peace. While they are clearly nervous about navigating the near term, China's current rulers also seem certain that the rides of history are running in their country's favor. Both of these views cannot be correct. [U.S. and China in a state of "Tóngchuáng Yimèng/同床异梦/同床異夢"] [p. 2]</p> <p>*Former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew has observed that "the 21st century will be a contest for supremacy in the Pacific because that's where the growth will be. . . . If you do not hold your ground in the Pacific you cannot be a would leader." [p. 8]</p>
	<p><b>Means of Ascent</b></p> <p>I-1. The "Vasco da Gama Epoch"</p> <p>I-2. Expansion and Domination</p> <p>*By the turn of the twentieth century, the situation in Asia was characterized by a degree of Western dominance that seemed beyond any possibility of challenge. . . . While the nations of Western Europe and North America leapt ahead, Asia fell further and further behind. Japan is the exception that proves the rule. Because they preserved their sovereignty, the Japanese were able to organize an effective response to the Western powers. [p. 16]</p> <p>I-3. Asian Renaissance</p> <p>I-4. Achieving Growth</p> <p>*The move to market-driven growth, and Asia's transformation from backwater to economic dynamo, came in a series of five overlapping waves, starting with Japan's postwar recovery and extending, most recently to the liberalization of India's economy in the early 1990s. [p. 23]</p> <p>I-5. China's Rise</p> <p>*China's part in the story of Asia's postwar renaissance is delineated by two dates. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed the establishment of a "People's Republic." [p. 27]</p> <p>*The second crucial date in China's reemergence as a great power is December 28, 1978, the opening day of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist Party Central Committee. Coming just two years after Mao's death, this meeting marked "the decisive break with the past and the beginning of China's reform era." [p. 30]</p> <p>I-6. Will China Continue to Rise?</p> <p>*[M]uch recent commentary on China is guilty of what might be called "straightline-ists," the natural human tendency to assume that prevailing trends will continue indefinitely; some is characterized by "collapse-ism," the somewhat less common belief that what goes up must inevitably come down. [p. 33]</p> <p>*As suggested by Japan's experience in the 1990s, if not managed properly, bubbles of the sort that seem now to be inflating rapidly in China can burst and lead to bank failures, stubbornly low growth rate, and sustained high levels of unemployment. [pp. 33-34]</p> <p>*China's unusual demographic profile also means that a relatively small group of younger workers will soon have to bear the burden of supporting a much larger cohort of retirees. Increasing spending on pensions and medical care will be necessary to maintain a decent society, but it will also divert some resources from investment in more productive activities. [p. 34]</p> <p>*A lasting expansion in the state sector at the expense of privately owned enterprises could hurt long-term prospects for growth. [p. 34]</p> <p>*Chinese society is marked by deepening divisions between urban "haves" and rural "have-nots," and between a small number of ostentatiously wealthy, well-connected plutocrats and the modestly well-to-do middle class. And this is to say nothing of a pervasive culture of official corruption and a system of governance that commands neither wide respect nor deep loyalty. [pp. 34-35]</p>
II	<p><b>Roots of Rivalry</b></p> <p>II-1. "Prediction Is Difficult, Especially about the Future?"</p> <p>II-2. The Narrowing Power Gap</p> <p>*The history of relations among great powers is a story of persistent rivalry and recurrent warfare, punctuated by occasional, usually brief, periods of peace. [p. 38]</p> <p>*Insecurity continues to be the defining feature of international life. Even if great-power war is a thing of the past, great-power rivalry certainly is not. [p. 39]</p> <p>*World history is replete with examples of the troubled, often violent, relations between fast-rising states and their once-dominant rivals. [p. 39]</p> <p>*The clash of interests between rising and status quo powers can be dealt with in a number of ways, but the resulting disputes have seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo powers) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a rising state before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. On the other hand, some great powers have taken the opposite approach: trying to appease potential challengers, looking for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions without conflict and seeking to incorporate them peacefully into an existing international order. [p. 40]</p> <p>*However sincere, these efforts have almost always failed. [p. 40]</p> <p>*Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory, but in practice they have proved devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, rising power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war. [p. 41]</p> <p>II-3. The Enduring Ideological Divide</p> <p>*Deep-seated patterns of power politics are dividing the United States and China toward mistrust and competition, if not yet open conflict. [p. 42]</p> <p>*Relations between democracies and non-democracies are always conducted in what political theorist Michael Doyle describes as an "atmosphere of suspicion," in part because of "the perception by liberal states that non-liberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people." [p. 42]</p> <p>*Anxiety over their own lack of legitimacy at home can cause non-democratic governments to try to deflect popular frustration and discontent toward external enemies, real or imagined. Some Western observers fear, for example, that if China's economy falters, its rulers will try to blame foreigners and even to manufacture crises with Taiwan, Japan, or the United States in order to rally their people and redirect their anger. Whatever Beijing's intent, such confrontations could easily spiral out of control. [p. 43]</p>

	<p>*China's current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement. But they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle of sorts, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. [p. 44]</p> <p>II-4. "Chimerica?"</p> <p>*The two countries are tied together as never before by flows of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas. Indeed, the connections between their respective economies have grown so numerous and so deep in recent years that some analysts have suggested that the two have effectively fused into a single organism known as "Chimerica." [p. 46]</p> <p>*Unfortunately, there is little reason in theory or historical experience to believe that economic links alone are sufficient to create lasting stability, still less perpetual peace. [p. 46]</p> <p>*Even if interdependence helps suppress mutual hostility, it will not necessarily constrain nations from engaging in various forms of competitive behavior, including arms races and the construction of opposing alliances. Such geopolitical maneuvering can lead to escalatory spirals of mistrust, a breakdown in political and economic relations, and even open conflict. [p. 46]</p> <p>*History suggests that when the chips are down, politics trumps trade. Before the start of the First World War, Britain and Germany were major economic partners. But this did not stop Britain's leaders from seeing Germany's growing power as a threat to their colonial empire and, eventually, to the stability of Europe. [p. 47]</p> <p>*Nor did it prevent the Kaiser and his advisors from concluding that Britain was intent on retaining its preponderant position and blocking Germany's rise. Strong economic ties could not slow the deterioration in Anglo-German relations that led eventually to war. To the contrary, by the turn of the twentieth century the growth in volume and quality of imported German manufactured goods was yet another factor fueling British fears of unfavorable long-term shifts in the balance of power. {20: These anxieties are discussed in Aaron L. Friedberg, <i>The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905</i> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 37-38.} . . . As this example suggests, economic interdependence is not always a cause of friendship and can, at times, become a major source of insecurity and friction. [p. 47]</p> <p>II-5. A Democratic Peace?</p> <p>*China now has a sizable, fast-growing middle class. At some point, perhaps its members too will begin to play their historic role and demand political rights. [p. 50]</p> <p>*Even if China begins to narrow the gap by moving toward greater openness and expanded political competition, the very process of change could itself increase the risk of confrontation and conflict. Political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder suggest that it is precisely when nations are in the midst of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy that they are most likely to pick fights with their neighbors. [p. 51]</p> <p>*Strident patriotism is usually accompanied by the glorification of military power and by "the scapegoating of enemies of the nation, at home and abroad." These tendencies, in turn, can lead to heightened international tensions, and often to war. [p. 51]</p> <p>II-6. A "Responsible Stakeholder"?</p> <p>II-7. Common Threat?</p> <p>*What brought the United States and China together initially in the late 1960s was not economic interdependence, or institutions, or common values, but rather a convergence of interest caused by the existence of a common enemy. [p. 54]</p> <p>*The real problem in U.S.-China relations is not the absence of cooperation on specific issues, but rather the underlying divergence of interests and the tensions and mutual mistrust that make cooperation so difficult in the first place. [p. 55]</p> <p>II-8. Nuclear Weapons?</p> <p>II-9. A Fragile Balance</p> <p>*Today's Sino-American rivalry is rooted in deep ideological differences and in the stubborn realities of power politics. [p. 57]</p>
III	<p><b>From Containment to Alignment</b></p> <p>III-1. Power and Principle</p> <p>*[T]he rise and fall of great power and the ebb and flow of relations among nations are not solely predictable end product of such impersonal forces. The course of events is determined as well by the perceptions (and misperceptions) of leaders, the struggles of domestic interest groups, and the strategies (however imperfectly conceived and implemented) of governments. [p. 58]</p> <p>III-2. Containment: 1949-69</p> <p>III-3. Alignment Phase I (1969-79)</p> <p>III-4. Alignment Phase II (1979-89)</p> <p>III-5. Convergence?</p>
IV	<p><b>"Congagement"</b></p> <p>IV-1. The End of Alignment</p> <p>*Congagement grew and evolved in the 1990s and early 2000s, and in certain respects it continues to do so. Albeit with some comparatively minor shifts in emphasis, this mixed policy has now survived three presidential transitions. [p. 90]</p> <p>IV-2. The Case for Continued Engagement</p> <p>IV-3. Recognizing the Challenge: The Taiwan Crisis and the Return of "Containment"</p> <p>*The evident growth in China's capabilities and the apparent expansiveness of its intentions raised the question of whether it might one day emerge as what defense planners referred to as a "peer competitor" of the United States. [p. 98]</p> <p>IV-4. Preserving the Balance</p> <p>*U.S. policy makers began to take a number of steps intended, not to "contain" China's rise, but to preserve a favorable balance of power in East Asia in spite of its growing capabilities. [p. 101]</p> <p>IV-4-(a) Bolstering U.S. military power in the Pacific</p> <p>IV-4-(b) Strengthening alliances and quasi-alliances</p> <p>IV-4-(c) Slowing the growth of Chinese military power</p> <p>*By continuing to open its markets and invest its capital, the United States was contributing substantially to the rapid expansion of China's GDP. This fueled Beijing's sustained military buildup, which in turn stimulated Washington to strengthen its Asian alliances and bolster its own forces in the region. Continued engagement thus helped to create the need for more balancing. [p. 109]</p> <p>*The area where the contradictions between engagement and balancing continued regularly to reemerge was the one in which the connections between trade and military power were most obvious and direct. Investing in factories, buying Chinese-made consumer goods, and thereby contributing to the overall growth of China's economy was one thing; transferring technology that might find its way directly into advanced weapons, or speed the day when China could develop them on its own, was much harder to justify. Yet it was precisely in the high-technology sectors that U.S. industry had the greatest advantages and Chinese firms were most eager to do business. [p. 109]</p> <p>IV-5. The Obama Administration Embraces Congagement</p> <p>IV-6. The Resilience of Congagement . . . And Its Risks</p> <p>*Can congagement be sustained? Critics of a mixed strategy have generally focused on the danger that attempts at balancing could undermine engagement. [p. 117]</p> <p>*Regardless of what either initially intended, the United States and China will end up in a new Cold War, if not an actual shooting war. There is</p>

	<p>certainly a possibility that this could happen, but the strength of the domestic interests arrayed in favor of continued engagement and against “excessive” balancing make it a far less likely scenario than it might otherwise be. [p. 118]</p> <p>*The assertion that “If we treat China like an enemy it will become one” has become a piece of elite conventional wisdom that few pause to examine. {78: Joseph Nye, quoted in Jim Mann, “U.S. Starting to View China as a Potential Enemy,” <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, April 16, 1995.} [p. 118]</p> <p>*Building up American military strength to keep pace with China will also be costly and hence unpopular with advocates of smaller federal budgets and lower taxes, as well as those who favor increased spending on health care and other social welfare programs. [p. 118]</p>
V	<p><b>“The Propensity of Things”</b> [“shì shì”]</p> <p>V-1. “Seek Truth from Facts”</p> <p>*Analysts of contemporary Chinese strategy are confronted at once by a confusing blend of cacophony and silence. . . . Today an assortment of Chinese officials and government agencies makes meaningful policy statements and prepares comparatively professional reports on a wide variety of topics. There is, of course, no shortage of sloganeering and blather, but there is also a good deal of wheat amid the chaff. [p. 121]</p> <p>*To the extent that they deal at all with future plans, defense budget statements and “white papers” are opaque and incomplete. Speeches and reports on foreign policy still repeat key phrases with mind-numbing regularity and China’s aims are discussed in only the most cursory and anodyne ways. [p. 122]</p> <p>V-2. Chinese Strategists Assess “the Propensity of Things”</p> <p>*[H]e [Chinese strategist] begins by making a minute evaluation of the relation of the forces in play so that he can make the most of the favorable factors implied in the situation, exploiting them constantly, whatever the circumstances he encounters.” {3: François Jullien, <i>A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking</i> (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), p. 38, [Traité de l’efficacité/Fúlǎngsuǒwǎ·Yúlíán/弗朗索瓦·于连: Xiàolǜlùn [«效率论»]].} [cf. Henry A. Kissinger, <i>On China</i>, p. 30 and Sunzi/Sūnzǐ (孙子), <i>Art of War</i>, Chapter 5.] [p. 124]</p> <p>V-3. “Peace and Development”</p> <p>V-4. Waiting for Multipolarity</p> <p>*In the early 1990s, Chinese analysts anticipated that the collapse of the Soviet Union would be followed in short order by the dissolution of America’s alliances, the accelerated growth and increasing independence of its former allies, and a sustained deterioration in its own national economic performance. These predictions echoed those of prominent Western “declinists.” The end result, in the view of Chinese strategists, would be a world with five or possibly six major players, including Japan, a reunited Germany (or perhaps a united Europe), a recovering Russia, a diminished America, possibly India, and, although they seldom referred directly to their own country, a rising China. [p. 128]</p> <p>V-5. The American Threat</p> <p>*A review of their internal personal files concludes that China’s fourth generation leaders see the United States as “the main obstacle to global stability and international law,” “the source of hegemonism and power politics” in the world, and a “looming threat” to the sovereignty of their country and the survival of their regime. [p. 133]</p> <p>V-6. Conclusion</p> <p>*The United States has “never abandoned its efforts to ‘Westernize’ China,” and the very success of “the development model of socialism with Chinese characteristics” in recent years has rekindled a sense of ideological rivalry. [p. 141]</p>
VI	<p><b>“Hide Out Capabilities and Bide Our Time”</b></p> <p>VI-1. The 24 Characters and the 3 Axioms</p> <p>*China is like a vessel being carried forward by strong currents into fast-flowing rapids. [p. 142]</p> <p>*Complex military and diplomatic concepts are often reduced in Chinese writings to pithy slogans or “tifa” [tí2fā3/tí2fā/提法] (“peace and development,” “three no changes and three new changes,” and so on). No such official summary statement of China’s grand strategy or, somewhat more narrowly, of its strategy for dealing with the United States is known to exist. [p. 143]</p> <p>*The closest thing to such a formulation is probably Deng Xiaoping’s often-quoted admonition that China should “hide its capabilities and bide its time [Tǎoguāng yǎnghuī/韬光养晦].” [p. 143]</p> <p>*These words were part of a slightly longer “24-character strategy” circulated to top party officials in the summer of 1991 [(1) Observe calmly (Lěngjìng guānchá/冷静观察); (2) Secure our position (Zhànwěn jiǎogēn/站稳脚跟); (3) Cope with affairs calmly (Chénzhuó yìngfù*/沉着应付); (4) Hide our capacities and Bide our time (Tǎoguāng yǎnghuī/韬光养晦); (5) Be good at maintaining a low profile (Shànyú shǒuzhuō/善于守拙); and (6) Never claim leadership (Juébù dāngtóu/绝不当头). (Later, the phrase was added to make a “28-character strategy”) (7) Make some contributions (Yǒusuǒ zuòwéi/有所作为); 冷静观察，站稳脚跟，沉着应付，韬光养晦，善于守拙，绝不当头，有所作为}]. [p. 143]</p> <p>*Extrapolating only slightly from Deng’s formulation, I would suggest that China’s post-Cold War strategy for dealing with the United States, and with the outside world more generally, can be summed up in the following three axioms: “Avoid confrontation” “Build comprehensive national power” “Advance incrementally” [p. 144]</p> <p>VI-2. “Avoid Confrontation”</p> <p>VI-3. “Build Comprehensive National Power”</p> <p>VI-4. “Advance Incrementally”</p>
VII	<p><b>“To Win without Fighting”</b></p> <p>VII-1. What Does “China Want?”</p> <p>*China is not just any rising power, and its unique history provides an additional reason for believing that it will seek some form of regional preponderance. [p. 158]</p> <p>*To sum up: China’s current rulers do not seek preponderance solely because they are the leaders of a rising great power or simply because they are Chinese. Their desire for dominance and control is in large measure a by-product of the type of political system over which they preside. [pp. 162-163]</p> <p>VII-2. Making the World Safe for Authoritarianism</p> <p>*It was the party, after all, that rescued China from foreign invaders, delivered it from a century of oppression and humiliation, and lifted it back into the ranks of the world’s great powers. In the eyes of its leaders, and some portion of the Chinese people, these accomplishments in themselves give the party unique moral authority and legitimize its rule. [p. 160]</p> <p>VII-3. Establishing a “Favorable Peripheral Environment”</p> <p>*The disposition of its “peripheral environment” is thus a matter of the utmost significance, and America’s continued presence there remains a serious threat to Chinese security. . . . If China is to secure its life zone, it must reduce America’s presence and influence there, and ensure that no other hostile power takes its place. [p. 164]</p> <p>*The key issue that will have to be addressed at some point is the question of America’s continuing role in East Asia. [p. 165]</p> <p>VII-4. “To Win Without Fighting Is the Highest Form of Excellence”</p> <p>*China seeks to displace the United States as the dominant player in East Asia, and perhaps to extrude it from the region altogether, while at the same time avoiding a potentially disastrous direct confrontation. [p. 166]</p> <p>*Here, since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has been trying to find the right mix of threats and inducements to weaken the foundations of the</p>

	<p>American regional alliance system. [p. 167]  VII-4-(a) Preserving good relations with Washington  VII-4-(b) Building alternative architectures  VII-4-(c) Preserving a “stable strategic rear area”  VII-4-(d) Securing the maritime domain  VII-5. The Meaning of “Victory”  *In keeping with their inclination to discuss trends rather than goals, Chinese analysts do not describe a future “end state” for East Asia. Still, recent commentary hints at two possibilities. Using the language of Western political scientists and game theorists, some writers discuss the prospect of achieving a “non-zero-sum” relationship in which America and China are able to cooperate, to varying degrees, on different issues and in different areas. {67: Da Wei/Dá Wēi (达巍) and Wang Wenfeng/Wáng Wénfēng (王文峰), “Quánqiú Fǎnkǒng Zhànzhēng yǔ Měiguó duìHuá Zhànlüè Guānzhù [Paying attention to global war on terror, US Strategy toward China/全球反恐战争与美国对华战略关注],” <i>Xiandai Guoji Guanxi/Xiàndài Guójì Guānxì</i> [Contemporary International Relations/现代国际关系] No.1 (January 2008), pp. 39-43.} [pp. 180-181]  *The other image is starker. Conservative writer Yan Xuetong argues that China will emerge eventually at the center of a new regional order in which all the other nations of East Asia will have no choice but to accept its leadership. Japan might wish to remain outside this new order, but “over time the Chinese club will be so powerful that Japan will want to join it.” {68: Yan Xuetong/Yán Xuétōng (阎学通), quoted in Mark Leonard, <i>What Does China Think</i>, New York: PublicAffairs, 2008, p. 113, (Mǎkè•Láingnàdé/马克•莱昂纳德, <i>Zhōngguó Zěnmě Xiǎng?</i> /«中国怎么想?») } [p. 181]</p>
VIII	<p><b>The Balance of Influence</b>  VIII-1. Who Is Winning the “Contest for Supremacy”?  *China and America are locked in a multifaceted competition to determine which will be the preponderant power in East Asia. [p. 182]  VIII-2. Who Is “Shaping” Whom?  *At its core, the Sino-American competition is a mind game. Each contestant seeks via various channels to influence the other’s perceptions and calculations, and through them its strategies and goals. [p. 183]  VIII-3. Is America “Taming” China?  *China’s leaders were ultimately able to have their cake and eat it too. [p. 191]  VIII-4. Is China “Lulling” America?  *China’s rulers have been in the business of “perception management” for millennia. Over the centuries, these efforts were generally aimed at convincing other governments of China’s awesome power and importance. [p. 194]  *In contrast to the past, this is no longer merely a matter of shaping the perception of a handful of diplomats. [p. 194]  VIII-5. Balancing or “Bandwagoning”?  *Thus in Europe the balancing of power with power was long thought to be “natural and desirable,” internationally as well as domestically. {48} [p. 203]  *In large parts of Asia, by contrast, where authority continued until the modern era to be concentrated in the hands of omnipotent rulers, hierarchy was seen as appropriate and normal. [p. 202]  *The nations of Asia will choose eventually to follow the lead of a rising China, “bandwagoning” with it, in the language of contemporary Western international relations theory, rather than trying to balance against it. [p. 204]  VIII-6. The Diplomatic Balance Sheet  *To sum up: China’s efforts to weaken U.S. alliances have thus far met with only limited success. [p. 213]  *Looking to the future, the willingness of America’s friends and allies in Asia to continue working with it will depend, in some measure, on their reading of its capabilities and intentions. [p. 213]</p>
IX	<p><b>The Balance of Power</b>  IX-1. The “Hard Power” Rivalry  *The enormous advantages that the United States now enjoys are the product of its long-standing lead in the development and deployment of new technologies, and the unmatched ability of its huge and dynamic economy to carry the costs of military primacy. Whether it will continue to enjoy these advantages in a long-term strategic rivalry with China is by no means obvious. [p. 215]  IX-2. The Conventional Military Balance: “Power Projection” versus “Anti-Access”  *America’s strategic position in Asia is built on a foundation of military power. [p. 216]  *Given China’s limited ability to project power, virtually the only place where a clash with the United States would have been physically possible at this time was in the immediate vicinity of Taiwan. [p. 217]  *The ability of the United States to sustain its forces in East Asia is heavily dependent on a relative handful of regional bases, most of them on the territory of its allies. [p. 219]  *To sum up: despite their vast cost, past success, and impressive appearance, America’s power projection forces in East Asia are in danger of becoming “wasting assets.” {18: Richard F. Krepinevich Jr., “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” <i>Foreign Affairs</i> vol. 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 18-33.} Unless it is willing to make substantial investments of its own, the United States may soon find that its promises to use conventional force to defend its regional friends lack credibility and its threats have lost their persuasiveness. [p. 224]  IX-3. The Nuclear Balance: Extended Deterrence versus Counter Deterrence  IX-4. Command of the Seas  *[T]he next several decades are going to see an intensifying naval rivalry among the United States, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and perhaps others that will shape the forces and strain the budgets of all who take part in it. [p. 232]  IX-5. The Shrinking Technology Gap  *The ability of the United States to maintain a technological edge over the Soviet Union was a crucial part of its strategy for winning the Cold War. [p. 232]  *Today’s rivalry is already taking a very different course. Instead of widening, the overall gap in technical sophistication between the American and Chinese economies has narrowed considerably since the end of the early 1990s, and it is likely to continue to do so in the years ahead. [p. 233]  *Beijing certainly recognizes the centrality of science and technology to every aspect of its program for building “comprehensive national power.” [p. 233]  IX-6. Resources for the “Long Haul”</p>



X	<p><b>Alternative Strategies</b></p> <p>X-1. "Alternative Chinas"</p> <p>*Prudent planners hope for the best but prepares for the worst. [p. 245]</p> <p>X-1-(a) Weak, unstable China</p> <p>*Since its founding, the PRC has launched surprise attacks on the United States (1950), India (1962), Russia (1969), and Vietnam (1979). {8} As RAND analysts Mark Burles and Abram Shulsky point out, Beijing has been willing to strike first even when the overall balance of military power seemed to be heavily weighted in favor of its opponent. [p. 248]</p> <p>*In the context of today's peacetime competition, Beijing can afford to be cautious and calculating, painstakingly accumulating marginal advantages in the hopes that these will eventually put it in a position to "win without fighting." Under severe duress, however, with its back to the wall, the regime may revert to a very different mode of behavior, one that, while still rational, could be extremely risky. [p. 248]</p> <p>X-1-(b) Strong, democratic China</p> <p>*Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent aggressive form, is one factor likely to play a prominent role in shaping the foreign policy of a democratizing China. [p. 249]</p> <p>X-2. Alternative Strategies</p> <p>X-2-(a) Confrontation and appeasement</p> <p>*A small handful of "realists" do believe that regardless of its domestic politics, a rising China will someday come to blows with the United States. [p. 252]</p> <p>*Their brutal prescription follows directly from this conviction: if a conflict is coming, Washington would be well advised to try to delay or derail China's rise, perhaps even going so far as to trigger a confrontation while the balance of power is still tilted to in its favor. {16: Mearsheimer, <i>Tragedy of Great Power Politics</i>, pp. 399-402.} Fortunately in the real world there is no chance that any American president would follow such advice. [p. 253]</p> <p>*Taking the engagement out of conengagement yields a strategy of pure containment; subtracting containment leaves what can only be called a policy of appeasement. This approach too is premised on the assumption of China's inevitable rise. [p. 253]</p> <p>*Given that America's relative power is waning, advocates of this approach argue that the best outcome that can reasonably be expected is some kind [253-254] of bipolar condominium arrangement under which the two powers agree to jointly manage issues of mutual concern, leaving each dominant in its own sphere of influence. The key question in this case would be where Beijing wished to draw the line and where America's present alliances and positions of strength would fall in relation to it. [pp. 253-254]</p> <p>*Unchecked Chinese domination of East Asia could give it preferred access to, if not full command over, the region's vast industrial, financial, natural, and technological resources. [p. 254]</p> <p>X-2-(b) Enhanced engagement</p> <p>*Eliminating the extremes at either end of the continuum of potential strategies leaves less radical variations on the theme of conengagement. Logically speaking there are two broad alternatives, with many possible permutations of each: either the United States can intensify engagement, while holding steady or cutting back on anything that appears direction, maintaining or partially constricting engagement while stepping up balancing. [p. 255]</p> <p>*The first option, a policy of "enhanced engagement," was essentially the one adopted during the opening years of the Obama administration. Notwithstanding its flaws and potential dangers, and despite its evident failure to induce better behavior from Beijing, this is still the approach favored by many American analysts, academics, and policy makers. [p. 255]</p> <p>*After identifying the inadequacies of this approach, I close in the next, and final, chapter by making the case for an alternative strategy of "better balancing." [p. 255]</p>
XI	<p><b>Can America Keep Its Balance?</b></p> <p>XI-1. Getting Engagement Right</p> <p>*For much of the past century the United States has had the luxury of being able to divide the world nearly into two clear-cut camps. Its most important friends and military allies have tended to be democracies with whom it did the great bulk of its business, while its strategic rivals were authoritarian regimes with whom it talked little and traded less. China has shattered this mold and rearranged the pieces into an unfamiliar and disconcerting pattern: it is neither a friend nor, at this point, an avowed enemy, and despite the repressive character of its government, it is among America's most important commercial partners. [p. 264]</p> <p>*Dealing effectively with this novel and ambiguous situation requires first of all that Washington find accurate and realistic language with which to describe it. This is not as easy it might seem. [p. 264]</p> <p>*Since the days of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, American political leaders, diplomats, and China specialists have been strongly inclined to "accentuate the positive." [p. 264]</p> <p>*Even more important, ceaselessly exaggerating the quality of Sino-American relations can only make it harder for U.S. political leaders to win support for the costly and difficult measures that will be needed to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia. "If things are so good," an astute taxpayer might well ask, "why do we need to spend billions on arms, bases, alliances in the Western Pacific?" Why indeed? [p. 265]</p> <p>*The reluctance of policy makers and pundits to speak ill of China stems, in part, from a fear that doing so will fan the flames of irrational Sinophobia at home and play into the hands of those who, for ideological or other nefarious reasons, seek to derail relations with Beijing. [p. 268]</p> <p>*In the long run, the only way to maintain a technological edge is not by holding others back but by continuing to move forward. . . . The foundations are formed by a first-class educational system, a society open and attractive to talented and ambitious immigrants, and generous public and private support for basic scientific research. Vibrant civilian industries, with ready access to capital, and a tax and legal code that reward innovation provide the scaffolding. A flexible, diverse, and competitive array of defense manufacturers, serving a well-funded and forward-looking defense establishment, complete the structure. [pp. 273-274]</p> <p>XI-2. Preserving a Favorable Balance of Power</p> <p>*Even as it continues to engage China, the United States must work with its friends and allies to maintain a margin of military advantage sufficient to deter attempts at coercion or aggression. Assuming that China's power continues to grow, this will require even greater exertion and closer cooperation in the future than it has in the past. [p. 274]</p> <p>*Once again, it is important to begin with words. In this case, what matters most is not what Washington says, but how it respond to what <i>Beijing</i> [Italics in the original] says. [p. 274]</p> <p>*Beijing will unleash a full-blown influence campaign in which public statements are accompanied by private warnings to both the United States and its local partners. [p. 274]</p> <p>*Eager to sustain the forward momentum of engagement, and hopeful of undercutting Chinese "hard-liners" in imagined internal debates, American policy makers have at times been too quick to take such warnings at face value. This is a serious mistake. If they wish to retain their freedom of action, U.S. officials are going to have to become much more discerning and tough-minded in responding to, and at times simply ignoring, Chinese rhetoric. [pp. 274-275]</p>

- \*Without active cooperation from its regional partners, Washington cannot hope in the long run to balance against a rising China. On the other hand, without strong tokens of its continuing commitment and resolve, America's friends may grow fearful of abandonment, perhaps eventually losing heart and succumbing to the temptations of appeasement. A serious response to China's military buildup is therefore vital both for its own sake and for its potentially spine-stiffening effects on others. [p. 275]
- \*The Pentagon's top priority over the course of the coming decade must be to find cost-effective ways to blunt, counter, sidestep, and defeat the rapidly maturing anti-access/area denial capabilities of the People's Liberation Army. [p. 275]
- \*The effects on political-military decision making of this unusual situation are by no means clear. A healthy degree of uncertainty and doubt on the part of generals and party officials could make both even more reluctant to pull the trigger than they might otherwise be. On the other hand, untested military men of questionable stature may be more prone to displays of overconfidence, and perhaps more reluctant to tell their superiors that despite massive investments over many years, they still lack usable options. For their part, inexperienced political leaders may be more inclined to accept without question the judgment of their military advisors. [p. 276]
- \*China's anti-access strategy depends on its ability to use nonnuclear weapons to strike U.S. and allied forces. [p. 276]
- \*The aspect of America's present position of military advantage that is likely to have the greatest geopolitical payoff in the long run is its command of the global commons and, in particular, of the world's oceans. [p. 279]
- \*Like it or not, in the last thirty years China has become a maritime nation. In contrast to India, Japan, and Australia, however, to say nothing of the United States, it has virtually no experience in building, training, maintaining, or operating a blue water navy. [pp. 279-280]
- \*There is one potential wildcard in the deck that American strategists have only recently begun to ponder. If, in the next few years, Taiwan is absorbed by the mainland, whether through coercion or consent, and if China is able to use the island for military purposes, the naval situation could change to its advantage. [p. 280]
- \*It is these countries that ultimately form the hard core, or rather the sturdy outer rim, of the American position in Asia. Far from being obsolete, the so-called hub-and-spokes arrangement that took shape during the Cold War remains indispensable. [p. 280]
- \*In addition to strengthening bilateral links, the United States must seek to integrate Asia's democracies more closely with one another. . . . Lack of strategic coordination is a luxury that the democracies can no longer afford; if they hope to balance China's growing power, they are going to have to find ways to resolve their differences, pool their resources, and align their policies. {27: The discussion that follows is drawn from Aaron L. Friedberg, "Asia Rising," *American Interest* vol. 4, no. 3 (January/February 2009), pp. 60-61.} [pp. 281-282]
- \*Toward this end, the United States should focus in the near term on promoting communication and cooperation among the various bilateral and "muliti-lateral" groupings that have already sprung up across the region. A logical place to start is by revitalizing the idea of a pan-Asian "quad." The United States is allied to Japan and Australia; Japan and India have begun to consult with one another on naval issues and other sensitive topics, as have India and the United States, Australia and Japan, and India and Australia. It makes perfect sense for the four countries to meet together on occasion to compare notes and share information. Similarly, Washington should do everything in its power to encourage reconciliation and a resolution of recent tensions between Japan and South Korea. [p. 282]
- \*The goal of all this communication and cooperation would be to promote candid discussion among like-minded governments and to set up regular multilateral mechanisms for sharing information, discussing options in various contingencies, and establishing common procedures for communication and possible joint military operations. [pp. 282-283]
- \*America's place as an Asian power rests not only on economic and strategic interests but also on enduring ties of family, faith, and personal experience. . . . For America, continued openness is not only an expression of self-confidence, it is an enduring source of national strength. The surest way for the United States to keep its balance in Asia and in the world is to remain true in its finest traditions. [p. 284]

Source: Quoted by the author from *A Contest for Supremacy*.

## 1-2. The Gist of Friedberg's Argument and Its Implications for Japan's Global Strategies

This section discusses briefly the following issues dealt in Friedberg's book—(1) a pan-Asian "quad," (2) Asia's historical orientation toward bandwagoning, and (3) "enhanced engagement" versus "better balancing."

First, Friedberg suggests America's "better balancing" start with close communication and cooperation among a pan-Asian "quad," i.e., the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. This grouping seems to be rational from an American perspective, but Japan's policy makers and strategists are concerned about the absence of ASEAN as well as China's possible reaction to such grouping. Second, in executing "better balancing," the United States needs its key partners. Thus Japan can play an important role in "better balancing," because Japan has long kept an arm's-length distance from the centuries-long Sinocentric suzerainty relationship in Asia since its founding. However, Japan is now faced with a series of historic crises in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake. Third, to be sure, "enhanced engagement" has been less successful in the sense that it did not induce China's politico-economic liberalization. In other words, "enhanced engagement" might bring about the same results as America adopts an appeasement policy. Yet, "better balancing" requires judicious and well thought-out strategies. To implement such strategies, the United States has to sophisticate its management of its hub-and-spokes and pan-Asian networks simultaneously. But, an ailing America is unable to allocate sufficient resources to better manage such complex foreign policy.


## 2. Japan amidst Intensifying Sino-American Geopolitical Rivalry

After reviewing the argument developed in the book titled *A Contest for Supremacy*, the author tries to briefly touch upon several politico-economic factors that could be examined through the prism of Sino-American rivalry.

### 2.1. China's Geographic Condition and Aggressive Activities of the PLA Navy (PLAN)

Seen from Beijing's viewpoint, China's geographical condition restricts the nautical activities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy or PLAN). PLAN's vessels have to cross straits between Taiwan and Kyushu (such as the Ishigaki and Miyako Straits), between Taiwan and Luzon Island of the Philippines (such as the Bashi Channel and the Luzon Strait), and between Hokkaido and Honshu (the Tsugaru Strait) (see Figure 1).<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 1. PLA Navy (PLAN): Growing Presence in the West Pacific**



Source: National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) (防衛研究所), *East Asian Strategic Review 2011*, May 2011, p. 136

A rising China requires the safety of its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) (hǎishàng jiāotōngxiàn/海上交通线). But, today's Sino-American rivalry has made China unable to expect continued U.S. benevolent safeguarding of Pacific and Indian shipping.<sup>5</sup> Therefore PLAN has to play a larger role in protecting China's SLOCs as well as seabed

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Ye Hailin/Yè Hǎilín (叶海林), "Yìndù yáng yíchéng Zhōngguó 'Míngyùn zhī Hǎi' [The Indian Ocean Has Already Become China's Sea



resources within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (zhuānshǔ jīngjìqū/专属经济区) even by building aircraft carrier squadrons.<sup>6</sup>

## 2.2. Strategic Approach to the Senkaku (尖閣)/Diàoyútái (钓鱼台) Dispute

Although the Senkaku problem has long been discussed since the end of World War II, the dispute has been defused rather peacefully until recently.<sup>7</sup> However, China, having overcome the 2008 global financial crisis, and replaced Japan to become the second largest economy in 2010, now bolsters its self-confidence. Under such circumstances, China's popular nationalism is expected to force the government to take its more assertive attitude toward the Senkaku dispute. Therefore, Japan has to broaden its strategic scope in handling the dispute; instead of focusing narrowly on this bilateral dispute, Japan should try to handle the dispute from a broader perspective. China has territorial disputes with not only Japan but also other countries including Brunei, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Thus, Japan should look to China's peripheral diplomacy (zhōubiānwàijiāo/周边外交) (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. China's Disputed Territories**



**China's Disputed Territories.** This map is an approximate presentation of PRC and other regional claims. China has remained ambiguous on the extent and legal justification for these regional claims. Three of China's major ongoing territorial disputes are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan, the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," August 2011, p. 16.


of Destiny/印度洋已成中国“命运之海”], *Guoji Xianqu Daobao/Guójì Xiānqū Dǎobào* [International Herald Leader/«国际先驱导报»], February 25, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, He, Yu/Hé, Yǔ (何宇), "2011, Zhōngguó Hángmǔ Yuánnián [2011: The First Year for China's Aircraft Carrier Squadrons/2011, 中国航母元年], *Dāngdài Hǎijūn/Dāngdài Hǎijūn* [Modern Navy/«当代海军»], No. 9 (September 2011), pp. 10-13.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Steven R. Weisman, "Tempers Cool in Japan-China Island Dispute," *New York Times*, October 31, 1990, p. 7, and Marcus W. Brauchli, "China Reverses Its Course, Discouraging Demands for Government Action," *Wall Street Journal* (Eastern Edition), September 16, 1996, A14.

Global strategists raise a question that China's anti-access strategies infringe to some extent upon freedom of navigation because of differences in the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).<sup>8</sup> Again, Japan can forge global alliances to overcome this kind of difficulties (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3. China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD; Fǎn Jièrù/Qūyù Fēngsuǒ (反介入/区域封锁) Strategies**



*Conventional Anti-Access Capabilities.* The PLA's conventional forces are currently capable of striking targets well beyond China's immediate periphery. Not included are ranges for naval surface- and sub-surface-based weapons, whose employment at distances from China would be determined by doctrine and the scenario in which they are employed.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), "Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China," August 2011, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) (防衛研究所), "China Security Report [「中国安全保障レポート」/Zhōngguó Ānquán Zhànlüè Bàogào/「中国安全战略报告」], March 2011, p. 20, and Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, "Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China's Exclusive Economic Zone," *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 9-29.

### 2.3. Japan-China Relationship: Security Concerns versus Economic Benefits

Located in the geographical vicinity of China, Japan has no luxury, unlike the United States, to keep a safety distance from a militarily stronger China. For this very reason, Japan has to ponder seriously security strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the same geographical vicinity enables Japan to get easier access to the most buoyant economy in the world, i.e., China's huge labor and consumer markets. Accordingly, Japan has to devise judiciously its strategies to minimize its security concerns and maximize its economic benefits, though it is no easy task to find the optimum solution between these two contradictory but inextricably linked elements. Japan's economy is currently plagued by (1) electricity shortage, (2) a higher yen, (3) a supply chain disruption caused by historic floods in Thailand, (4) as-yet-unsettled global economic institutional arrangements, and (5) feeble demand.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the Chinese market is the *sine qua non* to sustain Japan's economy, which might make Japan extremely susceptible to the lure of China's economy, though such observations have long been pointed out (see Table 2).<sup>10</sup>

**Table 2. Japan's External Transactions by Major Regions (Trillion Yen)**

Current Balance							Financial Account						
	Total	USA	Asia	China*	ASEAN	Europe		Total	USA	Asia	China*	ASEAN	Europe
2005	18.3	11.1	8.5	1.1	1.1	5.4	2005	-13.5	-1.8	-4.2	-0.9	-2.7	0.1
2006	19.8	13.1	9.0	1.8	0.5	7.3	2006	-11.9	-3.2	1.5	2.4	-0.7	-6.7
2007	24.8	13.1	11.7	2.7	1.2	9.2	2007	-22.1	-3.5	-6.6	-2.2	-2.6	8.4
2008	16.4	11.1	10.1	2.3	1.1	9.2	2008	-17.8	-13.3	-4.6	-2.6	-0.4	1.7
2009	13.3	7.0	8.4	2.0	1.3	3.8	2009	-12.2	-3.1	-0.6	-1.5	1.3	10.3
2010	17.2	7.1	13.2	4.0	2.6	4.0	2010	-11.6	-10.8	-7.7	-2.2	-4.6	29.2

Trade Balance							Income Balance						
	Total	USA	Asia	China*	ASEAN	Europe		Total	USA	Asia	China*	ASEAN	Europe
2005	10.3	7.8	7.4	1.1	0.5	3.0	2005	11.4	4.6	1.5	0.4	0.8	2.8
2006	9.5	9.0	7.2	1.5	-0.4	4.1	2006	13.7	5.4	1.8	0.6	0.8	3.6
2007	12.3	8.6	9.6	2.7	0.1	4.9	2007	16.3	5.7	2.2	0.7	1.0	4.7
2008	4.0	6.3	8.8	2.6	-0.3	4.5	2008	15.8	5.8	2.2	0.6	1.1	4.3
2009	4.0	3.4	7.0	2.1	0.3	0.8	2009	12.3	4.4	2.0	0.8	1.0	3.2
2010	8.0	4.6	11.0	3.6	1.1	1.2	2010	11.7	3.3	2.1	0.7	1.2	2.9

Note: Figures for Asia include those of China and ASEAN, and figures for China include those of Hong Kong.

Source: Ministry of Finance (MOF) (財務省).

Under these circumstances, there should be a sophisticated public discussion in Japan among experts who liberate themselves from tunnel vision or “*déformation professionnelle*” as well as well-informed citizens with good sense, in order to reduce the risk of, as Walter Lippmann warned, “a hullabaloo of sophistry, propaganda, special pleading, lobbying, and salesmanship.”<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Jun Kurihara (栗原潤), “Whither Japan: Will Its *Annus Horribilis* Be Coming to An End Soon?: Post-quake Corporate Japan Needs Approaches to Revitalize Its Global Competitiveness,” Tokyo-Cambridge Gazette: Politico-Economic Commentaries No. 8, Tokyo: Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), November 11, 2011.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea U.S. Policy Choices,” RL32882, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), January, 2006; Liu Jianyong/Liú Jiāngyǒng (刘江永), *Zhōngguó yǔ Rìběn: Biànhuà-zhōng de ‘Zhènglǐng Jīngjì’ Guānxì* [China and Japan: A Transition of the ‘Cold Politics and Hot Economics’ Relationship/«中国与日本: 变化中的“政冷经热”关系)], Beijing: Rénmín Chūbǎnshè (人民出版社), 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (later, the title was changed to *The Public Philosophy*), Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955.

### 3. Conclusion

This material has examined Friedberg's argument in his book titled *A Contest for Supremacy*, and discussed its relevance to Japan's global strategies. This concluding part will discuss briefly two additional issues that have not yet been dealt with—(1) Japan's political leadership and (2) Japanese who can communicate with their foreign counterparts at the time of candid discussion over sensitive international issues.

First, the problem of Japan's political leadership. In the final paragraph of his book, Friedberg acknowledges that the United States is an Asian power and states that "For America, continued openness is not only an expression of self-confidence, it is an enduring source of national strength. The surest way for the United States to keep its balance in Asia and in the world is to remain true in its finest traditions."<sup>12</sup> U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gives his judgment with a nod, albeit a slight difference in perspective, in her article in the latest issue of *Foreign Policy* by saying that "One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment . . . in the Asia-Pacific region."<sup>13</sup>

When the United States plays a more active role in securing peace and prosperity in the region and forges a new Asiatic "Quadruple Alliance," it would naturally ask Japan to shoulder more responsibility. The question is whether Japan can be a responsible stakeholder. Japan's domestic politics is in the state of shamble; in 5 consecutive years since 2006, Japan has chosen a new prime minister. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), like its predecessor, i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), provides neither strong political leadership nor adequate solutions timely to Japan's most pressing problems including the nuclear power plant accidents and deplorable fiscal deficit.<sup>14</sup> In this connection, Steven Vogel, a prominent Japanologist of the University of California at Berkeley, provides intriguing observations and judgments. He says that the current alignment of political parties does not represent unequivocal and rational policy cleavages, and therefore Japan requires a party realignment, for example, by "putting one party for market-oriented reforms against another emphasizing the distribution of wealth."<sup>15</sup> He also states that the United States and the world have to "wait for two or more Lower House elections before this competitive dynamic fully kicks in."<sup>16</sup>

Second, the author tries to touch on the deficiency of Japanese who can closely and candidly communicate with their foreign counterparts. In his book, Friedberg emphasizes the importance of "candid discussion among like-minded governments."<sup>17</sup> In addition to discussion among like-minded governments including Japan and the United States, the author tries to stress the importance of candid discussion *with* China. A new Asiatic "Quadruple Alliance" should

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<sup>12</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy*, p. 284.

<sup>13</sup> Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, No.189 (November 2011), p. 57.

<sup>14</sup> As for the DPJ's incompetence at leading adroitly the bureaucracy and demonstrating political leadership, the author identified the DPJ's characteristics as being (1) left-leaning, (2) domestically oriented, and (3) inexperienced, immediately after the DPJ's landslide victory in 2009 when the LDP completely lost the helm of state. See Jun Kurihara (栗原潤), "Japan's General Election: A Political 'Zugzwang'?" *Cambridge Gazette: Politico-Economic Commentaries*, No. 1, Tokyo: Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), August 31, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Steven Vogel, "Japan's Post-Catastrophe Politics," *Current History*, Vol. 110, No. 737 (September 2011), pp. 217-222.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>17</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283.



communicate closely with, and also seek every possibility to cooperate with China. Without an accurate understanding of China, judgment made by leaders and strategists of the “Quadruple Alliance” might be trapped within ignorance and misperceptions regarding China’s thought and action. For this reason, the author looks now to an indispensable role of confidence building measures (CBMs) especially on a military-to-military base.<sup>18</sup>

When it comes to communication among global leaders, U.S. top-tier institutions of higher learning can play an important role by attracting the best cream of the world including China.<sup>19</sup> In other words, the United States provides, in the form of public goods, opportunities to discuss candidly (and sometimes publicly) *with* smart Chinese who might be tomorrow’s leaders of the country. Harvard University, for example, accepts a growing number of excellent Chinese and provides various channels to discuss candidly sensitive international issues (see Table 3). Accordingly, collective leadership formed principally by U.S.-educated people can change the future of the Asia-Pacific region as we have learned from history—During the Russo-Japanese War, America’s successful intermediation toward the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was elaborately accomplished by a Harvard old-school tile between Kentaro Kaneko (金子堅太郎) and President Theodore Roosevelt (TR).<sup>20</sup> During World War II, China, in order to fight against a militarist Japan, could mobilize U.S. popular support thanks to its relationship with the Harvard-Wellesley community (Madame Chiang Kai-shek (宋美齡) and his brother, T.V. Soong (宋子文), were graduates of Wellesley and Harvard respectively).<sup>21</sup>

**Table 3. Number of Foreign Students Studying at Harvard by Major Countries (Persons)**

Year	1991	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Japan	179	179	173	148	151	158	162	134	127	137	135	130	127	107	101	100	94
China	220	178	165	176	227	270	318	337	354	361	378	403	400	421	463	541	582
Canada	348	375	361	401	419	434	464	492	444	467	481	471	489	531	538	541	547
South Korea	137	159	174	180	183	213	212	207	191	218	244	269	297	305	314	304	289
India	98	104	97	89	96	104	120	112	133	167	189	193	216	225	235	231	225
UK	149	127	118	109	133	158	156	174	180	191	177	194	201	209	227	242	211
Germany	105	107	112	103	123	120	118	124	132	137	159	149	158	159	159	199	176
Singapore	34	43	51	58	58	56	61	66	59	67	75	71	66	89	114	133	127
Australia	52	57	54	50	53	61	73	66	70	67	82	68	67	78	88	98	94

Source: Harvard International Office (HIO).

Table 3 shows that only Japan has experienced a continued decline in the number of students studying at Harvard while the opposite pattern has been prevalent in other countries including the two other countries (India and Australia) of the “Quadruple Alliance.” In this sense, the author is concerned about the deficiency of Japanese leaders in the global politico-economic arena, though the number of leaders itself does not necessarily matters.

<sup>18</sup> Toshimichi Nagaiwa (永岩俊道) and Jun Kurihara (栗原潤), “Japan-China Military Confidence Building Measures (Part I)—History, Politico-Economic Environment, and Evaluation—,” *Cambridge Gazette: Politico-Economic Commentaries*, No. 7, Tokyo: Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), October 11, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Now, 46 current and 165 former heads of government are products of U.S. higher education. See, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2011, p. 95.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Masayoshi Matsumura (松村正義), *Nichiro Senso to Kaneko Kentaro* [Baron Kaneko and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05): A Study in the Public Diplomacy of Japan/ 『日露戦争と金子堅太郎』], Tokyo: Yushindo (新有堂), 1987 (English translation by Ian Ruxton, Lulu, 2009).

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## APPENDIX 2: A 2008 Article that refers briefly to Friedberg's 2000 Article "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?"

## GLOBAL

## ROUND 4

## 知的格闘技のすすめ

21世紀の  
ナショナリズム再考

栗原 潤

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悲願の五輪開催で中国は様々な意味で「世界の中の中国」を体感した。昨年まで米国家安全保障会議（NSC）で活躍したウィクター・チャ氏は本学を訪れ、北京五輪と国際政治との関係を英国作家ジョージ・オーウェルの有名な小論「スポーツ精神」を引用しつつ語った——「国際スポーツ競技は『模擬戦争』となる。また国際競技は競技者よりも観衆の心の中にナショナリズムを生む」と。確かに、グローバル化が進展するなか、ナショナリズムをどう扱うかは我々現代人が抱える課題の一つだ。この問題に関し、この夏ボストンで開催された米政治学会（APSA）の年次総会に出席した多くの友人と面談する機会を得た。APSA発行の専門誌は専門家必読の雑誌だが、それに加えて英国雑誌「サヴァイヴアル（Survival）」も忘れてはならず、国際政治学者ナイ教授は米国のリーダーシップ回復に関する処方箋を今春同誌に発表している。またプリンストン大学のフリードバーグ教授が以前同誌に発表した論文「欧州の過去はアジアの未来か？」は今尚議論の対象となっている。すなわち、アジアは2度の世界大戦を含め幾多の戦争を回避出来なかった欧州の悲劇的な経験から学べるかどうか、と。

これに関して平和国家を標榜する日本とはいえ傍観する余裕はない。その理由は、①ナショナリズムを強烈に意識し始めた中国が猛烈な勢いで軍の近代化を行なっていること、②エネルギー資源や領土をめぐる

紛争が日本にも関係していること、③日本の民生用ハイテク技術はその優秀な故に軍用に直ちに転用される可能性を秘めていること、以上3点である。

特に③は多国籍企業の活動を考えた時、想像以上に身近な問題だ——日系企業が中国進出先で技術を盗用されないか、また中国資本が日本企業の買収を通じ民生用技術を軍用に転用しないか、と。現に米中間では既にこの問題が先鋭化している。ポールソン米財務長官は米中間投資拡大を唱えているが、資源とハイテクに関し国防総省と中国側、双方の警戒感の高まりはここハーバードにおいても肌で感じられる。

国家体制や価値観の違いで  
国際取引は大きく制限される

この難しい分野における最高権威のひとつりが丁度1年前に亡くなった畏友のエドワード・グラハム氏、愛称「モンティ」だ。本学ビジネス・スクール（HBS）出身でシンクタンクPeterson Instituteの研究者だった同氏はロバート・ローレンス教授が大統領経済諮問委員会（CEA）委員を務める間、代理として本校客員教授を務めた経験を持つ。アジアにおける前述の難問——国際的経済活動とナショナリズムの関係——に関し同氏からまだ相当学ぶものがあつたと思うと残念でならない。

国家全体を潤す目的で拡大すべき国際取引ではあっても、国家体制の違いに加え、価値観や前述したナショナリズムによって

国際取引は大きく制限されるのが実情だ。

富士通によるフェアチャイルド社買収問題やソニーのコロナビエ映画買収等で日米関係が緊張した80年代後半、同氏は友人のポール・クルーグマン氏と共に「米国内直接投資」を著して国際取引の重要性を強調し、財務省・国防総省に加えて諸外国の政府・企業に助言を与える人となる。日本語は話せないものの「親日家」のモンティは、寿司、特にウニが大好きで、世界各地でお待ち。片手に一国の安全保障政策と国際取引が両立する諸方策と課題について「個人教授」を受けたことが懐かしい。

昨年春、モンティの同僚、アダム・ボーズン氏と共に或る国際会議で発表した時、「ジュン、秋にモンティの業績を称える会で発表してくれる？」とたずねられた。「勿論、モンティのためなら」が筆者の返答だった——そして昨年9月、その会合は同氏を追悼する会合になってしまった。

司会役のボーズン氏は「昼食はモンティの好きな寿司です。本当に美味しい寿司はジュンだけが知っています」と言ってくれた。が、筆者が知っていたのは、モンティが本当にやさしい人だったということだけだった。そして今も同氏の言葉を思い出している——「どこの国に生まれようと人間は皆同じなんだよ。絶対にそれを忘れてはならないのだよ」と。

（くりはら・じゅん）2003年よりシニア・フェロー。日本で経済産業研究所リエン・オフィサーや関西学院大学客員教授等を兼務。著書に「日本の知識戦略」（慶應義塾大学出版会）がある。