

**Report on the First Session of the PAC Policy Simulation:  
“Crisis in Pakistan”**

August 7, 2009

Foreign Affairs/National Security Group  
The Canon Institute for Global Studies

## Executive Summary

Japan has failed to formulate and execute appropriate foreign and national security policies in a timely fashion. This is because it lacks common medium- and long-term policy visions and proper communication interface between politicians and bureaucracy. In order to ensure that the appropriate foreign and national security policies are established, we believe it necessary to introduce a Japanese version of the political appointee system. “PAC *Dojo*,” the program we have launched for Political Appointee Candidates (PACs), who were solicited and selected by us, is designed to train them intensively in policy simulations (in which PACs are required to play a role in policy-making in scenarios drawn up to be as close to the actual policy-making processes as possible) in order to develop them into full-fledged candidates for political appointments.

On July 4-5, 2009, the Canon Institute for Global Studies held the first session of policy simulation. The theme set for the first simulation was “Crisis in Pakistan.” While the simulation program is intended primarily to train PACs, it also aims at accumulating possible policy options to be considered by experts that may be useful in potential future crises in the real world. Therefore, the experts who were invited to the first policy simulation included researchers, journalists, and government officials currently in office. Some officials from the National Defense University under the U.S. Department of Defense were also invited to the session, and approximately 60 people in total attended the first policy simulation. About half of the participants were divided into teams that played the simulated roles of the Japanese Prime Minister and his staff, the officials of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and a media organization in Japan. The rest of the participants were allocated the simulated roles of the US President, White House officials, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the governments of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Arab League.

Shortly after 1 p.m. on the first day of the session, the simulation started with the showing of fictional news videos reporting an attempted terrorist attack in the United States using chemical substances, a military coup in Pakistan, and the unaccounted-for disappearance of nuclear weapons. After the videos, the teams held consultations and negotiations with each other. Starting at around 7 p.m., a simulated meeting of the United Nations Security Council chaired by Japan was called. Although the participants continued discussions till late into the night, they failed to reach an agreement on the proposed resolution. The following morning, a simulated debate between the leaders of the Japanese ruling and opposition parties was held, with a focus on the government’s response to the “crisis in Pakistan.” After completion of all simulation activities, all attendants reviewed the overall process of the first policy simulation.

The first policy simulation allowed us to train the PACs in a close-to-reality political environment. In addition, many foreign policy options that could be pursued by Japan were suggested in the simulation.

First, we were able to consider possible measures that the Japanese government could take (or would not likely take) if an event were to happen in Pakistan resulting in the disappearance of nuclear weapons. Policy options taken by the Japanese government in the simulation were (i) grant aid for the prevention of nuclear proliferation, (ii) a government aircraft being sent to rescue Japanese nationals in the troubled areas, (iii) non-proliferation experts and civilian police officers being dispatched to Pakistan and surrounding countries, (iv) maritime inspections, and (v) efforts to form an international opinion that could contribute to solving the crisis. The policy options that were considered but not adopted by the Japanese government in the simulation included (i) joint maritime inspections with the United States, (ii) dispatch of a medical team comprised mainly of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces personnel and (iii) dispatch of troops of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force.

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Second, it became clear in the simulation, foreign policy options that could be taken by Japan are significantly limited due to the institutional and organizational constraints and absence of national strategy. More specifically, we learned the following lessons from the simulation: (i) that diplomatic activities carried out by the Japanese government contributed little to limiting the impact of the crisis and restoring the regional order because such activities did not properly address the international situations, but rather were planned and executed with a priority on domestic appreciation (or appreciation within the policymakers' own organizations); (ii) that the Japanese government's decision-making process was very slow because policymakers consumed much time ensuring that the planned foreign policy actions met domestic legal and institutional requirements and coordinating the relevant parties' interests; and (iii) that the Japanese government's diplomatic policy efforts and activities were less visible to the eyes of the international community than other countries' activities.

After the simulation, a review was also done among the PAC members. It was noted that they had learned many lessons about the political appointees who are expected to act as an interface between politics and administration. The observations they made included: (i) that applying the demerit system to performance assessment discourages administrative organizations from working in an effective manner; (ii) that the international community judges Japan not on the basis of what it says, but what it does; (iii) that it is essential to read the mood of the international community; (iv) that there is room for Japan to take advantage of its neutral position; (v) that it is important for Japan to know itself (and the limits of its own power); and (vi) that leadership by politicians can be established only as a result of serious and constructive discussions among fellow politicians.

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## **Background to the Launch of the PAC DOJO Program for Prospective Foreign and National Security Staff**

In June 2009, the Foreign Affairs and National Security Group of the Canon Institute for Global Studies launched the PAC *Dojo* program, which provides a forum to train people to become policy experts in the field of foreign affairs and national security. PAC stands for Political Appointee Candidates.

It is an actual situation in Japan where politicians have been escaping from making difficult political decisions and focusing on bureaucracy-bashing while government officials have shied away from working with politicians and given up formulating policies. This is because there is no proper communication interface between politicians and government officials. As a result, Japan has failed to formulate and implement appropriate policies in a timely fashion.

We believe that now is the time to introduce a Japanese version of the political appointee system in order to ensure that appropriate foreign and national security policies are formulated and implemented in accordance with Japan's national interests.

Preparing for the day when the political appointee system may be introduced in Japan, we select some 10 people through public solicitation and train them intensively in policy simulation sessions (in which PACs are required to play a role for policy-making in scenarios as close to actual policy-making processes as possible). Training period will be about two years targeting to develop them as full-fledged candidates for political appointments at the end of the period. Eleven people have already joined the PAC *Dojo* after being selected through the first PAC solicitation from among a pool of applicants with a diverse range of backgrounds, from business people to academicians and think tank experts.

Policy simulation serves as a forum for PAC *Dojo* training. The first session of policy simulation, which was held on July 4-5, 2009 at a Canon training facility in Tokyo, centered on the response to a hypothetical crisis in Pakistan. This simulation was conducted under the "Chatham House Rule," which provides full anonymity to participants. We plan to hold similar simulation sessions four times every year.

Of course, this is no guarantee that the political appointee system will be introduced or become entrenched in Japan. However, we have fortunately obtained support from our friends at the National Defense University under the U.S. Department of Defense. We welcome people with a daring spirit to join this program.

We would like to remind you that the PAC *Dojo* program does not aim to challenge or replace the bureaucracy.

The objective of political appointees and PACs should be to act as a communication interface between politicians and civil servants and, when necessary, take responsibility for the consequences of policy implementation together with politicians. In other words, their objective should be to revitalize the essential functions of bureaucracy, formulating and implementing policies, by freeing civil servants from the burden of taking political responsibility.

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## 2. Overview of the First Session of the PAC Policy Simulation: “Crisis in Pakistan”

### (1) Overview of the First Session of the PAC Policy Simulation

Date: July 4 (Saturday) and July 5 (Sunday), 2009

Theme : Crisis in Pakistan

Sponsor: The Canon Institute for Global Studies

Simulation Controller: Kunihiko Miyake (Research Director, Foreign Affairs and National Security Group, the Canon Institute for Global Studies)

Approximately 60 participants, including officials invited from the National Defense University under the U.S. Department of Defense as well as PACs, Japanese researchers, journalists, and government officials currently in office were divided into the following teams and engaged in the policy simulation.

- \*Japanese Prime Minister and his staff (Prime Minister and secretaries responsible for political affairs)
- \*Japanese Cabinet Secretariat (Cabinet secretaries responsible for political and administrative affairs)
- \*Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minister of Foreign Affairs and relevant directors-general and directors)
- \*Japanese Ministry of Defense (Minister of Defense, secretary to the Minister, relevant directors-general and directors and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff of the Self-Defense Forces)
- \*U.S. President and the White House (President, a national security advisor, a special national security advisor and a relevant NSC [National Security Council] senior director)
- \*U.S. Department of State (Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State)
- \*U.S. Department of Defense (Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- \*China (General Secretary of the Communist Party, Premier of the State Council, and Director of the International Department of the Communist Party)
- \*Russia (President, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister)
- \*India (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister)
- \*Pakistan (President, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and Director of the Inter-Services Intelligence)
- \*Iran (Supreme Leader, President, and commander of the Revolutionary Guards)
- \*Arab League (Representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and Secretary-General)
- \*Media (Chief editor [concurrently playing the role of opposition leader], chief of the political news desk and two senior reporters)

### Program of the Policy Simulation

**July 4 (Saturday)** 13:30 The simulation starts. After a screening of two fictional news videos related to the crisis in Pakistan, teams hold consultations and negotiations with each other.

15:00 The countries involved hold press conferences.

19:00 A meeting of the United Nations Security Council is convened.

21:00 After a short break, the simulation resumes.

00:45 The first day ends without agreement on the proposed Security Council resolution.

**July 5 (Sunday)** 08:30 The second day of the simulation starts.

09:10 The leaders of the Japanese ruling and opposition parties hold a debate, after which the House of Representatives is dissolved for a general election.

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09:40 The simulation is concluded, followed by a review.  
11:00 Participants depart.

## **(2) Scenarios and Assumptions in the First Session of the PAC Policy Simulation**

\*Specific assumptions are described in the appendix.

\*Shortly before 8 p.m. on July 3, 201X, U.S. Eastern Time (shortly before 9 a.m. July 4, Japan Time), a large van apparently loaded with massive explosives attempted to ram into the arena of a multi-purpose facility in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. Security guards fired gunshots at the van, causing it to roll over and preventing an explosion. Liquids with an unusual odor leaked from the van, and local police requested the mobilization of the anti-chemical terrorism unit.

\*At around 2:30 a.m. on July 5, 201X, Pakistan Time (around 6:30 a.m. on July 5, Japan Time), Pakistani President Khan was shot to death by an armed group while asleep at the presidential residence. Several cabinet members were taken captive and are being held at an unknown location.

\*At 3:36 a.m., in a statement issued through the Pakistani state-run broadcaster, the deputy chief of staff of the Pakistani army, an aide to former President Musharraf, declared that he and his followers would keep the country under their control until a government that reflects the will of the people is formed. According to some sources, the group that staged the coup included dozens of senior military officers with close ties to a radical Islamic faction.

\*There is an unconfirmed report that some nuclear weapons have gone missing from the arsenals of the Pakistani military near the border with Afghanistan.

\* Osama bin Laden has declared that he has possession of the nuclear weapons that have reportedly gone missing and has announced plans to launch a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies.

\*It was confirmed that a ship suspected of carrying nuclear materials has left a Pakistani port and is sailing westward in the Indian Ocean.

### **【Viewpoints and Major Issues】**

#### **Pakistani Government's Legitimacy and Response to the Coup**

How should the coup involving the assassination of the President and the kidnapping of cabinet members by a group of Pakistani army officers and their exercise of control be analyzed and dealt with?

\*What should be done with the military campaign being carried out by the U.S. military on the Pakistani-Afghan border region (FATA region)?

#### **Response to the Disappearance of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan**

\*What could happen following the disappearance of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the Pakistani military?

\*What measures should be taken to deal with the possibility of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear materials being smuggled out of Pakistan by ship?

### **3. Overview of the Program of the First Session of the PAC Policy Simulation (team-by-team basis)**

(The following are the key points of policy objectives set, measures taken by each country, and the level of achievement as sorted out on the basis of a review by PAC members.)

#### **Team Japan**

The Prime Minister set forth the broad principle of implementing policies in a way that ensures that Japan's thinking and actions are visible to the eyes of the international community. Accordingly, Japan formulated policies with a priority first on securing the safety of Japanese nationals and second on making significant contributions that would be appreciated by the international community. As the chair of the Security Council, Japan aimed to quickly call a meeting of the council. However, as it focused too much on working out proposals that would demonstrate its own diplomatic clout, Japan failed to call the meeting in a timely fashion. Unexpectedly, the United States rejected Japan's proposal for Japan-U.S. joint maritime inspections, which the Japanese government regarded as the centerpiece of its response to the crisis.

Finally, Japan adopted the following policy options on its own: (i) the provision of a grant aid for the prevention of nuclear proliferation (economic assistance to help Afghanistan and India strengthen border controls), (ii) the provision of equipment to support the prevention of nuclear proliferation (for India), (iii) the dispatch of non-proliferation experts and civilian police officers to Pakistan and surrounding countries (based on the Peacekeeping Operations Act), (iv) the continuation and expansion of its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to support military operations, and (v) dispatch of government aircraft to India to evacuate Japanese nationals from trouble spots. After the Security Council meeting was called, Japan drafted a proposal for a resolution based on a U.S. proposal and engaged in coordination with other Security Council members. Although the draft resolution was voted down, the Japanese government exerted its initiative in enacting legislation to provide for maritime inspections and sent escort and refueling ships and patrol aircraft to trouble spots.

#### **Team U.S.**

At a meeting with his staff, the President set the broad principle of avoiding hasty policy decisions and examining the situation closely. The United States formulated policies with a priority on (i) bringing the situation under control, (ii) allaying the worries of neighboring countries, and (iii) promoting multilateral efforts to deal with the smuggling of nuclear weapons by ship (adoption of a Security Council resolution). As for (i) and (ii), diplomacy with Pakistan and India produced positive results. However, no significant results were achieved with regard to (iii), as different branches of the administration conducted diplomacy with Russia and China through different channels. The President also met with the leaders of other countries to discuss the crisis, although the meetings were not quite timely.

As the President placed a priority on diplomacy, and the U.S. administration, particularly the Department of State, actively promoted information-sharing with other countries. However, U.S. policy makers rejected the Department of Defense's proposal for the deployment of U.S. patrol ships and a proposal for joint maritime inspections made by Japan and India. As the National Security Council and the Department of State gradually took over the central role in policy coordination and formulation within the U.S. administration, feelings of isolation and discontent grew at the Department of Defense. As a result, it became difficult for the various branches of the administration to make coordination with each other on policy as the crisis played out, and intra-administration friction grew so much at one time as to fuel fears that the Pentagon could refuse to cooperate if a military option became necessary. In the meantime, in the run-up to the Security Council meeting, the U.S. administration played the central role in multilateral diplomacy, holding backroom negotiations to win council members over to the proposed Security Council resolution in support of Japan, the chair of the council.

### **Team India**

In its diplomacy, India sought to avoid provoking Pakistan and reacting to provocation and deployed troops on the quiet in preparation for a possible emergency. In line with this policy, India strived to identify the new Pakistani government's stance toward India and maintained cooperation with other countries while refraining from strongly condemning Pakistan. At the same time, India closed its border with Pakistan and reinforced troops deployed along the border. In particular, India made it clear that it would (i) try to avert the escalation of military tensions with Pakistan, (ii) refrain from launching a pre-emptive attack, (iii) seek to resolve the crisis under the framework of multilateral cooperation, and (iv) check the credibility of the reported disappearance of nuclear weapons. In addition, it asked the United States and Japan to send ships equipped with the AEGIS missile defense system and expressed its sense of crisis by using the mass media as an informational outlet.

### **Team Iran**

While Iran aimed to (i) maintain territorial integrity and national security, (ii) keep political order in the surrounding region, and (iii) prevent the establishment of order in the region under U.S. leadership as its policy objectives, it accepted that it might have to tolerate U.S. intervention in the crisis, depending on how the new Pakistani government moved. However, Iran eventually came to the conclusion that the new Pakistani government was not hostile to it and took actions to prevent the establishment of order in the region under U.S. leadership.

The actions taken by Iran included (i) disseminating information concerning military drills conducted in inland areas and in the Persian Gulf in order to maintain domestic stability, including in the border region, and (ii) using the framework of multilateral negotiations involving Pakistan and the neighboring countries so as to restore order to the surrounding region and maintain stability. As part of this effort, Iran tried to convince Russia, China, and India, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that order should be restored under the leadership of the countries with interests in the region. Iran also held a trilateral summit meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan and pledged to support efforts to restore order to the region. Moreover, the lines of communication opened between the chief commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and the director of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. After the U.N. Security Council meeting was convened, Iran devoted its efforts to preventing the implementation of maritime inspections based on Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.

### **Team Russia**

Russia focused on demonstrating its presence by taking diplomatic actions within the multilateral framework only when asked to act by other countries, as the crisis in Pakistan did not pose any immediate, direct threat to its own national security. However, in anticipation of a possible attempt by a radical group to smuggle nuclear weapons into the CIS region, Russia reinforced its defense and controls along the borders of the region so that it could launch a precision attack on incoming nuclear smugglers. Although it indicated a willingness to support a proposed resolution drafted by Japan, Russia flaunted its presence by eventually using its veto at the Security Council meeting to kill the resolution on the grounds that the debate on the legitimacy of the new Pakistani government had not been exhausted.

### **Team China**

China adopted the primary principles of (i) securing an international environment favorable for economic development and (ii) maintaining territorial integrity and domestic order. Based on these principles, China set the policy objectives of (i) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons from Pakistan, (ii) maintaining good relations with the United States and Japan, and (iii) heading off any influence of the crisis on pro-independence Uyghur elements in China. The actions taken by China include (i) calling for the prevention of nuclear proliferation by using its friendly ties with the Pakistani military junta as leverage (holding meetings between top leaders and foreign ministers from China and Pakistan and engaging in backroom negotiations about the proposed Security Council resolution), (ii) sending a

friendly signal to the United States and Japan (welcoming a visit to China by the Japanese Prime Minister and swiftly condemning the attempted terrorist attack in the United States), and (iii) preventing the crisis in Pakistan from affecting pro-independence Uyghur elements (carrying out a large-scale military drill).

#### **Team Arab League**

The Arab League placed top priority on avoiding being associated with Pakistani terrorists and pledged its maximum possible cooperation with the countries concerned. In addition, it decided to watch the situation from the sidelines as long as it was not directly affected by the crisis in Pakistan. However, frustrated with a lack of improvement in the situation, Saudi Arabia broke ranks with its Arab League partners and conducted negotiations with various countries on its own to pave the way for a meeting of the Security Council. Although the Arab League tried to forge a policy consensus among its members, it failed to form a united front, exposing the limits of its organizational unity.

#### **Team Pakistan**

Pakistan aimed to (i) get the international community to recognize the legitimacy of the new government installed after the coup, (ii) regain control of the reportedly missing nuclear weapons, (iii) restore domestic order, (iv) avoid friction with the neighboring countries, and (v) foster an international environment favorable for Pakistan. As the proposed U.N. Security Council resolution did not suit the national interests of Pakistan, its rejection represented a diplomatic victory for Pakistan.

#### **Media Team** (Japanese newspapers)

News reporters collected information concerning various countries' policy making related to (i) the whereabouts of the missing nuclear weapons, (ii) the protection of Japanese nationals, and (iii) the convening of a Security Council meeting and the contents of a proposed resolution by holding impromptu press conferences, pre-arranged interviews, and surprise attack interviews, and by obtaining leaked information from anonymous sources. Government officials from the United States, Japan, Pakistan, and China were the main targets of the news-gathering activities. As governments themselves were apparently too busy gathering information to proceed with policy-making smoothly, news reporters tried to find clues for the direction of policy making not only by listening to what government officials said but also by paying attention to how they looked and behaved. However, after the Security Council meeting was convened, they found it difficult to narrow down the targets of their news-gathering enough to obtain valuable information.

#### 4. Japan's Response to the "Crisis in Pakistan": Lessons Learned from the Policy Simulation

The latest policy simulation taught us many lessons regarding what policy options the Japanese government could take and what options should be abandoned if the disappearance of nuclear weapons or a similar crisis were to occur. At the same time, the simulation made it clear that the range of policy options that could be taken by Japan in response to an emergency is significantly limited due to the institutional constraints and the country's national strategy. As a result of the simulation, we have found that Japan could take the following options in response to the disappearance of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

##### **[Policy Options Taken in the Simulation]**

**(i) Grant aid for the prevention of nuclear proliferation (economic assistance to help Afghanistan and India strengthen border controls)**

**(ii) Dispatch of government aircraft to India to evacuate Japanese nationals from trouble spots and provision of equipment to support the prevention of nuclear proliferation (for India):** As the situation in Pakistan was unstable, Japan decided to prepare for possible evacuation of Japanese nationals from trouble spots by using an Indian airport as a base of operations. In addition, in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy of incorporating the activities of the Self-Defense Forces into Japan's economic assistance package, Japan used government aircraft intended for the evacuation of Japanese nationals to transport relief supplies.

**(iii) Dispatch of non-proliferation experts and civilian police officers to Pakistan and neighboring countries (based on the Peacekeeping Operations Act; this is the first dispatch of civilian officials in a situation like this)**

**(iv) Maritime inspections:** Concluding that it would be difficult to dispatch ground troops to prevent the missing nuclear weapons from being smuggled out of Pakistan, Japan expanded the scope of the refueling mission that supports warships engaging in the OEF-MIO (Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation) and dispatched additional refueling and escort ships. Under the initiative of the Ministry of Defense, a relevant bill was quickly drafted (legislative bill drafting is one of the strong points of Japan's bureaucracy). However, the smooth enactment of such a bill in the absence of a Security Council resolution that was witnessed in the simulation is somewhat unrealistic (as Japan currently does not have a permanent law that provides for the overseas dispatch of Self-Defense Forces, a delay in the bill-drafting and enactment process could be fatal in a crisis requiring immediate response). The additional ships and aircraft dispatched were one AEGIS escort ship (not equipped with a ballistic missile defense system), one conventional escort ship, one refueling ship and several P-3C patrol aircraft.

**(v) Formation of international opinion:** This was intended to foster an atmosphere that would promote international cooperation to regain control of the missing nuclear weapons. This process will be very important especially when actions, whether they be actions to be taken by Japan alone or multilateral actions, need to be backed by a U.N. resolution. However, in the simulation, international debate grew complicated, leading to constraints on the actions of Japan and the United States (this represented the manifestation of the kind of policy paralysis that NATO feared at the time of the Kosovo war in 1999). As part of the efforts to form international opinion, offering economic assistance may be considered as an option when it is necessary to provide an incentive in order to win the support of the countries concerned.

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### **【Policy Options Considered but Not Adopted in the Simulation】**

**(i) Joint maritime inspections with the United States:** This was a measure intended to seize nuclear weapons being smuggled out of Pakistan by ship. However, if Japan is overly restrictive regarding the scope of its operations or spends too much time on decision-making, the United States may regard Japan as a burdensome partner. In the simulation, the United States indeed declined Japan's offer for cooperation. In light of this, it is necessary in peacetime to prepare for possible joint operations between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military in anticipation of a variety of contingencies and put in place the necessary legal framework.

**(ii) Dispatch of a medical team comprised mainly of Self-Defense Forces personnel:** This is aimed at preparing for possible treatment of exposure to radiation just in case a nuclear attack is carried out. In the simulation, the Ministry of Defense showed reluctance to dispatch Self-Defense Forces personnel for this purpose (either in advance or following a nuclear attack). Japanese policy makers faced a dilemma between the need to secure the safety of Japanese nationals (Self-Defense Forces personnel) and the desire to win the appreciation of the international community. After all, placing priority on the former, the Japanese government decided against dispatching Self-Defense Forces personnel.

**(iii) Activities of the Ground Self-Defense Forces:** This was not implemented due to constitutional constraints.

## 5. Policy Making and Organization: Lessons for PACs

### **Demerit System Discourages the Effective Functioning of Bureaucracy**

The simulation reminded us that the demerit system discourages the effective functioning of bureaucracy. For example, a PAC who played the role of an official of the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that he felt like sitting on his hands until given an instruction from the Prime Minister's staff because he presumed that a proactive move by the Ministry would invite criticism that the Self-Defense Forces were too enthusiastic about going abroad.

However, this PAC also observed that he should have tried to expand the scope of the Self-Defense Forces' activities, for example, by asking the Minister of Defense to recommend to the Prime Minister an alteration of the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. This suggests that if the government had a personnel evaluation system that recognized and rewarded proactive behavior, the bureaucracy may have taken the initiative more effectively.

### **The International Community Evaluates Japan Based Not on What Japan Says but on What It Does**

It is often argued that Japan should strengthen its ability to communicate its views to the rest of the world on the grounds that its weakness in this respect tends to generate misunderstanding about the country. Although this argument is accurate to some degree, what is fundamentally more important is for Japan to focus on winning the appreciation of the international community through its actions.

In the latest simulation, the international community did not have high expectations for Japan's contributions to international crisis management. Other countries expressed harsh views about Japan's response to the crisis, such as:

"We came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to coordinate our policy with Japan in dealing with a crisis."

"While Japan was busy keeping in contact with other countries, it was reluctant to make its own proposals. When Japan did present a proposal, it was too late to be significant in a changed situation."

"Japan's pattern of behavior was so obvious that we did not feel the country was a partner with which to have a relationship of constructive tension."

### **Japan Should Share the International Community's Perspective and Sense of Urgency**

After listening to the opinions of PACs who played the roles of government officials of other countries, a PAC who played the role of an official of Japan's Ministry of Defense commented, "Ah, other countries were following the logic of diplomacy. We were following the logic of domestic considerations." Although the Ministry of Defense considered dispatching a director-general to the United States, it decided against doing so in order to avoid friction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also because of doubt as to the effectiveness of sending an envoy to the United States empty-handed. Describing Japan's behavior, one participant observed, "Japan appeared to be disconnected from the dynamism of diplomacy, with both the media and the negotiators of the country announcing what was already known as if it were a grand proposal."

In a desperate effort to conduct diplomacy in ways to ensure that Japan's thinking and actions are visible to the eyes of the international community, team Japan came up with the list of policy options that can be taken within the existing institutional and legal frameworks and tried to demonstrate to other countries what Japan could do. However, Japan's thinking was detached from the perspective of the international community and the country was too slow in doing what other countries wanted it to do most: to call a meeting of the Security Council. One participant observed that Japan cannot become an important player in the international arena unless it shifts the focus of its thinking from pursuing what it can do to proactively participating in crisis management with the international community.

### **Japan Can Take Advantage of Its Neutral Position**

The lack of a clear foreign policy philosophy or policy objectives may put Japan at a disadvantage in many aspects in the international community. However, it also means that Japan is in a neutral position, and Japan can turn this position to its advantage in conducting diplomacy.

This means that although close policy coordination with the United States is important for Japan, it may also have negative side effects. For example, after the latest simulation, one participant commented, “When we looked at the proposed U.N. resolution presented to us in advance, we found it to be very similar to the U.S. proposal. We had the impression that Japan was thinking that the United States was its only policy coordination partner and that coordinating its policy with the United States would mean winning an international consensus.”

### **Leadership by Politicians Can Be Established Only Through Serious and Constructive Discussions**

While the PAC *Dojo* is a forum for the training of political appointees, the latest simulation made it clear that leadership by politicians can be established only through serious and constructive discussions. PACs offered the following comments regarding their joint activities with civil servants:

“Civil servants are very capable people, and they do their work diligently without prodding from politicians and political appointees.”

“We must consider how we involve ourselves in a process like this and develop our communications and coordination skills so that we can realize what our minister wants to be done (e.g. dispatching Self-Defense Forces troops abroad in the face of opposition from ministry staff).

“I had the impression that unless we are constantly conscious of the exercise of leadership by politicians, bureaucracy-led initiatives tend to become uncontrollable. Although this means Japanese civil servants (or at least those who participated in the simulation) are very active and capable people who can accomplish their tasks quickly, leadership by politicians could vanish if we relax even just a bit.”

As political appointees are “outsiders” in most cases, they are likely to find it difficult to keep up with the fast pace of the workings of the bureaucratic machinery. In future PAC *Dojo* trainings, we hope to continue providing PACs with an opportunity to learn how to engage in serious and constructive discussions with politicians and civil servants.

## **Appendix: Assumptions in First Session of PAC Policy Simulation**

### **News Video 1: Attempted Terrorist Attack in Pittsburg**

#### **Overview of Attempted Terrorist Attack in Pittsburg**

\*Shortly before 8 p.m. on July 3, 201X, U.S. Eastern Time (shortly before 9 a.m. July 4, Japan Time), a large van apparently loaded with massive explosives attempted to ram into the arena of a multi-purpose facility in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. Security guards fired gunshots at the van, causing it to roll over and preventing an explosion. Liquids with an unusual odor leaked from the van, and local police requested the deployment of the anti-chemical terrorism unit.

#### **U.S. Administration's Response**

\* The U.S. Administration, under President Olson, launched an investigation into the possibility of involvement by an international terrorist group. Before the incident, the United States had begun a large-scale military campaign in the Pakistani-Afghan border region, known as Federally Administrated Tribal Area, FATA, on July 1. In response to the military campaign, a man claiming to be a member of al-Qaeda issued a statement expressing the terrorist group's resolve to retaliate against any U.S. attack on its allies. Therefore, some within the U.S. administration suspected that the incident may have come about in retaliation to the U.S. military campaign in the border region.

#### **Situation in Pakistan**

\*The U.S. administration has urged the Pakistani government, under President Khan, to strengthen the crackdown on pro-al-Qaeda elements. However, as factions sympathetic to radical Islamic groups was growing within the Pakistani military and security forces, the Pakistani government was unable to enforce a thorough crackdown on pro-al-Qaeda elements. In the meantime, the Pakistani government strongly requested the U.S. administration to refrain from engaging in military operations in Pakistan. The U.S. military campaign in the border region was conducted despite this request. In Islamabad, demonstrations erupted sporadically, fueling criticism of the Khan government and threatening to spread nationwide.

\*In Pakistan, there was a conflict between military officers who wanted to preserve an Islamist government and moderate civilians advocating cooperation with the international community and democracy. Although Muhammad Khan, a moderate civilian politician, was elected president in the presidential election held in the previous year, his political skills were untested. Connections with radical Islamic groups spread through the military rapidly.

#### **Situation in Afghanistan**

\*Among citizens in Kabul, resentment against the U.S. military was growing. In the meantime, some within the Afghan government expressed support for the U.S. military attacks on al-Qaeda forces. After the inauguration of new Afghan President Khalizad, no improvement was observed in the central government's ability to maintain domestic control. The reinforcements of the Afghan military and police forces pledged by the new president made no headway and the tribal conflict and the culture of corruption within the government worsened.

#### **Al-Qaeda's Movements**

\*Al-Qaeda had been plotting large-scale operations in the United States over the past several years. Having reorganized itself, al-Qaeda established a new base in the FATA region and was apparently successful in recruiting young people in Pakistan. Although it had not carried out any massive attacks since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda did engage in acts of terrorism on a limited scale.

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## **News Video 2: Coup in Pakistan and Disappearance of Nuclear Weapons**

### **Overview of Military Coup in Pakistan**

\*At around 2:30 a.m. on July 5, 201X, Pakistan Time (around 6:30 a.m. on July 5, Japan Time), Pakistani President Khan was shot to death by an armed group while asleep at the presidential residence. Several cabinet members were kept in custody and were being held at an unknown location.

\*At 3:36 a.m., in a statement issued through the Pakistani state-run broadcaster, the deputy chief of staff of the Pakistani army, an aide to former President Musharraf, declared that he and his followers would govern the country under their control until the formation of the new government. According to some sources, the group that staged the coup included dozens of senior military officers with close ties to radical Islamic factions.

\*There is an unconfirmed report that some nuclear weapons have gone missing from the arsenals of the Pakistani military near the border with Afghanistan.

### **U.S. Administration's Response**

\*The U.S. administration, under President Olson, convened a meeting of the National Security Council at 6:30 p.m. for consultations among the President and the relevant cabinet members. White House Press Secretary Dott issued a statement saying, "We have no intention of endorsing a change of government staged through a coup. We call on Pakistani rebel officers to immediately release the cabinet members they are holding captive, to stop military rule, and to reinstall a democratically-elected civilian government. We also call on the international community to take necessary measures to restore stability to Pakistan."

\* According to a diplomatic source in Washington, the U.S. administration was planning to urge Pakistan to locate the whereabouts of the missing nuclear weapons and, if it was unable to do so on its own, to cooperate with the international community to take the necessary measures.

### **Situation in India**

\*The Indian government, under Prime Minister Hattie, convened an emergency meeting of the cabinet ministers and other relevant senior officials for consultations involving the commanders of the air, ground, and naval forces, as well as the chief of the intelligence agency. The Indian government had grave concerns over destabilization of the political situation in Pakistan and the missing nuclear weapons.

### **Situation in Afghanistan**

\*President Khalizad called off his visit to the United States that was scheduled for the following week. The scenario that the Afghan government appeared to fear most was that Pakistan would fall into a failed state, with the turmoil spreading to Afghanistan.

\*The crisis seemed to make the Afghan government more reluctant to crack down on the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

### **Movements by the Japanese Government**

\*There was a constant stream of officials from the relevant government ministries and agencies going in and out of the Prime Minister's residence. Government officials were increasingly concerned about the missing nuclear weapons.

\*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs effectively urged Japanese nationals staying in Pakistan, totaling around 1,000 people, to leave the country.

### **Assumed International Situation**

**\*The United States will continue to have strong influence on the global political situation as well as on the global military situation as it does now.**

\*The United States will overcome the financial crisis, with its economy on a stable path to recovery.

\*The U.S. military will be deploying 74,150 troops to Afghanistan (up by 17,000 troops from the 2009 level). On the other hand, as it has completed the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the U.S. military will be able to deploy some additional troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2011.

\*The U.S. military will be maintaining its presence in the Asia-Pacific region while strengthening the military function of Guam.

**\*Emerging countries will have an increased influence.**

\*As G-20 summits and BRIC summits are being held frequently, emerging countries will have an increased influence.

\*Although anti-terrorism collaboration will proceed between China and Russia and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, emerging countries will not have the ability to carry out joint military operations outside their own territories.

**\*The EU will have a level of influence on common foreign policy and national security policies that is similar to the current level.**

**\*Crude oil prices (as measured by WTI prices) will stay stable at \$60 to \$70bbl.**

### **\*Other Regional Assumptions**

\***Afghanistan:** The government is pro-U.S. and pro-Pakistan, and the economy is dependent on international economic assistance. The domestic political situation is stable, with no signs of a disintegration of the country occurring anytime soon. The number of troops engaging in the OEF-ISAF operations is increased by 15,000 after 2009 to around 105,000.

\***North Korea:** With no news about Kim Jong Il coming out of North Korea, speculation will arise that the country may have shifted to a collective leadership system controlled by the Workers' Party and the military. North Korea will continue the development of nuclear weapons, improving its uranium-enrichment technology and the performance of its long-range missiles.

### **Individual Countries' Domestic Political Situations and Policies Toward South Asia**

**Japan:** A new coalition government led by the Democratic Party of Japan was inaugurated in 2011. Although the Japanese economy has recovered gradually, the coalition government is essentially fragile, leaving the domestic political situation unstable. While continuing support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Japan has not deployed Self-Defense Forces in either country. Nor has it established permanent legislation that provides for the overseas deployment of Self-Defense Forces.

**United States:** Democratic Party has continued to stay in power succeeding of the Obama administration. After completing the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the U.S. military has concentrated on operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While supporting the civilian government in Pakistan, the United States promoted international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

**China:** The fifth-generation general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party who succeeded Hu Jintao presided over continued strong economic development, with the economic growth continuing at an annual pace of 8-9%. China continues to attach importance to relations with the United States and maintain good relations with Pakistan politically, economically, and militarily. It has also developed its relationship, especially its economic ties, with India.

**Russia:** Vladimir Putin has returned to be President in 2010. The Russian economy has gone through repeated ups and downs after the financial crisis in 2008. Although Russia continued to attach importance to Central and South Asia and strengthen national security cooperation with these regions, the Russian military will lack the ability to deploy massive troops there.

**India:** India continues to enjoy strong economic development. With the ruling coalition led by the Congress Party maintaining a stable majority in parliament, the Indian government pursued the path of moderate reform. The India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement won the support of the public. While the dispute over the Kashmir region will remain unresolved, a major military conflict with Pakistan is unlikely to occur anytime soon.

**Pakistan:** The political situation in Pakistan remains unstable, as the civilian government of the Pakistan People's Party in power at the time of the simulation is fragile. The Pakistani economy remains weak and the unemployment rate stays high. The Pakistani military has succeeded in downsizing nuclear warheads and continue to own approximately 100 of those weapons. Terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic radicals and terrorist groups occur frequently, as such groups continue to operate actively in the western and mountainous parts of the country, FATA, and supporters and sympathizers increase within the military.

**Iran:** Although the national divide arising from the controversy over the 2009 presidential election has grown, hard-line conservative forces remain in power. While oil prices recovered, Iran's economy still suffered from the high inflation and unemployment rates. Despite a limited strike against nuclear facilities by Israel, the Iranian government keeps silence.

**Arab League:** Arab League members are divided over regional issues. The member countries' economies have been back on the path to recovery process. Egypt and Saudi Arabia keep a watchful eye on Iran's nuclear development.

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